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Abstract

How does an episode of forced displacement affect the subjective well-being of victims upon their return? To answer this question, we study the week-long inter-ethnic conflict that occurred in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, using individual survey data for 2006–2019. Our baseline analysis compares conflict-affected displaced individuals with unaffected individuals while controlling for observable characteristics. To address the potential endogeneity of displacement, we complement these estimates with an instrumental-variables strategy based on household-level geographic features, including proximity to conflict-related destruction and the availability of nearby locations suitable for temporary hiding. We also use a difference-in-differences design to trace changes in local subjective well-being over time. Our results show that even short-term displacement is associated with a substantial decline in post-conflict subjective well-being. This negative effect is attenuated among individuals who received support from family and friends during displacement. The effects also vary markedly across dimensions of subjective well-being, with the strongest negative impacts observed for satisfaction with dwelling, health, security, and future prospects. Although the subjective well-being of displaced individuals gradually converges toward that of non-displaced individuals, recovery is slow and takes several years.[1]

Keywords: forced displacement, subjective well-being, inter-ethnic conflict
JEL: D6, I31, O15

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1. Introduction

Inter-ethnic conflict is a persistent feature of the global landscape, often taking localized forms and triggering episodes of forced displacement as households flee targeted violence (Lischer, 2007). Recent episodes in Sri Lanka (2018), Ethiopia (2019), and India (2023) illustrate how quickly such conflicts can escalate and disrupt communities.[2] As forced-displacement crises have become increasingly protracted and associated with long-term displacement (Quinn and Ruiz, 2022; Rozo and Grossman, 2025), less attention has been paid to episodes of temporary displacement followed by relatively rapid return (e.g., Carrozzo, 2025; Khawaja et al., 2011). At the same time, research on ethnic conflict characterizes such violence as sporadic, localized, and low-intensity (Abbs, 2021).

To study the consequences of such episodes, we focus on the 2010 Osh riots in Kyrgyzstan. In June 2010, clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks left 470 people dead, mostly from the Uzbek minority, and displaced roughly 200,000 individuals (Hennicke and Brück, 2022)[3]. Although highly destructive, the conflict was short-lived and lasted only a few weeks. This pattern allowed most displaced people to return home shortly afterward (Akiner, 2016). Drawing on both nationally representative cross-sectional data and individual- and community-level panel data, we provide new evidence on the consequences of short-term forced displacement for returnees.

Figure 1 previews our main empirical findings. Before the conflict, in 2006, average subjective well-being was rather similar in communities from which people would later be displaced and those that never experienced displacement. Immediately after the June 2010 riots, well-being in communities

[2] In early 2018, the death of a Sinhalese truck driver in Sri Lanka triggered a wave of ethno-religious violence, prompting the government to declare a nationwide state of emergency (see Reuters, 2018). In Ethiopia, a series of inter-ethnic conflicts—particularly along the Oromia–Somali border and in Gedeo–West Guji—contributed to a major displacement crisis by March–April 2019, when about 3.1 million people were internally displaced nationwide (see IOM, 2019). In May 2023, escalating tensions between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities in India led to widespread property destruction and the displacement of more than 60,000 individuals (see The New Humanitarian, 2023).

[3] As highlighted by Hager et al. (2019), the June 2010 events in Osh resembled other episodes of sudden, large-scale ethnic rioting, such as the anti-Chinese riots in Kuala Lumpur (1969), the anti-Luba riots in Luluabourg (1959), and the anti-Indian riots in Durban (1949–1953). In all of these cases, brief but extreme eruptions of violence produced substantial losses of life and property, large-scale displacement, and deep psychological trauma, yet were followed by periods of relative political and social stability.

affected by displacement dropped sharply relative to unaffected communities, and this gap remained large and statistically significant in the first post-conflict years. From 2013 onward, the difference gradually narrowed, and by 2016–2019 average well-being in affected and unaffected communities was statistically indistinguishable. The remainder of the paper shows that this aggregate pattern of a large short-run loss followed by slow convergence masks substantial heterogeneity by ethnicity, access to support networks, and subjective well-being domains.

Figure 1: The subjective well-being effects of short-term forced displacement



Note: This figure depicts average subjective well-being (measured on a 1–5 scale) for displaced and non-displaced individuals before and after the displacement, which occurred in June 2010. Estimates are based on community-level means. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, and p-values are from two-sample t-tests of equality of means.

In this study, we interpret the 2010 Osh riots as a sharp, group-specific shock to well-being for ethnically targeted individuals. Kyrgyz crowds mainly attacked Uzbek residents and their homes and businesses, making Uzbeks the group most directly affected by the conflict. The shock was sudden and chaotic, yet short-lived in calendar time, which allows us to trace the immediate impact on subjective well-being. After a traumatic event, however,

a major concern is that victims may be reluctant or unable to reveal accurate economic information due to stress, distrust, or fear of repercussions, making the true economic impact difficult to estimate (Fujii, 2010). Income, assets, or employment status may be strategically understated or overstated, or simply misreported because respondents wish to avoid further exposure and scrutiny. To address this challenge, we focus instead on satisfaction-related questions across multiple aspects of life, which are less sensitive in nature and more directly capture post-trauma well-being. Using nationally representative survey data collected three months after the conflict, we estimate OLS regressions with a rich set of controls, including community-level measures of ethnic conflict exposure, and find that displacement exerts large negative effects on the subjective well-being of returnees compared with non-displaced individuals. These impacts are reflected in lower satisfaction with health, security, housing, and future prospects, and are especially pronounced among displaced Uzbek men and women, consistent with their position as the primary targets of the violence. Conversely, we find that Kyrgyz returnees exhibit levels of well-being similar to those of non-displaced individuals in the communities to which they returned.

Another key feature of the setting motivates our empirical analysis: displaced individuals differed sharply in their access to family and community support. Some displaced individuals were able to stay with relatives or close friends and thus remained embedded in strong informal networks, while others found accommodation without such support and effectively faced displacement in isolation. This heterogeneity in access to informal support is central to our empirical analysis. We find that the short-term negative effects of displacement on subjective well-being are concentrated among displaced Uzbeks who lacked access to friends and family, whereas those staying with relatives or close friends exhibit no statistically detectable decline in well-being. This pattern underscores the buffering role of informal support. Consistent with this interpretation, Hager et al. (2019) show that ethnic riots erode trust and weaken prosocial behavior, thereby reducing access to informal support precisely when it is most needed.

The short-term effects of displacement estimated by OLS regressions may be biased due to non-random selection into displacement status. Households that are displaced can differ systematically from those that are not along both observable and unobservable dimensions (Kondylis, 2010; Shemyakina

and Plagnol, 2013). We address these problems by employing instrumental variable (IV) and difference-in-differences (DD) approaches. Our IV strategy uses distance-based instruments, proxied by proximity to conflict-related destruction and to potential hiding places, to generate exogenous variation in displacement, while our DD approach captures average changes in well-being before and after displacement. The results from both strategies closely mirror our OLS estimates, confirming our main findings. Each method, however, comes with important strengths and limitations. The distance-based IV approach helps mitigate concerns that displacement is correlated with unobserved household characteristics, but its validity depends on the exclusion restrictions and it identifies effects only for households whose displacement status is influenced by geographic factors. The DD design leverages temporal variation and allows us to difference out time-invariant district characteristics, yet it relies on a parallel-trends assumption that cannot be formally tested with only one pre-period. Despite these limitations, the convergence of findings across OLS, IV, and DD specifications increases confidence in our empirical results.

Using a balanced panel covering 2010–2019, we further examine the transitional dynamics of subjective well-being. The average adverse effects persist for several years, with subjective well-being among displaced households converging to the level of non-displaced families only after roughly six years. In the short run, we observe sharp declines across several domains, but perceptions of health and personal security recover relatively quickly, consistent with the restoration of basic services and everyday safety. By contrast, satisfaction with dwelling and with future prospects improves only slowly, reflecting the time it takes to rebuild housing, reestablish livelihoods, and revise expectations about long-term opportunities. The dynamic profiles of trust and institutional confidence display a similar pattern of gradual improvement from a low base. Taken together, these transitional patterns are consistent with a slow restoration of trust and social ties, combined with a temporary period of higher spending as households draw on their own resources to repair damage and rebuild their lives.

Our paper contributes to three strands of literature, with its primary contribution to the literature on the well-being consequences of inter-ethnic conflict (Cordell and Wolff, 2009; Couttenier et al., 2022; Korovkin and Makarin, 2023). First, we study a short but intense episode of inter-ethnic

violence in Kyrgyzstan and provide evidence that the main well-being losses are driven not only by exposure to general conflict but also by displacement. Second, we go beyond average effects and identify the domains of well-being most affected by displacement and how these domains recover. Third, we shed light on the mechanisms behind these patterns by linking recovery to ethnic targeting and networks.

From a broader perspective, our findings can be situated within the emerging evidence on the well-being impact of displacement (Lischer, 2007; Shemyakina, 2011) and on the trajectory of well-being recovery after shocks (Lucas, 2007). Recent work on internally displaced people in Ukraine shows that displaced residents experience substantially lower life satisfaction than nearby non-displaced residents, with these gaps persisting several years after displacement (Perelli-Harris et al., 2024). Our immediate OLS estimates for displaced Uzbeks without support from family or friends point to a similarly sizeable decline in well-being in the short run, but in our case the dynamic specifications indicate that these losses gradually fade and eventually become statistically indistinguishable from zero. At the same time, our setting more closely resembles a large but mostly temporary displacement shock in which many affected households are able to return to their original communities. In this respect, a Hurricane Katrina study provides a useful benchmark: using panel data on happiness before and after the storm, Calvo et al. (2015) document a clear short-run deterioration in subjective well-being followed by a marked recovery over subsequent years. Taken together, these comparisons suggest that the Osh riots generated a shock of similar qualitative importance to other major displacement episodes, but that the combination of relatively short displacement spells and the possibility of rapid return facilitated faster average adaptation than in many protracted, conflict-induced displacement settings.

Regarding mechanisms, our focus on informal support during displacement is in line with historical work showing that social ties can be crucial under extreme, targeted persecution. Using the 1941 Amsterdam registration records, Tammes (2007) shows that Jews with close ties to non-Jews (for example, through intermarriage) had higher survival odds than those without such links. The interpretation is straightforward: "bridging" ties could help people find hiding places and secure everyday support when formal protections collapsed. More recently, Belin et al. (2023) offer a more

methodologically rigorous analysis using administrative data from Theresienstadt and subsequent deportations. They exploit quasi-random differences in individuals' potential support networks and document that Jewish prisoners with a larger set of pre-existing social ties had higher survival chances. Taken together, these studies point to a mechanism that fits our setting well: when violence and displacement weaken institutions, informal networks can function as insurance. As a result, otherwise similar displaced individuals can follow very different well-being trajectories depending on whether they can rely on pre-existing networks, including friends and family, during the shock.

We also speak to the debate between cumulative causation and hedonic adaptation. Cumulative causation emphasizes the persistent and self-reinforcing negative effects of shocks (Myrdal, 1957), while hedonic adaptation emphasizes individuals' capacity to gradually regain their pre-shock well-being levels (Brickman and Campbell, 1971). Our results suggest that, on average, displaced households do tend to move back towards their previous well-being levels over time, which is more consistent with hedonic adaptation than with cumulative deterioration. At the same time, the recovery is uneven: losses are larger and more persistent for those who lack family or friend support, and domains including trust and expectations recover more slowly than health and personal security. Thus, the aggregate pattern is one of adaptation, but with important and policy-relevant, domain-specific and network-related scars.

Finally, our findings also speak to the broader development challenges of Central Asia. In the spirit of Collier's (2008) conflict trap, we show that even brief episodes of ethnic violence and short-term forced displacement can generate multi-year losses in well-being and expectations among targeted minorities, a channel through which conflict can reinforce persistent underdevelopment in the absence of policy interventions. In particular, our findings naturally translate into several policy implications. First, rapid humanitarian and security interventions appear to be crucial for stabilizing health and personal safety and for preventing a prolonged erosion of trust. Second, housing and economic conditions recover more slowly and require well-targeted reconstruction and financial support: in our data, displaced households finance much of the rebuilding from their own resources, which is reflected in higher expenditures and lower short-run satisfaction with income and work.

Third, expectations about young people's futures remain persistently lower even after average well-being has largely recovered, highlighting the need for sustained policies that promote youth inclusion, reduce discrimination, and expand opportunities for upward mobility in post-conflict settings.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setting. Section 3 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results, including heterogeneity analyses across well-being domains and characteristics of the displaced. Section 5 discusses the average long-term patterns of recovery and the role of post-conflict policies. Section 6 concludes.

2. Setting

Kyrgyzstan's 2010 ethnic conflict did not emerge in a vacuum. Relations between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks have long been shaped by a combination of shared everyday life and recurrent episodes of tension. For centuries, both groups coexisted in Central Asia, engaging in trade, agriculture, and pastoralism across shared borderlands. Although inter-ethnic violence did occur intermittently, day-to-day relations were often pragmatic and cooperative, with both groups benefiting from peace (Rezvani, 2013).

Under Soviet rule, frictions between titular and non-titular groups were contained by centralized control, repression of overt nationalist mobilization, and state-promoted narratives of inter-ethnic friendship. However, the late Soviet period saw a loosening of political constraints. During Perestroika, demands for greater local autonomy in southern Kyrgyzstan provided a platform for Uzbek activists in the ethnically-mixed southern city of Osh and nearby areas to call for their own autonomous region (Hager et al., 2019). These initiatives interacted with disputes over land, housing, and employment. The result was a major outbreak of ethnic violence in June 1990, when clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in and around Osh lasted several days and left deep scars on local inter-ethnic relations.

Following independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan experienced repeated episodes of political contestation and regional tension. Contested parliamentary elections in 2005 triggered a revolution, driven by opposition mobilization and allegations of electoral fraud, that led to the resignation of Kyrgyzstan's

first president. In April 2010, further anti-government protests, triggered by popular discontent over corruption and rising utility prices, culminated in a second revolution and the ousting of the country's second president (Akiner, 2016). These two uprisings in the space of five years created a period of heightened political uncertainty and contributed to the exacerbation of regional and social divides through intensified political polarization.

In June 2010, mounting tensions erupted into widespread ethnic violence in Osh and nearby districts. Confrontations between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks resulted in several hundred fatalities and the displacement of tens of thousands of people, revealing both the fragility of local inter-ethnic relations and the particular exposure of borderland areas with sizable Uzbek communities (see Figures 2a and 2b for an illustration of the setting). Two decades after the Osh clashes of 1990, the country thus experienced another wave of severe ethnic violence, this time unfolding amid a political vacuum created by the president's removal from office.

The events in Osh and its surroundings were triggered by a gambling dispute between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz that escalated in a women's dormitory at a local university. Nationalist mobilization in neighboring villages followed, and several thousand Kyrgyz villagers, many armed, moved toward Osh, attacking Uzbek residents and their properties along the way (Hager et al., 2019). The riots were highly disorderly and largely uncoordinated. During the unrest, which was concentrated in predominantly Uzbek neighborhoods, 2,843 homes and business premises were destroyed, 470 deaths were officially recorded, and around 200,000 people were forced to flee (Hennicke and Brück, 2022; KIC, 2011). Although the large-scale violence ended abruptly, as noted by Akiner (2016), reports of localized clashes, harassment, and physical abuse against Uzbeks persisted in the aftermath.

Most displaced people returned to their original communities in and around Osh within weeks of the riots (Hennicke and Brück, 2022). For many affected households, this period involved moving between formal camps, temporary accommodation with relatives or friends, and partially damaged homes. From our perspective, these return dynamics are central: they provide both a large, plausibly exogenous shock to subjective well-being and a natural source of variation in exposure to informal support networks. Some displaced households were able to stay with family or friends, receiving hous-

ing, material help, and emotional support, while others returned in much more fragile conditions, with limited assistance and higher uncertainty about their future.

Figure 2: Pre-conflict population composition and post-conflict displacement patterns in Kyrgyzstan



(a) Population composition of Kyrgyzstan before the 2010 ethnic riots

Note: This figure depicts the percentage of the Uzbek population and the total number of people living across regions and major cities of Kyrgyzstan based on the 2009 Kyrgyzstan Population and Housing Census data.



(b) Geographic distribution of exposure to the 2010 displacement in the main sample

Note: This figure depicts the distribution of displacement patterns in Kyrgyzstan based on the 2010 Life in Kyrgyzstan survey data.

The immediate political turbulence in Kyrgyzstan culminated in a constitutional referendum in June 2010, which introduced a parliamentary system. The sociopolitical environment remained unsettled during the months leading up to the October parliamentary elections (Gullette and Heathershaw, 2015). The election outcome surprised many observers: the nationalist Ata-Zhurt (Fatherland) party emerged as the largest single party.[4] A governing coalition was formed by Ata-Zhurt, the Social Democratic Party (whose leader, Almazbek Atambayev, subsequently became prime minister and later president), and the newly created Respublika (Republic) party, which explicitly advocated ethnic inclusiveness. This settlement brought a measure of institutional stability and signaled the end of the most acute phase of violent conflict. Over the next decade, Kyrgyzstan avoided a recurrence of large-scale ethnic rioting, although political contestation remained intense and culminated in a further round of protests and a change of power in 2020.

3. Data and empirical specification

3.1. Data

In this study, we integrate data from three sources: the 2006 Life in Transition (LiTS) survey, the 2009 Kyrgyz Census, and the 2010–2019 Life in Kyrgyzstan (LiK) panel survey. The LiK dataset serves as the primary source. It was collected every fall from its inception in September 2010 through October 2013, and again in the fall of 2016 and 2019. In contrast, we use the LiTS survey and the Kyrgyz Census to construct control variables and perform robustness checks. For 2010, we have two main samples: an unrestricted sample, based on nationally representative data, and a restricted sample, consisting of a balanced panel of individuals we can follow up to 2019. We also have repeated cross-sectional samples for 2006 and 2010, constructed for DD estimations based on districts observed in both years.

Treatment variable. Based on survey questions about individuals' experience of displacement during the 2010 ethnic conflict, we construct a binary individual-level treatment variable. At the community level, we define the

[4] As reported by France 24 (2010), the party's leader publicly warned non-ethnic Kyrgyz citizens not to expect equal rights.

treatment based on the leaders' survey responses about whether their community was exposed to violence during the conflict. To avoid spillover effects, we exclude from the control group the individuals who are family members or personally acquainted with those displaced.[5] Table 1 shows the age distribution of displaced individuals and the duration of their displacement in weeks. It shows that displacement lasted only around one week and that the majority of the displaced were Uzbeks. Around half of the displaced Uzbeks remained without support from friends or family members. On the other hand, the displaced Kyrgyz mostly received support.[6]

Table 1: Displacement statistics

	Ky. men	*Ky. women*	*Uz. men*	*Uz. women*	*Other*
Average age	34.45	31.38	42.86	38.57	39.00
Average displacement weeks	1.03	0.75	1.06	1.00	0.78
No. stayed with friends/family	30	55	19	38	4
No. stayed without friends/family	1	0	17	38	5

Note: This table provides descriptive statistics on displacement by gender and ethnicity. The first two columns show statistics for Kyrgyz respondents, the third and fourth for Uzbek respondents, and the fifth for individuals from other ethnic groups. In the first two rows, the average age of the corresponding group and the duration of their displacement are shown. In the last two rows, we show how many of them stayed with their families or friends during the displacement.

Outcome variable. We use both aggregate and individual measures of satisfaction as our outcomes, assessed on an ordinal scale. The satisfaction domains include health, job, household and personal income, dwelling, family life, children's education quality, security, and children's future. To obtain the aggregate measure, we averaged the responses across nine domains and rounded the result to the nearest integer. Figure 3 describes the average well-being differences between displaced and non-displaced individuals before and after the conflict. The baseline comparisons indicate that displacement resulted in a significant decrease in subjective well-being, but its negative effects diminished over time. In the non-DD samples, we measure the outcome on the original 0–10 LiK scale. We rescale the LiK outcome to a 1–5 scale in the DD samples to ensure comparability with the LiTS well-being measure.[7]

[5] The survey's treatment-related questions are in Appendix Figure A.1.

[6] We examine the impact of social support during the displacement by comparing Uzbeks who did or did not stay with friends.

[7] The survey questions are in Appendix Figure A.2.

Figure 3: Subjective well-being of the displaced and non-displaced over time



Note: This figure shows well-being differences between displaced and non-displaced individuals over time. p-values are from two-sample t-tests comparing groups within each year. The dashed line indicates the displacement that occurred in June 2010. "DD" denotes the difference-in-differences sample (outcome measured on a 1–5 scale). After the DD sample, the figure presents cross-sectional and panel samples, where the outcome is measured on a 0–10 scale.

Balancing tests. Kyrgyzstan is administratively divided into 44 districts plus the cities of Bishkek and Osh, which have district status. When we merge the 2006 LiTS survey and the 2010 LiK survey, our analysis sample covers 29 of these district-level units. Among them, 6 districts recorded at least one displaced household during the 2010 conflict, while 23 districts recorded none. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and balancing tests for these two groups of districts before the conflict. In both 2006 and 2009, displaced and non-displaced districts look similar in terms of education levels, labor force participation, consumption per capita, general trust, population size, and short-term mobility. The main systematic differences concern ethnic composition: districts that later experienced displacement have a lower share of Kyrgyz and a much higher share of Uzbeks in both the 2006 LiTS and the 2009 census. This confirms that displacement during the 2010 events was concentrated in districts with larger Uzbek populations rather than in districts that were already worse off along standard socioeconomic dimensions.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics and balancing tests

	Displaced			*Non − displaced*			Absolute
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Mean	St. Dev.	difference
2006 LiTS:							
Kyrgyz population share	6	0.564	0.278	23	0.818	0.215	0.255*
Uzbek population share	6	0.260	0.263	23	0.026	0.083	0.234**
Education levels share:							
with secondary	6	0.525	0.093	23	0.473	0.043	0.052
with higher	6	0.155	0.135	23	0.175	0.133	0.020
Labor force participation rate	6	0.602	0.102	23	0.488	0.224	0.114
Consumption per capita (in logs)	6	6.607	0.231	23	6.610	0.210	0.003
General trust (on 1-4 scale)	6	2.336	0.579	23	2.140	0.563	0.195
2009 Census:							
Kyrgyz population share	6	0.578	0.085	23	0.842	0.169	0.264**
Uzbek population share	6	0.298	0.135	23	0.048	0.094	0.251**
Education levels share:							
with secondary	6	0.439	0.027	23	0.444	0.036	0.005
with higher	6	0.065	0.029	23	0.076	0.041	0.011
Labor force participation rate	6	0.425	0.053	23	0.436	0.034	0.011
Population (in logs)	6	11.762	0.888	23	11.283	0.546	0.480
Share of residents moved $\leq$1 year	6	0.028	0.021	23	0.026	0.025	0.001

Note: This table provides descriptive statistics and the results of balancing tests at the district level. We compare the districts that experienced at least one displacement with those that did not, using the 2006 LiTS survey and the 2009 census data. * $p < 0.05$ and ** $p < 0.01$ with p-values based on two-sided t-tests.

3.2. Empirical strategy

In this section, we describe how we estimate the impact of displacement on subjective well-being. First, we treat reported subjective well-being as an ordinal measure of an underlying latent well-being construct. Following Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004), we use a linear regression model (OLS) as a baseline specification because linear and ordered-response models often yield similar qualitative conclusions in subjective well-being applications, while recognizing the concerns raised by Bond and Long (2019) regarding cardinal interpretations of happiness scales and cross-group mean comparisons. We therefore complement the linear estimates by reestimating the main specifications using an ordered probit model, which explicitly respects the ordinal nature of the data and allows us to examine how the riots shifted the distribution of well-being across response categories.

We begin with a simple linear specification and interpret the well-being scale as an approximately continuous outcome. Formally, we estimate:

$$\text{Well-being}_{ict} = \alpha + \beta\,\text{Displaced}_i + X'\theta + \varepsilon_{ict}, \tag{1}$$

where Well-being$_{ict}$ denotes the well-being outcome for individual i in community c at time t, Displaced$_i$ is an indicator for displacement during the 2010 riots, and X is a vector of individual, household, and community controls. Standard errors are clustered at the community level.

Though this linear specification has several advantages, such as ease of interpretation and flexibility, its main limitation is that it treats an ordinal outcome as if it were cardinal and does not enforce the bounds of the response scale. To address these concerns and assess the robustness of our findings, we complement the linear estimates with an ordered probit model. For an individual i, it can be expressed as:

$$\Pr(\text{Well-being}_i = j) = \Pr(k_{j-1} < \beta\,\text{Displaced}_i + X_i'\theta + u_i \leq k_j), \quad (2)$$

where, again, Well-being is the ordinal outcome, k_j ... k_J are well-being cut points corresponding to the outcome categories, Displaced$_i$ is the binary treatment, X is the vector of controls, and u_i is assumed to be standard normally distributed.

Since displacement is unlikely to be purely random, we complement the OLS and ordered probit estimates with IV and DD specifications that are tailored to our ordinal outcomes. In particular, households may self-select into displacement on the basis of unobserved characteristics that are related to current well-being. In this case, the OLS and ordered probit coefficients on Displaced$_i$ need not have a causal interpretation.

The treatment variable in our DD specification is a binary indicator for districts that experienced displacement, defined as districts from which at least one household was displaced in 2010. The unit of observation is the individual. We exploit one pre-conflict survey wave and one post-conflict wave, combining the pre-conflict repeated cross-section with the first post-conflict panel wave. The specification includes individual- and district-level controls and a post-conflict time indicator, so that identification comes from the change in well-being between the pre- and post-conflict periods in districts with and without displaced households. The ordered probit DD framework respects the ordinal nature of the well-being measure and captures how the riots shifted the distribution of outcomes between more and less exposed districts. The key identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the conflict,

average well-being in districts with and without displacement would have evolved similarly between the pre- and post-conflict survey waves.

With only one pre-period, we cannot formally test for parallel pre-trends, but several features of the setting make this assumption plausible. First, all districts were exposed to the same nationwide macroeconomic and policy environment over this interval, and we control for observable individual and district characteristics. Second, the location of displacement is driven primarily by the geography of the riots rather than by pre-existing trends in subjective well-being. Figure 3 and Table 2 show that pre-conflict levels of well-being and key socioeconomic variables are statistically similar across districts with and without subsequent displacement, which is consistent with the parallel trends assumption. Under these conditions, the DD estimator can be interpreted as the average effect of district-level exposure to displacement on the well-being distribution, separate from common time effects and time-invariant differences across districts.

Second, we implement an IV strategy based on the conditional mixed-process (CMP) framework. In particular, we consider the limited-information maximum-likelihood estimator with a probit link and an ordered probit model in the final stage (Roodman, 2011). We select this estimator to account for the binary nature of the treatment and the ordinal nature of the outcome. In this setting, individual displacement is modeled in a first-stage equation as a function of plausibly exogenous distance instruments, while well-being is modeled in a second-stage outcome equation. Intuitively, this procedure isolates the component of displacement that is driven by location, rather than by individual selection, and uses it to recover an IV estimate of the effect of displacement on well-being.

Following Hager et al. (2019), who employed the proximity of neighborhoods to armored military vehicles as an instrument for the community-level measure of the 2010 ethnic conflict, we use dwelling location as an instrument for individual-level displacement. We consider two distance-based measures at the household level to instrument individual-level displacement: (1) the average distance to the main road, community town hall, and agricultural market, and (2) the average distance to the nearest school and hospital. The rioters who caused the conflict in the neighborhoods typically came from outside and were heading toward the city center, destroying properties along

the way (Hager et al., 2019).

The first instrument is expected to capture the degree of connectivity of the household to the destruction path. Conversely, school and hospital buildings offered opportunities for individuals to seek refuge. The exclusion restriction requires that, conditional on controls, these distance measures affect post-conflict well-being only through their effect on displacement (and general conflict exposure, which we control for). Several features of our setting support this assumption. First, distances to roads, town halls, markets, schools, and hospitals are long-run locational characteristics shaped by historical settlement patterns and infrastructure placement, rather than by households optimizing on unobserved preferences for well-being. To strengthen this argument, we restrict the IV sample to individuals who report being born in the dwelling where they currently reside, so that residential location predates the conflict and is less likely to reflect recent sorting on unobservables. Second, we include rich sets of pre-conflict controls and community fixed effects that absorb systematic differences in amenities and socioeconomic conditions across localities.

4. Short-term results

In this section, we first present the baseline results and then examine heterogeneity in the effects of displacement by ethnicity, gender, and access to social support during displacement.

4.1. Baseline analysis

Table 3 presents the short-term well-being effects of displacement. We first report the OLS specification with a continuous outcome variable. After accounting for baseline individual controls and community fixed effects, the findings reveal that displacement is associated with a decline in well-being exceeding 6%. This drop is relative to the mean well-being score of 5.83 observed among the non-displaced subsample.

In the ordered probit specifications in Columns (2) and (3), we replace community fixed effects with community-level controls, including exposure

to conflict and pre-riot socioeconomic characteristics, to address data saturation. We also account for individual-level variables including risk and trust preferences, as well as household income (Column 2) and expenses (Column 3). The negative effects of displacement remain statistically significant and are shown to amplify the impact of the ethnic conflict. The difference in estimates between Columns (2) and (3) is also consistent with positive selection of displaced households into better-off communities and locations: omitting these characteristics attenuates the displacement effect toward zero, and the richer specifications correct this upward bias.

Table 3: The short-term effects of displacement

Well-being	OLS	Oprobit		2nd Stage Oprobit		Oprobit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Displaced	-0.347***	-0.339***	-0.432***	-1.416***	-1.494***	
	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.111)	(0.196)	(0.221)	
Displaced community						-0.628***
× Post						(0.238)
Riots/destruction/		-0.273***	-0.257**	-0.259***	-0.299**	
violence		(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.109)	
Displaced				1st Stage Probit		
Distance to				-0.114***	-0.230***	
hall/road/market				(0.029)	(0.038)	
Distance to				-0.222***	-0.153***	
school/hospital				(0.035)	(0.039)	
First stage F-stat.				105.16	74.74	
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Extra controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community FE	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Region ×urb. FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Individuals	7,175	7,175	7,175	7,175	5,186	6,388
Communities	49	49	49	49	49	29

Note: This table presents the results of OLS, ordered probit, and conditional (recursive) mixed process estimations with SE clustered at the community level. Unlike the OLS and IV specifications, the DD coefficient is identified from district-level exposure to displacement rather than respondent-level displacement status. The description of the control variables and the full regression results are in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ** $p < 0.05$ and *** $p < 0.01$.

Before turning to the IV results, we first assess our IV specification in Table 4. We begin by evaluating the validity of the instruments using a placebo test: we regress a pre-treatment outcome in 2006 on the distance-based instruments and find no significant effects.[8] This suggests that the

[8]Because aggregation leaves few observations, in addition to robust standard errors, we also report

instruments are not simply capturing pre-existing differences or trends that were already present before the conflict, providing supportive evidence for their exogeneity and the exclusion restriction. We then assess relevance by regressing the treatment variable in 2010 on the instruments. In this case, the instruments have a statistically significant effect on displacement, indicating that they meaningfully shift treatment status. This strong first-stage relationship confirms that the instruments are relevant and can be used to identify the causal effect of displacement on well-being.

Table 4: Displacement, well-being, and distances

	Well-being in 2006			Displaced in 2010		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance to	0.017		0.003	-0.064		-0.068
hall/road/	(0.037)		(0.049)	(0.026)**		(0.030)**
market	[0.671]		[0.948]	[0.030]		[0.041]
Distance to		0.027	0.024		-0.042	0.007
school/		(0.042)	(0.06)		(0.023)*	(0.026)
hospital		[0.545]	[0.673]		[0.082]	[0.777]
R-squared			0.02			0.15
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	29	29	29	29	29	29

Note: The table shows the OLS regressions of average well-being in 2006 and displacement in 2010 on the two instruments at the district level, which are the average distances to town halls, roads, or markets and to schools or hospitals. The last three columns check the relevance of the instruments. The robust SEs are shown in round brackets. The p-values obtained via the wild bootstrap-t (Rademacher weights, null imposed) with 9,999 replications in rectangular brackets. * $p < 0.1$ and ** $p < 0.05$.

In Columns (4) and (5) of Table 3, we report the instrumented effects of displacement. Column (4) uses the full sample. In Column (5), we address potential concerns about the exclusion restriction by restricting the sample to individuals who report being born in the dwelling where they currently reside, so that residential location predates the conflict and any direct effects of local amenities on well-being are less likely to drive the results. Consistent with expectations, individuals residing farther from areas of destruction and potential hiding places are less likely to experience displacement. Moreover, since we control for a variety of economic variables and restrict the sample to those who never changed their place of living, the distance measures are ex-

wild bootstrap t-statistics, which yield better-calibrated p-values in small samples and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

pected to affect individuals primarily through their effects on displacement. In the second stage, the effects of displacement remain negative; however, the magnitudes are notably larger.[9] As a robustness check, we also reestimate the specification using a continuous outcome variable with a linear link function. The results remain very similar: the estimated effect becomes -2.019 (0.322) in Column (4) and -2.061 (0.344) in Column (5), with corresponding first-stage F-statistics of 101.18 and 76.27, respectively.

Finally, Column (6) reports the DD estimate based on an ordered probit specification with individual controls and community fixed effects. The coefficient on the interaction between displacement and the post-conflict indicator, which captures the average shift in well-being in districts exposed to displacement, is negative and statistically significant, showing that well-being falls more for individuals in communities affected by displacement than for those in communities without displacement after the riots. This pre–post comparison at the community level supports the OLS and IV results and confirms that the short-term decline in well-being among the displaced is not driven only by differences between communities.

To show that the results are not driven by aggregation, we analyze the original well-being data in Figure 4.[10] In these specifications, we use baseline controls, excluding those that might be correlated with the respective well-being dimensions. Thus, instead of the varying controls as in Table 3, we compare results for the restricted and unrestricted samples. DD estimations are absent due to a lack of disaggregated data. The graph reveals that displacement is associated with increased dissatisfaction in several domains, including health, housing, security, and prospects for children's futures.[11] Conversely, satisfaction with economic domains, children's education, and family life appears to be largely unaffected by displacement.

[9] The most plausible explanation is misclassification of displacement status. Because displacement during the 2010 riots was brief and self-reported, some temporary movers may be classified inconsistently, biasing the non-instrumented estimates toward zero. Other possible explanations are that the IV recovers a larger local effect for geographically exposed compliers or that unobserved resilience attenuates the baseline estimates.

[10] Additional instrumented estimations and the full estimates for the most robust heterogeneity estimations are presented in Figure A.3 and Tables A.3 and A.4.

[11] We attribute the large standard errors in Figure 4 for satisfaction with family income and family life to the nonlinear estimation and limited variation within these subcategories.

Figure 4: The disaggregated short-term effects of displacement



Note: This figure depicts the results of restricted and unrestricted oprobit estimations with baseline controls and SE clustered at the community level. The restricted sample is based on individuals who live in the communities where they were born.

4.2. Heterogeneity analyses

We present the heterogeneity analysis in Table 5. The dimensions are motivated by the conflict setting and prior expectations. First, displacement is expected to affect Uzbeks more than Kyrgyz, as Uzbeks were the primary targets of the June 2010 violence. Displaced Kyrgyz therefore provide a useful benchmark for whether the shock is group-specific. Consistent with this idea, Column (1) shows that the well-being of displaced Kyrgyz is statistically indistinguishable from that of non-displaced individuals within less than three months after the riots, whereas displaced Uzbeks continue to exhibit significantly lower well-being (Column (2)). Second, informal support is typically an important buffer against well-being losses (e.g., social support and mental health literature), so we focus only on Uzbeks and distinguish between displaced individuals who stayed with family or friends and those who did not. Columns (3)–(4) show that the negative short-term effects of displacement are concentrated entirely among Uzbeks who returned without such support. Finally, gender may shape exposure to violence, perceived insecurity, and caregiving responsibilities, so we further split Uzbeks who lacked

support by sex. Columns (5)–(6) indicate that, within this group, the displacement effects on men and women were very similar, with no statistically significant difference by gender.

Table 5: The short-term effects of displacement: heterogeneity analyses

Well-being	By Ethnicity		By Network		By Gender	
	Kyrgyz vs. All	Uzbeks vs. All	Uz. supported vs. Uzbeks	Uz. alone vs. Uzbeks	Uz. alone ♂ vs. Uzbeks	Uz. alone ♀ vs. Uzbeks
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Displaced	-0.016	-0.645***	-0.049	-0.985***	-0.920**	-0.965***
	(0.152)	(0.224)	(0.473)	(0.273)	(0.395)	(0.240)
$\beta_{1,3,5} = \beta_{2,4,6}$	p=0.037		p=0.045		p=0.895	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,062	7,088	712	710	672	693
Communities	49	49	21	21	21	21

Note: This table presents the results of ordered probit estimations with SE clustered at the community level. The regression coefficients and SE are based on separate regressions, while the p-values are based on the regressions where both coefficients under consideration are included in the regression together. Column (1) compares displaced Kyrgyz to all non-displaced; Column (2), displaced Uzbeks. Columns (3)–(4) distinguish Uzbeks by staying with/without friends or family; Columns (5)–(6) further split by gender. The full regression results are in Table A.5 in the Appendix. ** $p < 0.05$ and *** $p < 0.01$.

5. Long-term results

In this section, we first present long-run results using a balanced panel of individuals followed from 2010 to 2019, and then discuss how post-conflict policies and interventions may have shaped the observed trajectories of well-being. Because the balanced panel includes only around 60 displaced individuals, we do not pursue detailed heterogeneity analyses here and instead focus on more general patterns of recovery.

5.1. Panel-data analysis

In Figure 5, we present evidence on the dynamics of the treatment effects over time. We first verify that the aggregated and domain-specific effects in the panel subsample are comparable to those observed in the main estimations. In the first subplot, we demonstrate that the aggregate negative effects of the 2010 displacement and conflict at the community level diminish over time. The impact of the conflict becomes insignificant within a year, whereas that of the displacement disappears fully by 2016. Regarding the effects of displacement on individual well-being domains, as shown in the second subplot, health and security recover first, followed by satisfaction with dwelling

and future prospects.

The last subplot analyzes the effects of displacement on trust and household expenditures. The results show that health and trust recover simultaneously. Subsequently, households increase their consumption, possibly addressing security and dwelling concerns. As these issues are gradually resolved, individuals become less worried about their future. Well-being domains not directly impacted by displacement, as shown in the third subplot, respond to changes in other domains. For example, when household expenditures increase, individuals are less likely to report satisfaction with their current job and family income.

Figure 5: The medium-term effects of displacement



Note: This figure depicts the results of ordered probit and OLS estimations (OLS only for household expenses) based on the balanced sample of 2,866 individuals observed over 9 years in 49 communities. The first subplot shows the effects of displacement and conflict; the rest, only displacement. The full regression results for the aggregated well-being measure are in Table A.6 in the Appendix.

5.2. Policy responses analysis

The domain-specific patterns documented above naturally raise the question of how post-conflict policies and interventions shaped the recovery of well-

being after the Osh riots. In this subsection, we relate the estimated trajectories in health, security, housing, economic conditions, and future-oriented outcomes to the main strands of the humanitarian and reconstruction response, and discuss how the timing and design of these policies may help explain the heterogeneous speed of recovery across domains.

Health, security, and trust. Indicators of physical health, perceived security, and general trust decline sharply in the immediate aftermath of displacement but converge relatively quickly toward the levels of the non-displaced. This pattern is consistent with the rapid mobilization of humanitarian assistance. A series of UN OCHA situation reports documents the delivery of emergency medical care, food assistance, and protection services within weeks of the conflict (UN OCHA, 2010a; UN OCHA, 2010b). In parallel, the OSCE's Community Security Initiative, launched in November 2010 at the government's request, reestablished police presence, introduced mobile police reception offices, and promoted multi-ethnic policing (OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, 2012). On the state side, the Kyrgyz government rolled out a US$70 million World Bank–supported Emergency Recovery Project to restore critical infrastructure and fund social reconciliation activities (World Bank, 2010). Together, these interventions likely accelerated the restoration of basic safety, service access, and institutional confidence, helping explain the relatively fast convergence we observe in this domain. The policy implication is that speed matters: rapid deployment of health and security services, combined with community-based policing and trust-building measures, can substantially shorten the welfare recovery horizon.

Dwelling, job, income, and expenditures. In contrast, satisfaction with housing exhibits a more persistent decline, remaining significantly below that of the non-displaced for several years. Government and donor programs initially provided emergency shelter and later supported self-help reconstruction through the distribution of building materials (Reuters, 2011; Shelter Projects, 2010; UNHCR, 2010), but these efforts faced delays in debris removal, logistical bottlenecks, and uneven material delivery (UNHCR, 2011). Our data show a simultaneous increase in household expenditures and a decline in satisfaction with own income and job, consistent with households financing reconstruction out of their own pockets, thereby raising spending but tightening liquidity constraints and reducing subjective income well-being. These results point to the need for better-targeted housing reconstruction subsidies and financial support mechanisms to avoid forcing displaced

households into costly self-financing that may crowd out investment in other welfare-enhancing areas.

Youth's future, family life, and children's education. Forward-looking welfare indicators show a distinct pattern. Expectations about young people's futures remain depressed for the longest time, suggesting that displacement casts a persistent shadow on intergenerational optimism and perceived life chances. In contrast, satisfaction with children's education and family life fluctuate strongly but exhibit no lasting gap, likely reflecting early efforts to restore education and family routines: UNICEF's Annual Report 2010 and its Humanitarian Action Update in November 2010 note efforts to reopen schools, provide educational materials, and protect children's rights even in the immediate crisis period (UNICEF, 2011; UNICEF, 2010). Moreover, the Situation Analysis of Children reports identify improvements in school access and attendance among children after the crisis, despite ongoing obstacles (UNICEF, 2015). These findings indicate that restoring services is necessary but not sufficient: rebuilding confidence in the future requires sustained policies aimed at youth inclusion, anti-discrimination, and opportunities for upward mobility to ensure that displacement does not result in permanently lower aspirations or reduced human capital investment.

6. Concluding remarks

Our findings demonstrate that short-term forced displacement caused by inter-ethnic conflict is associated with substantial and long-lasting declines in subjective well-being. Thus, the duration of displacement is not a sufficient guide to the duration of its consequences. These effects persist for several years before gradually returning to pre-displacement levels. The losses are most pronounced among members of the directly targeted ethnic group who lacked support from friends and family, affecting both men and women. Post-displacement recovery appears to be multidimensional. Perceptions of health and security rebound relatively quickly, particularly when supported by timely interventions. In contrast, material and economic well-being recover more slowly, as households often need to self-finance reconstruction and replace lost assets. Expectations for the future, including those concerning the next generation, remain scarred the longest. These results suggest that effective post-conflict policy should combine rapid emergency relief with sustained reconstruction support and targeted programs to accelerate the full

restoration of well-being. More broadly, they show that even short-lived displacement should not be treated as a minor or self-correcting consequence of conflict, since rapid return can still mask persistent damage.

From a policy perspective, our results point to the importance of sequencing and targeting post-conflict support. Rapid emergency assistance and the quick restoration of basic security are essential to stabilize health and safety, but they are not sufficient to restore overall well-being. Sustained support for housing reconstruction and local labor markets is needed to repair longer-lasting material and economic damage, and targeted programs for children and youth may be required to rebuild expectations about the future. Finally, our evidence that the largest and most persistent well-being losses occur among those who return without the support of family or friends highlights the value of policies that help displaced households to reconnect with local networks and community institutions.

Our analysis has several limitations. First, the Osh riots constitute a short, intense episode of violence followed by relatively rapid return, so our findings may not generalize to protracted displacement in camp settings or to other types of conflict. Second, the number of displaced individuals in our survey data is modest, reflecting both the survey's sampling design and selective attrition. This limits statistical power, especially for fine-grained subgroup analyses, and implies that some smaller effects may go undetected. Third, our identification strategies are not without caveats. The exclusion restriction for the IVs may be violated if proximity to destruction or to potential hiding places affects well-being through channels other than displacement, or if it is correlated with other unobserved post-conflict shocks. The DD analysis relies on changes in community-level averages rather than tracking the same individuals over time, so it cannot fully rule out compositional changes within communities. In addition, both displacement status and well-being are based on self-reports, which may be subject to recall error or systematic differences in reporting across groups. Finally, our information on exposure to specific programs is limited, so the links we draw between policy responses and domain-specific recovery should be read as suggestive. These issues imply that our estimates should be viewed as primarily descriptive rather than fully causal, and point to the value of future work using larger samples, alternative instruments, and individual-level panels.

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Appendix

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Appendix A.1. Treatment variable

We construct our treatment variable using the information summarized in Figure A.1, which is based on the 2010 LiK survey module on the June 2010 events. Respondents were asked whether they had to leave their place of residence during the riots. We interpret an affirmative answer as indicating forced displacement and use this to define the binary displacement indicator. There is very little variation in the reported length of absence, so we do not exploit duration in the main analysis. However, we use the follow-up questions on where respondents stayed while away from home to distinguish those who stayed with family or friends from those who did not in the heterogeneity analysis. In addition, we use information on whether respondents personally know someone who was displaced to exclude such indirectly affected individuals from the control group.

Figure A.1: Treatment-related survey questions

In June 2010, did you have to leave your place of living?	Yes	1
	No	2
After how many weeks or months did you return? *(Indicate **either** weeks **or** months)*	Month _____	1
	Week _____	2
Where did you stay most of the time during the absence?	In the same town/village with friends/family	1
	Elsewhere in Kyrgyzstan with friends/family	2
	Displacement/ refugee camp within Kyrgyzstan	3
	Uzbekistan	4
	Abroad (except Uzbekistan)	5
	Others	6
Do you personally know any people who are **not members of your household** and who were forced to flee their place of living in June 2010?	Yes	1
	No	2

Note: This figure depicts the displacement module of the 2010 LiK survey.

Appendix A.2. Outcome variable

We describe our outcome variable using the information summarized in Figure A.2. The LiK survey provides disaggregated questions on subjective well-being across several domains, each measured on a 0–10 scale. In the analysis, we use both these domain-specific measures and an aggregate index of overall well-being constructed from them. By contrast, the LiTS survey includes a single aggregate life satisfaction question measured on a 1–5 scale. For comparability across data sources, we also recode the LiK well-being measure into a 1–5 scale, aligning its categories with the LiTS response format.

Figure A.2: Outcome-related survey questions

Life in Kyrgyzstan

How satisfied are you today with the following areas of your life? Please rate them from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied)	0 (completely dissatisfied)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 (completely satisfied)	Not applicable
Your health												
Your job (if employed)												
Your household income												
Your personal income												
Your dwelling												
Your family life												
The quality of education at your children's school												
Your security												
Childrens'/young generation's future												

Life in Transition	1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neither agree nor disagree	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree	-98. Not applicable	-97. Don' t know
All things considered, I am satisfied with my life now							

Note: This figure depicts the well-being module of the 2006 LiTS and 2010 LiK surveys.

Appendix A.3. Descriptive statistics

Table A.1 reports individual-level descriptive statistics for displaced and non-displaced respondents in the 2010 LiK survey. The displaced sample is relatively small (207 individuals) compared with 6,968 non-displaced respondents and differs in several systematic ways. Displaced individuals are, on average, younger, less likely to be male, and much more likely to be Uzbek and less likely to be Kyrgyz. Educational attainment is broadly similar, with only a modest difference in the share with secondary or primary technical education and no significant difference in higher education. Household size and the probability of having children are also comparable across groups, though displaced respondents are slightly more likely to be married. Labor market attachment is somewhat weaker among the displaced, who report fewer months worked in the previous 12 months and lower household income, but at the same time somewhat higher household expenses. Finally, displaced individuals exhibit marginally lower levels of general trust, while self-reported risk attitudes do not differ significantly from those of the non-displaced.

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

	Displaced			*Non − displaced*			Absolute
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Mean	St. Dev.	difference
Age	207	36.807	14.257	6,968	40.519	16.535	3.712***
Man	207	0.338	0.474	6,968	0.469	0.499	0.131***
Kyrgyz	207	0.416	0.494	6,968	0.676	0.468	0.260***
Uzbek	207	0.541	0.500	6,968	0.094	0.292	0.447***
Education:							
with Prim. tech./Sec.	207	0.628	0.485	6,968	0.696	0.460	0.068**
with Higher	207	0.189	0.392	6,968	0.159	0.366	0.030
Marital status:							
Single	207	0.029	0.168	6,968	0.050	0.218	0.021
Married	207	0.744	0.438	6,968	0.672	0.470	0.072**
Household size	207	5.425	1.916	6,968	5.205	2.310	0.221
Has a child	207	0.952	0.215	6,968	0.947	0.224	0.005
Household head	207	0.304	0.461	6,968	0.360	0.480	0.056
Months worked last 12 months	207	5.459	5.672	6,968	6.399	5.706	0.940**
Household income (in logs)	207	7.342	1.014	6,968	7.611	0.846	0.269***
Household expenses (in logs)	207	7.094	0.792	6,968	6.867	0.851	0.228***
General trust	207	2.918	1.009	6,968	3.051	0.890	0.133**
Risk level	207	3.990	3.246	6,968	3.803	3.386	0.187

Note: This table provides descriptive statistics and the results of balancing tests at the individual level based on the 2010 LiK survey. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$ with p-values based on two-sided t-tests.

Appendix A.4. Full main regression results

The next tables report the full regression results and allow us to compare how the coefficient on displacement and the role of controls evolve across alternative specifications. Table A.2 reports the complete short-term results for overall well-being, corresponding to the baseline OLS, ordered probit, IV, and DD specifications summarized in the main text. These tables make it possible to see how the inclusion of individual, community, and pre-conflict controls affects both the magnitude and precision of the displacement estimates, and to verify that the main results are not driven by a particular choice of covariates or estimator.

Table A.2: The short-term effects of displacement: complete results

Well-being	OLS		Oprobit			CMP		Oprobit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Displaced (community)	-0.492**	-0.347***	-0.385***	-0.339***	-0.432***	-1.416***	-1.494***	0.432*
	(0.237)	(0.116)	(0.144)	(0.095)	(0.111)	(0.196)	(0.221)	(0.238)
Post								-0.393***
								(0.103)
Displaced community								-0.628***
× Post								(0.238)
Baseline controls:								
Age		-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.006***
		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Man		0.172***	0.115***	0.065**	0.078**	0.062**	0.066**	0.135***
		(0.046)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.023)
Kyrgyz		0.332*	0.080	0.121	0.069	0.077	0.118	0.226
		(0.185)	(0.129)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.131)	(0.139)
Uzbek		0.069	0.024	-0.099	-0.095	-0.026	-0.040	-0.074
		(0.301)	(0.199)	(0.186)	(0.181)	(0.173)	(0.211)	(0.144)
Household head		-0.156***	-0.099***	-0.032	-0.075**	-0.063*	-0.073	-0.100***
		(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.035)
Single		-0.573***	-0.316***	-0.239***	-0.252***	-0.257***	-0.261***	-0.197***
		(0.077)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Married		0.275***	0.176***	0.219***	0.192***	0.202***	0.197***	0.178***
		(0.058)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.027)
Has a child		0.129	0.083	0.102	0.076	0.063	-0.001	-0.045
		(0.171)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.089)
Household size		0.023	0.018	0.045***	0.033**	0.031**	0.033**	0.050***
		(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Prim. tech./Sec. education		0.154	0.107	0.116*	0.113*	0.099	0.126	0.064
		(0.109)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.067)
Higher education		0.623***	0.397***	0.327***	0.336***	0.326***	0.424***	0.281***
		(0.136)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.090)	(0.080)
Months worked last 12 months		0.007	0.006*	-0.000	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.002
		(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Urban resident		0.057	-0.482**					-0.097
		(0.502)	(0.227)					(0.330)

Table A.2: The short-term effects of displacement: complete results

Well-being	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Extra controls:								
log(HH income per member)				0.275***				
				(0.039)				
log(HH expenses per member)					0.184***	0.187***	0.155***	0.262***
					(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.055)
General trust 2				0.092	0.097	0.069	-0.035	0.096
				(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.113)	(0.079)
General trust 3				0.349***	0.367***	0.341***	0.278***	0.249***
				(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.081)
General trust 4				0.542***	0.559***	0.527***	0.412***	0.462***
				(0.120)	(0.129)	(0.125)	(0.138)	(0.103)
Risk level 2				-0.063	-0.027	-0.026	-0.025	
				(0.113)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.152)	
Risk level 3				-0.141	-0.152	-0.119	-0.166	
				(0.123)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.149)	
Risk level 4				-0.132	-0.112	-0.083	-0.099	
				(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.127)	(0.164)	
Risk level 5				-0.132	-0.112	-0.083	-0.099	
				(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.127)	(0.164)	
Risk level 6				0.089	0.089	0.099	0.048	
				(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.104)	
Risk level 7				0.073	0.086	0.108	0.115	
				(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.127)	
Risk level 8				0.098	0.135	0.141	0.149	
				(0.106)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.129)	
Risk level 9				0.322***	0.366***	0.391***	0.395***	
				(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.103)	
Risk level 10				0.369***	0.376***	0.397***	0.264**	
				(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.128)	
Risk level 11				0.330***	0.336***	0.350***	0.313**	
				(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.128)	
Shocks at the community level during the last 12 months:								
Climate shocks			0.013	0.004	0.029	0.039	0.092	
			(0.128)	(0.136)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.162)	
Riots, destruction, violence			-0.220**	-0.273***	-0.257**	-0.259***	-0.299***	
			(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.109)	
Economic shocks			-0.104	-0.116	-0.111	-0.086	-0.061	
			(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.135)	
Community controls a year before the shock:								
% Kyrgyz pop. (2009)			-0.028***	-0.032***	-0.032***	-0.031***	-0.030***	
			(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	
% Uzbek pop. (2009)			-0.020**	-0.020**	-0.023**	-0.019*	-0.017	
			(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	
% with Secondary edu. (2009)			0.010	0.025	0.026	0.021	0.019	
			(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	
% with Higher edu. (2009)			-0.043*	-0.022	-0.018	-0.017	0.001	
			(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.036)	
% Moved in $\leq$ 1 year ago (2009)			0.084**	0.077**	0.078**	0.079**	0.086**	
			(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.042)	
% in Labor force (2009)			-0.013	-0.021	-0.018	-0.020	-0.018	
			(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	
Relative pop. size (2009)			-16.480***	-19.875***	-17.280***	-18.353***	-18.926***	
			(5.009)	(4.469)	(4.373)	(4.176)	(3.892)	
Community FE	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Region and urban FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Region×urban FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Individuals	7,175	7,175	7,175	7,175	7,175	7,175	5,186	6,388
Communities	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	29

Note: This table presents the results of estimations with SE clustered at the community level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix A.5. Full heterogeneity analysis results

Figure A.3 presents additional IV estimations with an ordered probit model in the final stage for the cross-sectional heterogeneity analysis. It is not possible to conduct the DD estimations in this case due to discrepancies in the well-being domains across years. Tables A.3 and A.4 then provide the full CMP results for the preferred disaggregated well-being domains (health, dwelling, security, youth's future, job, income, family life, and children's education), which underlie the heterogeneity results across well-being domains. Table A.5 presents the complete heterogeneity analysis by ethnicity, access to friends and family during displacement, and gender, complementing the more compact summary in Table 5. Finally, Table A.6 reports the full ordered probit coefficients for the short- and medium-run effects of displacement on overall well-being in the balanced 2010–2019 panel, which we use to describe the long-term recovery dynamics.

Figure A.3: The disaggregated short-term effects of displacement



Note: This figure depicts the results of additional restricted and unrestricted disaggregated estimations. The full regression results for the preferred specification are in Tables A.3 and A.4.

Table A.3: The disaggregated short-term effects of displacement I - CMP estimation

	(1) Well-being	(2) Health	(3) Dwelling	(4) Security	(5) Youth future
Displaced	-1.519***	-1.485***	-0.923***	-1.199**	-1.619***
	(0.341)	(0.543)	(0.334)	(0.563)	(0.335)
Age	-0.005***	-0.025***	0.002	0.002	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Man	0.110***	0.118***	0.048	0.123***	0.046
	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.030)
Kyrgyz	0.129	-0.064	-0.036	0.279	0.452**
	(0.159)	(0.121)	(0.109)	(0.193)	(0.211)
Uzbek	0.123	0.070	0.058	0.172	0.372
	(0.236)	(0.213)	(0.218)	(0.225)	(0.258)
Household head	-0.101**	-0.056	-0.074	-0.123**	-0.018
	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Single	-0.316***	-0.093	-0.258***	-0.175***	-0.056
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.063)	(0.059)
Married	0.185***	0.063	0.071*	0.017	0.039
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.039)
Has a child	0.003	0.090	-0.007	0.024	0.004
	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.098)
Household size	0.020	0.022**	0.026**	0.011	-0.016
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Prim. tech./Sec. education	0.105	0.132**	0.100	0.091	-0.015
	(0.086)	(0.067)	(0.085)	(0.082)	(0.078)
Higher education	0.451***	0.311***	0.352***	0.108	0.086
	(0.095)	(0.075)	(0.105)	(0.122)	(0.101)
Months worked last 12 months	0.004	0.019***	-0.001	-0.009**	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Urban resident	-0.371*	-0.334**	-0.297*	-0.216	-0.390
	(0.217)	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.182)	(0.250)
Climate shocks	0.061	0.005	-0.010	0.203	0.031
	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.133)	(0.182)	(0.180)
Political riots/destruction	-0.235**	-0.267**	-0.181	-0.044	-0.189
	(0.117)	(0.111)	(0.127)	(0.144)	(0.128)
Economic shocks	-0.057	0.111	-0.003	-0.089	-0.193
	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.155)
% Kyrgyz pop. (2009)	-0.028***	-0.022***	-0.032***	0.001	-0.011
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)
% Uzbek pop. (2009)	-0.016	-0.019**	-0.023**	0.002	0.002
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)
% with Secondary edu. (2009)	0.008	0.024	0.023	-0.022	-0.024
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.023)
% with Higher edu. (2009)	-0.037	0.032	-0.014	-0.055	-0.080***
	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.031)
% Moved in $\leq$ 1 year ago (2009)	0.064*	0.022	0.042	0.124**	0.075*
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.039)
% in Labor force (2009)	-0.013	-0.003	-0.013	0.023	-0.016
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Relative pop. size (2009)	-17.930***	-7.964	-15.394***	-11.850***	-17.400***
	(4.357)	(5.311)	(5.510)	(4.368)	(4.158)
Region and urban FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,186	5,186	5,186	5,186	5,186
Communities	49	49	49	49	49

Note: This table presents the results of estimations with SE clustered at the community level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.4: The disaggregated short-term effects of displacement II - CMP estimation

	(6) Job	(7) Fam. income	(8) Pers. income	(9) Fam. life	(10) Children's edu.
Displaced	-0.022	-0.125	-0.060	-0.152	-0.406
	(0.732)	(1.083)	(0.764)	(1.490)	(0.812)
Age	0.000	0.000	-0.003	0.000	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Man	0.090	0.063*	0.180***	-0.016	-0.067
	(0.060)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.043)
Kyrgyz	-0.087	0.023	-0.083	-0.009	0.146
	(0.147)	(0.129)	(0.127)	(0.144)	(0.109)
Uzbek	-0.182	0.002	-0.250	-0.324	0.056
	(0.247)	(0.245)	(0.198)	(0.376)	(0.210)
Household head	-0.024	-0.155***	-0.013	0.008	0.068
	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.047)
Single	-0.021	-0.175**	-0.143	-0.746***	0.049
	(0.105)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.147)	(0.092)
Married	-0.033	0.031	0.014	0.849***	0.134**
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.130)	(0.056)
Has a child	0.080	-0.062	-0.014	-0.095	-0.053
	(0.115)	(0.097)	(0.103)	(0.129)	(0.096)
Household size	0.000	0.017	0.000	0.040***	0.010
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Prim. tech./Sec. education	0.155	-0.014	0.046	-0.089	-0.087
	(0.117)	(0.078)	(0.113)	(0.080)	(0.084)
Higher education	0.712***	0.309***	0.473***	0.148	0.120
	(0.105)	(0.083)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.107)
Months worked last 12 months	0.034***	0.011***	0.026***	0.003	0.007**
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Urban resident	-0.127	-0.255	-0.232	-0.051	-0.170
	(0.165)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.191)	(0.130)
Climate shocks	-0.200**	0.053	-0.212*	0.102	0.019
	(0.094)	(0.147)	(0.111)	(0.144)	(0.076)
Political riots/destruction	-0.241**	-0.158	-0.259**	-0.219*	-0.165**
	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.128)	(0.120)	(0.074)
Economic shocks	-0.013	-0.069	-0.139	-0.003	-0.088
	(0.115)	(0.139)	(0.115)	(0.177)	(0.115)
% Kyrgyz pop. (2009)	-0.031***	-0.023***	-0.029***	-0.036***	-0.018***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.005)
% Uzbek pop. (2009)	-0.026***	-0.018*	-0.025**	-0.028***	-0.006
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.007)
% with Secondary edu. (2009)	0.010	0.016	-0.022	0.029	0.022
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.017)
% with Higher edu. (2009)	-0.006	-0.021	-0.035	0.043	-0.006
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
% Moved in $\leq$ 1 year ago (2009)	-0.041	0.021	-0.019	-0.003	0.004
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.028)
% in Labor force (2009)	-0.043**	-0.013	-0.028	0.017	-0.007
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.012)
Relative pop. size (2009)	-15.514***	-7.208	-18.916***	-11.892**	-8.804***
	(4.232)	(6.426)	(5.880)	(4.896)	(2.905)
Region and urban FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,568	5,186	4,568	4,810	4,763
Communities	49	49	49	49	49

Note: This table presents the results of estimations with SE clustered at the community level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.5: The short-term effects of displacement: complete heterogeneity analyses - Oprobit estimation

Well-being	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Displaced Kyrgyz	-0.016							
vs. non-displaced	(0.152)							
Displaced Uzbek		-0.645***						
vs. non-displaced		(0.224)						
Uzb. displaced with frds./fam.			-0.345					
vs. non-displaced			(0.215)					
Uzb. displaced without frds./fam.				-0.949***				
vs. non-displaced				(0.226)				
Uzb. displaced with frds./fam.					-0.049			
vs. non-displaced Uzbek					(0.473)			
Uzb. displaced without frds./fam.						-0.985***		
vs. non-displaced Uzbek						(0.273)		
Uzb. displaced man without frds./fam.							-0.920**	
vs. non-displaced Uzbek							(0.395)	
Uzb. displaced woman without frds./fam.								-0.965***
vs. non-displaced Uzbek								(0.240)
Age	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Man	0.115***	0.114***	0.114***	0.114***	0.155*	0.125	0.128	0.124
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.095)
Kyrgyz	0.080	0.075	0.081	0.074				
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.128)				
Uzbek	0.098	0.082	0.109	0.087				
	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.213)				
Household head	-0.100***	-0.101***	-0.099***	-0.100***	-0.356***	-0.351***	-0.380***	-0.351***
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.116)	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.128)
Single	-0.316***	-0.307***	-0.314***	-0.307***	-0.489	-0.475	-0.498	-0.487
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.362)	(0.385)	(0.385)	(0.388)
Married	0.175***	0.176***	0.173***	0.176***	0.209*	0.265**	0.246**	0.252**
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.123)	(0.105)	(0.112)	(0.110)
Has a child	0.081	0.083	0.083	0.081	-0.104	-0.203	-0.241	-0.173
	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.201)	(0.207)	(0.218)	(0.221)
Household size	0.020	0.019	0.020	0.020	0.044**	0.039**	0.042**	0.043**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Prim. tech./Sec. education	0.095	0.110	0.107	0.102	0.273**	0.227**	0.237**	0.221**
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.111)	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.100)
Higher education	0.392***	0.399***	0.398***	0.396***	0.008	-0.022	0.008	-0.029
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.253)	(0.237)	(0.279)	(0.238)
Months worked last 12 months	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	0.003	0.009	0.011	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Urban resident	-0.479**	-0.484**	-0.479**	-0.474**	0.162	0.093	0.123	0.070
	(0.226)	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.224)	(0.437)	(0.446)	(0.470)	(0.460)
Climate shocks	0.022	0.015	0.018	0.017	0.734**	1.085***	0.987***	1.078***
	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.285)	(0.292)	(0.288)	(0.290)
Political riots/destruction	-0.237**	-0.221**	-0.236**	-0.228**	-0.108	-0.032	-0.117	-0.028
	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.430)	(0.349)	(0.345)	(0.365)
Economic shocks	-0.093	-0.102	-0.095	-0.095	-0.461*	-0.616***	-0.648***	-0.615***
	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.245)	(0.207)	(0.194)	(0.205)
% Kyrgyz pop. (2009)	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.127***	-0.115***	-0.122***	-0.116***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.029)
% Uzbek pop. (2009)	-0.021**	-0.020**	-0.021**	-0.021**	-0.117***	-0.122***	-0.124***	-0.123***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)
% with Secondary edu. (2009)	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.010	0.253***	0.213***	0.241***	0.217***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.062)
% with Higher edu. (2009)	-0.043*	-0.043*	-0.043*	-0.044*	0.060	-0.004	0.019	-0.003
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.067)	(0.086)	(0.080)	(0.088)
% Moved in $\leq$ 1 year ago (2009)	0.082**	0.082**	0.081**	0.084**	-0.195**	-0.139*	-0.162**	-0.140
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.087)
% in Labor force (2009)	-0.016	-0.014	-0.016	-0.016	-0.190***	-0.217***	-0.208***	-0.219***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.059)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Relative pop. size (2009)	-15.200***	-16.813***	-15.698***	-15.934***	-31.547***	-39.709***	-37.095***	-40.141***
	(5.202)	(4.964)	(5.018)	(5.254)	(12.101)	(14.014)	(13.503)	(13.911)
Region and urban FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,062	7,088	7,028	7,027	712	710	672	693
Communities	49	49	49	49	21	21	21	21

Note: This table presents the results of estimations with SE clustered at the community level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.6: The aggregated short- and medium-term effects of displacement in the balanced sample: complete results - Oprobit estimation

Well-being	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Displaced	-0.906***	-0.637***	-0.528***	-0.436	0.024	-0.107
	(0.124)	(0.171)	(0.203)	(0.331)	(0.225)	(0.155)
Age	-0.004**	-0.005***	-0.001	-0.002	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Man	0.145***	-0.034	0.020	-0.039	0.048	-0.058
	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.038)
Kyrgyz	-0.093	-0.194	-0.027	-0.002	-0.245	-0.135
	(0.148)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.150)	(0.172)	(0.098)
Uzbek	-0.092	-0.422	-0.129	0.047	-0.328	-0.114
	(0.253)	(0.262)	(0.259)	(0.194)	(0.228)	(0.185)
Household head	-0.107*	0.007	-0.076*	0.068	-0.062	-0.017
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.041)	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.034)
Single	-0.432***	-0.150	-0.378***	-0.287***	-0.252*	-0.039
	(0.095)	(0.152)	(0.117)	(0.102)	(0.148)	(0.161)
Married	0.212***	0.283***	0.297***	0.266***	0.196***	0.351***
	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.054)
Has a child	0.059	0.111	-0.033	-0.046	-0.013	0.075
	(0.153)	(0.144)	(0.122)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.129)
Household size	0.024*	0.012	0.010	0.001	0.021	0.035***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.009)
Prim. tech./Sec. education	0.042	0.064	0.161*	-0.082	-0.039	0.125
	(0.100)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.076)	(0.080)
Higher education	0.301**	0.347***	0.495***	0.183*	0.228*	0.414***
	(0.134)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.100)
Months worked last 12 months	0.003	0.007	0.021***	0.022***	0.022***	0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Urban resident	-0.262	-0.431*	-0.551**	-0.506***	-0.446**	0.331
	(0.204)	(0.224)	(0.244)	(0.174)	(0.209)	(0.226)
Climate shocks	-0.066	0.023	0.142	0.086	0.055	-0.050
	(0.180)	(0.221)	(0.171)	(0.177)	(0.221)	(0.196)
Political riots/destruction	-0.424***	-0.186	-0.201	-0.023	-0.115	0.007
	(0.128)	(0.177)	(0.153)	(0.111)	(0.164)	(0.188)
Economic shocks	-0.218	-0.299	-0.147	-0.179	0.325	-0.004
	(0.165)	(0.226)	(0.204)	(0.151)	(0.207)	(0.176)
% Kyrgyz pop. (2009)	-0.035***	-0.026**	-0.021	-0.038***	-0.021	0.015
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)
% Uzbek pop. (2009)	-0.023**	-0.021	-0.029*	-0.062***	-0.028*	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.012)
% with Secondary edu. (2009)	0.001	0.025	-0.021	-0.021	-0.049	0.037
	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.033)
% with Higher edu. (2009)	-0.094***	0.008	-0.004	-0.004	0.016	-0.018
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.030)
% Moved in $\leq$ 1 year ago (2009)	0.059	-0.003	0.149***	0.000	0.037	0.050
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.060)
% in Labor force (2009)	-0.026	-0.027	0.009	-0.065***	-0.029	0.020
	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Relative pop. size (2009)	-25.798***	-7.024	1.845	5.456	-5.679	5.752
	(5.196)	(7.093)	(9.001)	(5.064)	(7.252)	(6.473)
Region and urban FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period	2010	2011	2012	2013	2016	2019
Observations	2,866	2,866	2,866	2,866	2,866	2,866
Communities	49	49	49	49	49	49

Note: This table presents the results of estimations with SE clustered at the community level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$.

Abstrakt

Tato práce se zabývá dopady krátkodobého nuceného vysídlení na subjektivní blahobyt osob po jejich návratu. Empirická analýza vychází z případu týdenního mezietnického konfliktu, který proběhl v červnu 2010 na jihu Kyrgyzstánu, a využívá individuální dotazníková data z let 2006–2019. Výchozí specifikace porovnává vysídlené osoby zasažené konfliktem s osobami, které konfliktem zasaženy nebyly, při kontrole pozorovatelných charakteristik. Vzhledem k možné endogenitě vysídlení jsou odhady dále doplněny metodou instrumentálních proměnných založenou na geografických charakteristikách domácností, zejména na vzdálenosti od lokalit postižených destrukcí související s konfliktem a na dostupnosti blízkých míst vhodných k dočasnému ukrytí. K zachycení časové dynamiky změn subjektivního blahobytu na lokální úrovni je současně využita metoda rozdílů v rozdílech. Výsledky ukazují, že i krátkodobé vysídlení je spojeno s významným poklesem subjektivního blahobytu v období po skončení konfliktu. Tento negativní dopad je méně výrazný u osob, kterým se během vysídlení dostalo podpory ze strany rodiny a přátel. Analýza dále ukazuje, že účinky vysídlení se výrazně liší mezi jednotlivými dimenzemi subjektivního blahobytu, přičemž nejsilnější negativní dopady jsou patrné v oblasti spokojenosti s bydlením, zdravotním stavem, pocitem bezpečí a vyhlídkami do budoucna. Přestože se úroveň subjektivního blahobytu vysídlených osob v čase postupně přibližuje úrovni osob nevysídlených, proces obnovy je pomalý a trvá několik let.

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