Daily Events

Dissertation Committee:

Christian Ochsner, Dr. rer. pol.  (CERGE-EI, chair)

prof. Ing. Štěpán Jurajda, Ph.D., DSc. (CERGE-EI)

Vasily Korovkin, Ph.D. (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Sebastian Ottinger, Ph.D. (CERGE-EI)

Defense Committee:

prof. PhDr. Michal Bauer, Ph.D., DSc. (CERGE-EI, chair)

doc. Nikolas Mittag, Ph.D. (CERGE-EI)

doc. Ing. Josef Montag, Ph.D. (Faculty of Law, Charles University)

Meeting link:

https://cerge-ei.webex.com/cerge-ei/j.php?MTID=m8d7d7e2b2afc42ea31fdddba14debe6e

Meeting number: 2740 605 2456

Meeting password: 628631

Gerhard Toews, Ph.D.

New Economic School, Russia

Abstract: In the late 1960s, Western powers reduced military interventions, weakening international contract enforcement and increasing expropriation risk in developing countries. This led to the emergence of self-enforcing agreements characterized by backloading—delays in production and taxation—and higher government rent-shares. Using oil industry data and a new backloading measure, we find that following this geopolitical shift, production and taxes were delayed by 3–5 years, resulting in annual revenue losses of $1 billion per country. The associated tax income loss for governments was offset by an increased rent-share. U.S. military deployments in the 1980s revived international contract enforcement, reducing backloading and government rent-shares.