Tying by a Non-monopolist*

EUGEN KOVÁČ†
(CERGE-EI‡)

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Abstract

This paper explores tying in the situation where a multi-product firm without monopoly power competes against several single-product firms. I consider two markets: one for a horizontally differentiated good, the other for a homogeneous good. As opposed to the widely accepted opinion that tying may be profitable only in the case of monopoly power, I show that under reasonable assumptions tying is profitable for the multi-product firm and has a negative welfare effect.

Tento článek analyzuje svazování v situaci, kde velká firma vyrábějící více produktů nemá monopolní postavení a na každém trhu soupeří s několika specializovanými firmami, které vyrábějí jenom jeden produkt. Uvažuji dva trhy: jeden pro horizontálně diferencovaný produkt, druhý pro homogenní produkt. Naproti obecně akceptovanému tvrzení, že svazování je výhodné jenom v případě monopolního postavení, ukazuji, že za rozumných podmínek je svazování výhodné pro velkou firmu, přičemž má negativní efekt na sociální blahobyt.

Keywords: industrial organization, anti-trust policy, multi-product firm, tying, bundling

JEL classification: L13, L11, L41

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†Address: CERGE-EI, P.O.BOX 882, Politických vězňů 7, 11121 Prague 1, Czech Republic; e-mail: eugen.kovac@cerge-ei.cz.

‡A joint workplace of the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles University, and the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.
1 Introduction

Tying refers to the situation where a firm makes the purchase of one of its products conditional on the purchase of another of its products. According to the leverage theory, tying “provides a mechanism whereby a firm with monopoly power in one market can use the leverage provided by this power to foreclose sales in, and thereby monopolize, a second market” (Whinston 1990). Therefore, tying is one of the basic concepts in anti-trust laws and policies. Particular cases deal with firms that try to monopolize another market and require a proof of the monopoly power in the first market. This proof is often omitted in practice “since how could a tie-in be imposed unless such power existed?” (Posner 1976, p. 172), suggesting that in general tying may be profitable only when a monopoly is present.

Following this idea, the theoretical literature on tying focuses mainly on the monopolization of the second market and also on tying of complementary components of a system (e.g., hardware and software) produced by several multi-product firms. However, it does not properly address the effect of tying by a multi-product firm when the goods are not complementary and the firm has no monopoly power. According to the argument by Posner (1976), the multi-product firm will never find tying profitable. However, a casual evidence indicates that tying in such situation also occurs in the marketplace. In this paper I analyze the situation where a multi-product firm (without monopoly power) competes against several single-product firms to show that tying can indeed be a reasonable strategy for the multi-product firm but has a negative effect on welfare. This is important for assessing the relevance of anti-trust laws and policies.

I introduce a model in which one multi-product (generalist) firm competes in

\footnote{Recall, for example, the famous case of U.S. vs. Microsoft.}

\footnote{Microsoft’s tying of Word, Excel, Access, PowerPoint and other programs into Office can serve as an example. See Denicolo (2000) for details.}
two markets for two non-complementary goods. The first good is heterogeneous and is produced by another (specialist) firm. The second good is homogeneous, and I consider different structures of the market for it, in particular duopoly and perfect competition. If the generalist firm decides to offer its products only as a bundle, two effects emerge: a competition softening effect and a substitution effect. The former means that the competition on the market for the second good becomes softer and a mark-up is added to its price, which increases the generalist’s firm incentives to bundle. The latter means that consumers with low valuation for the second good may switch from the bundle offered by the generalist firm and buy the products separately. This usually decreases the generalist firm’s incentives to bundle. The profitability of bundling depends on the relationship of these two effects. As opposed to the argument by Posner (1976), I show that the generalist firm prefers pure bundling in the case where the competition softening effect is significant and the substitution effect is weak, and in the case where the substitution effect is very strong, which subsequently allows firms to relax their prices. The first case occurs, for example, when there is duopoly on the market for the second good and the first good is differentiated sufficiently; the second case occurs when the degree of differentiation of the first good is low. Moreover, in cases where the model is tractable, I show that tying has a negative effect on welfare.

The theoretical literature does not properly address tying by a multi-product firm which has no monopoly power and competes against several single-product firms.

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3These assumptions are satisfied, for example, in the well known Czech anti-trust case S21/95-240 of Likéřka STOCK Plzeň-Božkov, which was tying several alcoholic beverages to Fernet Stock. Fernet Stock was considered horizontally differentiated from other bitter liqueurs (e.g., Becherovka, Jägermeister,...) whereas the other alcoholic beverages were considered homogeneous products.

4Bundling is a more general concept than tying and refers to the situation when a package containing at least two different products is offered. The practice in which the firm offers only the bundle is called pure bundling, as opposed to mixed bundling when the firm also offers some of the products separately.
firms. The literature on tying in an environment with multiple firms can be divided into two streams: the use of tying to create or preserve market power, in particular a monopoly (leverage theory), and bundling of compatible products produced by several multi-product firms. After heavy criticism in the 1950s and the 1970s, Whinston (1990) reconsiders the leverage hypothesis. Using a simple model where a multi-product firm with a monopoly on one market competes in price with a rival on another market, he examines the implications of tying and comes to the conclusion that it may lead to the foreclosure of the monopolist’s rival in the tied good market. However, the monopolist will engage in tying only if it can commit itself to doing so, which will consequently drive its rival out of the market. Whinston (1990) claims that tying is profitable for the monopolist precisely because of the “exclusionary effect on the market structure.” However, the welfare effects in his model are uncertain.

Besides foreclosure, several other effects of tying by a firm with monopolistic power in one market were identified. Carbajo, de Meza and Seidmann (1990) argue that under imperfect competition (e.g., duopoly) on the tied good market, bundling may cause the rivals to compete less aggressively. Seidmann (1991) argues that bundling may enable rivals to avoid competition for tied good sales. Hence tying has a favorable effect on a rival that does not tie, which contradicts the common interpretation of the leverage theory. He also applies his analysis to several anti-trust cases to demonstrate the relevance of his study. Carlton and Waldman (2002) argue that a dominant firm can use bundling to remain dominant in an industry with rapid technological change. They apply this analysis to the Microsoft case and claim that Microsoft’s tying and deterrence of Netscape’s entry into the market for internet browsers could have increased social welfare.

5See Director and Levi (1956) and Posner (1976).
The second stream of literature focuses on bundling of compatible complementary products produced by several multi-product firms (also called mix-and-match literature). Matutes and Regibeau (1988) consider two firms, each of them producing two necessary components of a system, with horizontally differentiated components produced by different firms. Matutes and Regibeau (1992) introduce bundling in their former model and show that in many cases the firms choose to produce compatible components but offer discounts to consumers who buy the components from one firm. They claim that firms would be better off when they commit themselves to not providing such discounts.

The only paper which discusses tying by a multi-product firm without monopoly power which competes against several single-product firms is Denicolo (2000). He adapts the model from Matutes and Regibeau (1988) to a case where one generalist firm faces two specialized competitors. The author analyzes the incompatibility and compatibility of the products and carries the analysis over to pure bundling and independent components, considering pure bundling equivalent to incompatibility. He introduces a model with two complementary products. To describe the markets he uses a Hotelling model, following Matutes and Regibeau (1988), with consumers uniformly distributed on the unit square and with quadratic transportation costs. Denicolo (2000) argues that if bundles are more differentiated than the components, bundling may relax the price competition benefiting the generalist firm and compares his results to Whinston (1990), pointing out that bundling may be profitable for the generalist firm even in the absence of foreclosure and also for the specialist firm producing the less differentiated component. The models presented in this paper differ crucially from Denicolo (2000). As opposed to Denicolo (2000), I do not require complementarity of the goods and consider only one differentiated product whereas the other is homogeneous. Moreover, I also analyze
mixed bundling which even cannot be interpreted in Denicolo’s the framework of incompatibility and compatibility. I also focus on the welfare effects of bundling which are only briefly discussed by Denicolo (2000).

The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the basic model to illustrate the competition softening effect. This model is completely tractable and allows for a complete classification of the generalist firm’s decision. In Section 3, I extend the basic model by assuming heterogeneous but discrete valuations for the second good which allow for the substitution effect. This model is also tractable and it generalizes the results of the basic model. In Section 4, I assume continuous distribution of valuations for the second good to check the robustness of the results from previous sections. In Section 5, I conclude and discuss the relevance of my results for anti-trust policies and suggests possible extensions. Appendix A contains the proofs of all lemmas and propositions.

2 Basic model

I start with a simple model to illustrate the competition softening effect. There are two markets for indivisible goods \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \) and three firms: firm \( G \) operating on both markets and firms \( A \) and \( B \), each of them operating only on the market for good \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \), respectively. Production of good \( X_i \), \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) involves constant unit cost \( c_i \geq 0 \), which is the same for every firm producing it. Goods \( X_1 \) produced by firms \( G \) and \( A \) are horizontally differentiated (\( X_{G1} \) and \( X_{A1} \) denote their version of good \( X_1 \));\(^6\) good \( X_2 \) is homogeneous. To model the differentiation, I use a Hotelling model with firms positioned on the edges of the unit interval: firm \( G \) at 0 and firm \( A \) at 1.

\(^6\)I have also investigated the case of vertically differentiated products. Because the results are similar to the results in this section, they are not presented here.
Consumers are indexed by two parameters $\alpha$ and $v$. The marginal utility for the first unit of good $X_1$ purchased from a firm positioned at $x_1$ is $w - \theta|\alpha - x_1|$; the marginal utility from the first unit of good $X_2$ is $v$. The marginal utility from any additional unit of each good is zero. This ensures that a consumer will buy either one unit of a good or he will not buy it at all. In this basic model I assume that $v$ is constant ($v > c_2$) and $\alpha$ is uniformly distributed over the interval $[0, 1]$.

The expression $\theta|\alpha - x_1|$ represents the transportation costs (assumed to be linear) or equivalently the disutility from getting a differentiated product. The parameter $\theta$ stands for the unit transportation costs or the degree of differentiation of products $X_{A1}$ and $X_{G1}$. For simplicity let $w$ be high enough to have the market for good $X_1$ covered in equilibrium (either as a separate product or in a bundle). Note that the same effect is achieved if I simply assume that every consumer wants to buy good $X_1$. The above assumptions about marginal utility imply that the utility function of the consumer indexed by parameters $\alpha$ and $v$ is additive and takes the form

$$u_{\alpha, v}(h, x_1, x_2) = h + w - \theta|\alpha - x_1| + x_2v,$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $x_1$ is the position of the firm from which the consumer purchases good $X_1$, $x_2$ is the quantity of good $X_2$ he purchases ($x_2 \in \{0, 1\}$) and $h$ is the amount of money spent on all other goods. I assume the wealth is identical for all consumers (denoted by $m$) and is high enough to purchase any combination of goods $X_1$ and $X_2$ available in equilibrium. Note that the assumption of identical wealth is not restrictive since because of additivity of the utility function, the consumer’s decision does not depend on his level of wealth (provided $m$ is high enough).

The whole situation can be modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, firm $G$ decides which combination of goods $X_1$ and $X_2$ it will sell; its options are
listed in Table 1. In the second stage, all firms compete in prices.\textsuperscript{7} I assume that firm $G$ can precommit itself not to change its bundling strategy in the second stage (e.g., not to sell one of the goods separately if it previously decided otherwise). This precommitment can be achieved, for example, by a technological setting which may involve sunk costs; see Whinston (1990) for a more extensive discussion. I analyze the pure-strategy equilibria of each subgame and look for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Products offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no bundling</td>
<td>$X_{G1}$ and $X_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pure bundling</td>
<td>bundle $\mathcal{G} = {X_{G1}, X_2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mixed bundling</td>
<td>$\mathcal{G}$ and $X_{G1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\mathcal{G}$ and $X_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\mathcal{G}$, $X_{G1}$ and $X_2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Strategies of firm $G$ in the first stage

Remark 1. To avoid unintuitive cases I usually, with one exception, assume that consumers who are indifferent among several choices decide randomly among them.\textsuperscript{8} The exception is the situation where the consumer is indifferent between buying a good or not buying it at all. In this case I assume that he chooses the former.

Remark 2. In addition, I assume that if a firm cannot earn a positive profit, its best response is to set the price equal to marginal cost. This avoids cases where a firm’s profit has a maximum of zero, the firm is indifferent among several prices yielding the profit zero and a particular price has to be chosen to yield the equilibrium. The assumption restricts the analysis to such equilibria where no firm earns negative profit and if a firm earns zero profit, its price is equal to marginal costs. Further,

\textsuperscript{7}When comparing some outcomes (e.g., profits, prices, etc.) of those subgames, I always mean the equilibrium outcomes.

\textsuperscript{8}All the results also hold with the weaker assumption that if the measure of indifferent consumers is positive, then for every choice there is a positive measure of consumers choosing it.
with the claim that a subgame has no equilibrium in pure strategies, I always
mean that it does not have any equilibrium satisfying the above condition (see in
particular Proposition 5 and Lemma 5).

To be able to judge welfare implications, I compare consumer surplus and total
surplus across subgames. The former is defined as

\[ CS = \int_0^1 u_{\alpha,v}^* \, d\alpha, \]

where \( u_{\alpha,v}^* \) denotes the equilibrium utility of consumer \( \alpha \). The latter is defined as
the sum of consumer surplus and total industry profits.

### 2.1 No bundling

Consider first the benchmark case where firm \( G \) decides to sell its products sep-
arately. Let \( p_{j1} \) be the price of good \( X_1 \) offered by firm \( j \) (where \( j = G, A \)).
Similarly, let \( p_{j2} \) be the price of good \( X_2 \) offered by firm \( j \) (where \( j = G, B \)) and
denote \( p_2 = \min\{p_{G2}, p_{B2}\} \). In the absence of bundling, the consumer can choose
among four options. Table 2 shows his utility from each choice (note that the
rest of the wealth is spent on other goods). The additivity of the utility function
implies that the decisions to buy goods \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \) are independent.\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination</th>
<th>Utility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( X_{G1} )</td>
<td>( m + w - p_{G1} - \theta \alpha )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X_{A1} )</td>
<td>( m + w - p_{A1} - \theta (1 - \alpha) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X_{G1} ) and ( X_2 )</td>
<td>( m + w - p_{G1} - \theta \alpha - p_2 + v )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X_{A1} ) and ( X_2 )</td>
<td>( m + w - p_{A1} - \theta (1 - \alpha) - p_2 + v )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Consumer’s options in the absence of bundling

\(^9\)Whinston (1990) refers to such a situation as an independent pricing game.
Bertrand competition on the market for good $X_2$ implies the equilibrium prices $p_{G2} = p_{B2} = c_2$, at which every consumer is going to buy it. In that case, the profits from selling good $X_2$ are $\Pi_{G2} = \Pi_B = 0$. The Hotelling competition on the market for good $X_1$ implies that in equilibrium, the market is split equally (consumers with $\alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ buy $X_{G1}$ and consumers with $\alpha > \frac{1}{2}$ buy $X_{A1}$) and

$$p_{G1} = p_{A1} = \theta + c_1, \quad \Pi_{G1} = \Pi_A = \frac{1}{2}\theta; \quad (2)$$

see, for example, Shy (1996), pp. 149–152. Therefore, the profit of firm $G$ is $\Pi_G = \Pi_{G1} + \Pi_{G2} = \frac{1}{2}\theta$ and the total industry profit is $\theta$. For the prices given by (2), the consumer surplus can be computed as

$$CS = \int_0^{1/2} (m + w - (\theta + c_1) - \theta \alpha - c_2 + v) \, d\alpha + \int_{1/2}^1 (m + w - (\theta + c_1) - \theta (1 - \alpha) - c_2 + v) \, d\alpha = m + w + v - c_1 - c_2 - \frac{5}{4}\theta,$$

which yields the total surplus $TS = m + w + v - c_1 - c_2 - \frac{1}{4}\theta$.

2.2 Pure bundling by firm $G$

In the case of pure bundling, the consumer has only three options (assuming that he needs to buy good $X_1$): good $X_{A1}$ alone, both goods $X_{A1}$ and $X_2$ (from firm $B$), and the bundle $\mathcal{G} = \{X_{G1}, X_2\}$; he cannot buy $X_{G1}$ separately. The bundle is offered at the price $p_{G}$ and yields the utility $m + w - p_{G} - \theta \alpha + v$ (the utility in the other cases is the same as in Table 2). If $p_{B2} < v$, the combination $X_{A1}, X_2$ is strictly preferred to $X_{A1}$ by all consumers. If $p_{B2} = v$, all consumers who are indifferent between buying and not buying $X_2$ in addition to $X_{A1}$ choose by assumption
to buy it (see Remark 1). Therefore, for \( p_B \leq v \), each consumer decides only between buying both \( X_{A1} \) and \( X_2 \), and buying the bundle \( G = \{X_{G1}, X_2\} \). On the other hand, if \( p_B > v \), the consumer decides between buying \( X_{A1} \) and buying the bundle \( G \). Given the prices \( p_{A1}, p_{B2}, p_G \), the consumer indexed by parameters \( \alpha \) and \( v \) buys the bundle if and only if \( \alpha \leq \alpha^*(v) \), where \( \alpha^*(v) \) corresponds to an indifferent consumer. Obviously, \( \alpha^*(v) \) is given by the equation \( v - p_G - \theta\alpha = v - p_{A1} - p_{B2} - \theta(1 - \alpha) \) if \( p_B \leq v \), and by the equation \( v - p_G - \theta\alpha = -p_{A1} - \theta(1 - \alpha) \) if \( p_B > v \). Hence
\[
\alpha^*(v) = \frac{p_{A1} + \min\{v, p_{B2}\} - p_G}{2\theta} + \frac{1}{2}.
\]
(3)

In the rest of this section, I will drop the argument \( v \) because it is assumed to be identical for all consumers.

Obviously, any \( p_B > v \) is dominated. The above discussion implies that for \( p_B \leq v \) all consumers decide only between buying both \( X_{A1} \) and \( X_2 \), or buying the bundle. Hence there is no substitution effect in this model. Note that this result is crucially based on the fact that all consumers have identical valuation for good \( X_2 \).

If \( 0 \leq \alpha^* \leq 1 \) and \( p_B \leq v \), the profits of the firms are
\[
\Pi_G = \frac{1}{2\theta}(p_G - c_1 - c_2)(p_{A1} + p_{B2} - p_G + \theta),
\]
(4)
\[
\Pi_A = \frac{1}{2\theta}(p_{A1} - c_1)(-p_{A1} - p_{B2} + p_G + \theta),
\]
(5)
\[
\Pi_B = \frac{1}{2\theta}(p_{B2} - c_2)(-p_{A1} - p_{B2} + p_G + \theta).
\]
(6)
The equilibrium of this subgame is characterized in the following lemmas (their proofs can be found in Appendix A).
Lemma 1. If $v - c_2 \geq \frac{3}{4} \theta$, the equilibrium prices of the pure bundling subgame are

$$
\begin{align*}
p_G &= \frac{5}{4} \theta + c_1 + c_2, \\
p_{A1} &= \frac{3}{4} \theta + c_1, \\
p_{B2} &= \frac{3}{4} \theta + c_2.
\end{align*}
$$

(7)

Remark 3. This result is consistent with Denicolo (2000), who also considers the case when one of the products is less differentiated in Lemma 2. He receives the same prices as above for $\theta = 1$ and $c_1 = c_2 = 0$.

In the previous lemma, I assumed $v - c_2 \geq \frac{3}{4} \theta$ to ensure that $p_{B2} \leq v$ in equilibrium. If this assumption is violated, firm B chooses $p_{B2} = v$ (I assume that indifferent consumers decide to buy good $X_2$; see Remark 1) leading to another equilibrium which is characterized in the following lemma.

Lemma 2. If $v - c_2 < \frac{3}{4} \theta$, the equilibrium prices of the pure bundling subgame are

$$
\begin{align*}
p_G &= \theta + c_1 + \frac{v + 2c_2}{3}, \\
p_{A1} &= \theta + c_1 - \frac{v - c_2}{3}, \\
p_{B2} &= v.
\end{align*}
$$

(8)

To simplify the analysis I introduce a new parameter,

$$
\mu = \min \left\{ \frac{1}{4} \theta, \frac{1}{3} (v - c_2) \right\},
$$

(9)

which allows me to write the equilibrium prices in one expression and to obtain the following proposition. Note that $\mu > 0$; its interpretation follows.

Proposition 1. The equilibrium prices of the pure bundling subgame are

$$
\begin{align*}
p_G &= \theta + c_1 + c_2 + \mu, \\
p_{A1} &= \theta + c_1 - \mu, \\
p_{B2} &= c_2 + 3 \mu.
\end{align*}
$$

(10)
yielding firm G’s market share \( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\theta} \mu \), profits

\[
\Pi_G = \frac{1}{2\theta} (\theta + \mu)^2, \quad \Pi_A = \frac{1}{2\theta} (\theta - \mu)^2, \quad \Pi_B = \frac{3}{2\theta} \mu (\theta - \mu),
\]  

(11)

and consumer surplus

\[
CS = m + w + v - c_1 - c_2 - \frac{3}{4} \theta - \frac{3}{2} \mu + \frac{1}{36} \mu^2.
\]

Compared to the case of no bundling, the price of good \( X_2 \) is higher by \( 3\mu \). The price of the bundle is higher by \( \mu \) than the sum of prices of \( X_{G1} \) and \( X_2 \) in the case of no bundling. However, the price of \( X_{A1} \) is lower by \( \mu \). The intuition behind this has been set out previously in the introduction (Section 1). When firm \( G \) exits the market for good \( X_2 \), the competition there becomes softer (competition softening effect), in which case firm \( B \) is the only seller of separate good \( X_2 \). However, there is no monopoly because the consumer may substitute good \( X_2 \) with the bundle. Nevertheless, the price of good \( X_2 \) can rise by \( 3\mu \) and the price of the bundle by \( \mu \). Therefore \( \mu \) can be interpreted as the markup which is added to the price of the bundle in the case of pure bundling due to the competition softening effect. However, the effect on the price of good \( X_{A1} \) is inverse because every consumer buys either the bundle or both \( X_{A1} \) and \( X_2 \) (which is more expensive), so firm \( A \) has to decrease its price not to lose too many customers when \( B \) increases its price. Obviously, there is no substitution effect because in equilibrium all consumers buy good \( X_2 \).

As for the profits, obviously firm \( G \) earns a higher profit than do firms \( A \) and \( B \) together. Comparing them to the case of no bundling, the profit of firm \( A \) is lower, but the profits of firms \( B \) and \( G \) are higher. The total industry profit \( \theta + \frac{3}{2} \mu - \frac{1}{36} \mu^2 \) is obviously higher than in the case of no bundling. Using the above proposition,
the total surplus is

\[ TS = m + w + v - c_1 - c_2 - \frac{1}{4} \theta - \frac{1}{4\pi} \mu^2, \]

which is lower than in the case of no bundling. I conclude that firm G always prefers pure bundling to selling separate products, which has a negative effect on firm A, but a positive effect on firm B. In addition, this practice decreases both consumer surplus and total surplus.

Remark 4. Note that the difference between the profits vanishes as the degree of differentiation \( \theta \) approaches zero. Then, the goods become perfect substitutes, the markup \( \mu \) converges to zero, and pure bundling yields in equilibrium the same profits as selling separate products.

2.3 Mixed bundling by firm G

Mixed bundling means that besides offering the bundle firm G also offers good \( X_{G1} \) or \( X_2 \) or both. I will analyze each of these three cases separately.

2.3.1 Firm G offers the bundle and good \( X_{G1} \)

Consider first the situation where firm G decides to offer the bundle as well as good \( X_{G1} \). In this case the pair of goods \( X_{G1} \) and \( X_2 \) is a perfect substitute for the bundle (this can be seen from the utility function), and to choose between them the consumers simply compare \( p_G \) and \( p_{G1} + p_{B2} \). Therefore, by also selling good \( X_{G1} \) firm G “competes against itself.” This means that it may be willing to charge a very high price if good \( X_{G1} \) is purchased separately. The following proposition confirms this intuition and characterizes the equilibrium.
**Proposition 2.** In the subgame where firm $G$ offers the product $X_{G1}$ as well as the bundle, the equilibrium prices of goods $X_{A1}$, $X_{B2}$, and the bundle are the same as in the pure bundling subgame (see Proposition 1) and $X_{G1}$ may have any price satisfying the condition

$$p_{G1} > \theta + c_1 - \frac{1}{2\theta}\mu(\theta - 3\mu).$$  

(12)

In this case, no consumer buys $X_{G1}$ and $X_{B2}$, and these prices yield the same profits as in the pure bundling subgame.

If the above condition does not hold, firm $B$ can decrease its price slightly below $p_G - p_{G1}$, in which case all consumers purchase good $X_2$; see Appendix A for computations.

Obviously, the above equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the equilibrium in the no bundling subgame.\(^{10}\) Condition (12) means that firm $G$ sells good $X_{G1}$ for a very high price so that it does not compete with the bundle. However, because $\theta > 3\mu$, this price may be still lower than the equilibrium price of $X_{G1}$ in the no bundling subgame, given by (2).

This case is important for anti-trust policies. If firm $G$ is not allowed to engage in pure bundling, it may yield the same outcome also by mixed bundling when offering the good $X_{G1}$ for a quite low price (lower than in the no bundling case) but high enough so that nobody buys it separately (note that the price of good $X_2$ is higher).

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\(^{10}\)Two equilibria are outcome equivalent if they yield the same utility to each consumer and the same profit to each firm.
2.3.2 Firm $G$ offers the bundle and good $X_{G2}$

If firm $G$ offers the bundle as well as good $X_2$ (for the price $p_{G2}$), Bertrand competition on the market for good $X_2$ yields $p_{G2} = p_{B2} = c_2$ in equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium in this case is analogous to the case where the market for good $X_2$ is perfectly competitive. Then after the exit of firm $G$ from the market for good $X_2$ its price will not change and will be equal to $c_2$ (the same occurs also in the case when there are at least three firms selling good $X_2$).

Obviously, there is no competition softening effect in both cases described above. Intuitively, it implies that there cannot be any markup added to the price of good $G$. Hence $p_G = \theta + c_1 + c_2$ and $p_{A1} = \theta + c_1$, which is outcome equivalent to the case of no bundling. The following proposition clearly confirms the intuition.

**Proposition 3.** In the subgame when firm $G$ offers the bundle and good $X_2$, the equilibrium prices are

\[
p_G = \theta + c_1 + c_2, \quad p_{A1} = \theta + c_1, \quad p_{G2} = p_{B2} = c_2,
\]

yielding firm $G$’s market share $\frac{1}{2}$ and the same profits as in the no bundling subgame.

**Corollary 1.** If the market for good $X_2$ is perfectly competitive, the equilibrium prices of the pure bundling subgame are given by (13). Firm $G$ is indifferent between selling separate products and pure bundling.

**Remark 5.** Note that by taking $\mu = 0$ in (10) and (11), I obtain exactly the same prices and profits as in Proposition 3. This corresponds either to the situation when $X_{G1}$ and $X_{A1}$ are perfect substitutes (i.e., $\theta = 0$) or to a situation when the marginal cost of good $X_2$ is very high (i.e., $c_2 = v$). Obviously, in both of these
cases bundling does not pay; see also Remark 4.

2.3.3 Firm $G$ offers the bundle and both goods $X_{G1}$ and $X_{G2}$

The last case to consider is where firm $G$ offers the bundle as well as goods $X_{G1}$ and $X_2$ separately. Using the same arguments as above, $p_{G2} = p_{B2} = c_2$. The consumers’ decision whether to buy the bundle or goods $X_{G1}$ and $X_2$ (either from $B$ or $G$) is determined by their prices $p_G$ and $p_{G1} + c_2$. Obviously, there is again no competition softening effect in this case. Therefore, $\min\{p_G, p_{G1} + c_2\} = \theta + c_1 + c_2$ and $p_{A1} = \theta + c_1$ in equilibrium. Every such equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the case of no bundling.

2.4 Subgame-perfect equilibrium

The above analysis of the pricing subgames implies that firm $G$ prefers pure bundling over other marketing strategies.\textsuperscript{11} However, both consumer surplus and total surplus are lower than in the no bundling subgame.

3 Heterogeneous valuations of good $X_2$

In this section I extend the basic model to illustrate the substitution effect and to investigate when it arises. For this purpose I consider heterogeneous valuations for good $X_2$ starting with a simple discrete case with only two types of consumers: those with low and high valuation; denote them $v_L$ and $v_H$. In the next section I analyze the case where the valuation of good $X_2$ is distributed uniformly over the interval $[0, 1]$. Furthermore, I restrict the analysis to comparing the subgame where firm $G$ sells separate products as a benchmark with the pure bundling subgame and

\textsuperscript{11}The same outcome can also be achieved by mixed bundling when firm $G$ also sells good $X_{G1}$, but for such a price that nobody wants to buy it.
the mixed bundling subgame where firm $G$ sells product $X_2$ as well as the bundle (because of its interpretation that the market for good $X_2$ is perfectly competitive; see the discussion preceding Proposition 3 and Corollary 1).

Remark 6. Other types of mixed bundling, in particular when firm $G$ offers good $X_G1$ as well as the bundle, may also have interesting implications. Introduction of good $X_G1$ (at price $p_G1$ such that $p_G1 < p_G < p_G1 + c_2$) can serve for firm $G$ as a tool for price discrimination between consumers with high and low valuation for good $X_2$. Obviously, this weakens the substitution effect. Hence, a specific form of mixed bundling may be preferred by firm $G$ to both selling separate products and pure bundling. However, an analysis of these cases significantly extends the discussion and is beyond the scope of this paper.

I assume that for each $v \in \{v_L, v_H\}$, the parameter $\alpha$ is distributed uniformly on $[0, 1]$, independently from valuation, and there is an equal measure of consumers with valuation $v_L$ and $v_H$. In other words, the consumers are distributed uniformly on the set $[0, 1] \times \{v_L, v_H\}$, with density $\frac{1}{2}$. To illustrate the substitution effect I assume that $v_L < c_2 < v_H$, which means that the consumers with low valuation for good $X_2$ will not buy it separately. In addition, I assume that $v_L = 0$ and $v_H = 1$ (then $0 < c_2 < 1$). This assumption significantly simplifies the analysis and does not weaken the results.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{12}\)The model can be generalized by assuming that the measure of consumers with valuations $v_H$ and $v_L$ are $\lambda$ and $1 - \lambda$, where $\lambda \in [0, 1]$. For $\lambda \to 1$, this model reduces to the basic model analyzed in the previous section. However, the discussion becomes much more complicated.

\(^{13}\)Because of the additivity of the utility function and the particular type of the distribution, any of the conditions on the parameters can be written as a linear inequality in $v_H - c_2$, $c_2 - v_L$, and $\theta$. Hence, my choice of $v_H$ and $v_L$ implies only that $(v_H - c_2) + (c_2 - v_L) = 1$. Note that also in the basic model $\mu$ depends only on $v - c_2$.\(^{14}\)
3.1 No bundling

When firm $G$ sells its product separately, consumers’ decision which type of good $X_1$ to buy is the same as in the previous model, yielding the same equilibrium prices and profits as in (2). Analogically, Bertrand competition on the market for good $X_2$ implies that $p_{G2} = p_{B2} = c_2$ in equilibrium, yielding zero profits. Hence consumers with $v = 1$ buy good $X_2$, and consumers with $v = 0$ do not. The consumer surplus in this case is $CS = m + w - c_1 + \frac{1}{2}(1 - c_2) - \frac{5}{4}\theta$; the total surplus is $TS = m + w - c_1 + \frac{1}{2}(1 - c_2) - \frac{1}{4}\theta$.

3.2 Pure bundling

Firm $G$’s decision to bundle causes the substitution effect. This means that some consumers who otherwise prefer to buy $X_1$ from firm $G$ now also obtain good $X_2$ in the bundle and hence may switch to firm $A$. Therefore, the substitution effect should decrease firm $G$’s incentives to bundle. However, this effect may be so significant that none of the consumers with valuation 0 for good $X_2$ buy the bundle, i.e., $\alpha^*(0) \leq 0$, where $\alpha^*$ is defined by (3). In this case the effect on firm $G$ is inverse, because it allows firm $A$ to relax its price. Depending on the sign of $\alpha^*(0) = \frac{1}{2\theta}(\theta + p_{A1} - p_G)$, I will consider three cases:

(a) $\alpha^*(0) > 0$, (b) $\alpha^*(0) < 0$, (c) $\alpha^*(0) = 0$.

Based on this classification, I will call an equilibrium type (a) equilibrium, if $\alpha^*(0) > 0$ and analogically I define type (b) equilibrium and type (c) equilibrium.
An easy computation yields the market share of firm $G$:

$$q_G = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{2\theta}(\theta + p_{A1} + \frac{1}{2}p_{B2} - p_G), & \text{if } \alpha^*(0) \geq 0, \\
\frac{1}{4\theta}(\theta + p_{A1} + p_{B2} - p_G), & \text{if } \alpha^*(0) \leq 0. 
\end{cases}$$

The market share of firm $A$ is $q_{A1} = 1 - q_G$, and the market share of firm $B$ is $q_{B2} = \frac{1}{4\theta}(\theta - p_{A1} - p_{B2} + p_G)$. Note that each firm $A$’s and $G$’s profit functions are concave on both sets where $\alpha^*(0) \geq 0$ or $\alpha^*(0) \leq 0$. Taking the first derivative of firm $G$’s profit, I obtain

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_G}{\partial p_G} = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{2\theta}(\theta + p_{A1} + \frac{1}{2}p_{B2} - 2p_G + c_2), & \text{if } \alpha^*(0) > 0, \\
\frac{1}{4\theta}(\theta + p_{A1} + p_{B2} - 2p_G + c_2), & \text{if } \alpha^*(0) < 0. 
\end{cases} \quad (14)$$

Depending on the sign of $\alpha^*(0)$ and the value of $p_{B2}$ (interior or one of two corner solutions), there can be nine types of equilibria. The following lemma claims that there is no equilibrium where $\alpha^*(0) = 0$.

**Lemma 3.** There is no type (c) equilibrium in the pure bundling subgame.

The equilibria in the remaining six cases are classified in Table 3 in Appendix B. The table contains the differences between the price and marginal costs, profits, and characterization of the bundling decision of firm $G$. All the computations are straightforward and I omit them. The third column of the table specifies necessary conditions for $\alpha^*(0)$ to have the correct sign and for $p_{B2}$ to have the appropriate value, i.e., whether $c_2 < p_{B2} < 1$ in cases (a1) and (b1), whether $\partial \Pi_B/\partial p_{B2}|_{p_{B2}=1} \geq 0$ in cases (a2) and (b2), and whether $\partial \Pi_B/\partial p_{B2}|_{p_{B2}=c_2} \leq 0$ in cases (a3) and (b3).

In addition to these conditions, it is necessary to check that none of the firms prefers to switch to the case where $\alpha^*(0)$ has the opposite sign. For example,
consider prices given in Table 3 in Appendix B for case (a1). Firm G may prefer to raise its price above \( p_{A1} + \theta = \frac{10}{10} \theta + c_1 + \frac{1}{5} c_2 \) (see Table 3), i.e., to achieve the case where \( \alpha^*(0) < 0 \). Firm G’s profit has another local maximum on \((p_{A1} + \theta, \infty)\) if and only if \( \frac{\partial \Pi_G}{\partial p_G} \big|_{p_G=p_{A1}+\theta} \) is positive from right or equivalently \( \theta < \frac{16}{13} c_2 \).

Then for \( p_G = \frac{5}{4} \theta + c_1 + c_2 \), firm G’s profit attains its maximum \( \frac{25}{64} \theta \) on the interval \((p_{A1} + \theta, \infty)\) which is higher than the original profit if and only if \( \theta < \frac{4}{343} (44 + 25 \sqrt{2}) c_2 \approx 0.9245 c_2 \). Hence I need to exclude all cases where the last inequality holds. Analogical computations need to be performed for all six cases for firms A and G (firm B cannot affect \( \alpha^*(0) \)); the last column of the table contains the results (called the no switch condition). Obviously, these together with the necessary conditions from the third column are sufficient and necessary for the existence of each type of equilibrium. According to these conditions, Figure 1 in Appendix B classifies the equilibria by parameters \( c_2 \) and \( \theta \). The thin dashed lines show the region which is excluded because of the conditions that no firm prefers to switch.

The figure shows that there is a region where none of the equilibria exists. Hence, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies of the pure bundling subgame. This fact is caused by non-concavity of the profit functions, which may have more local maxima. Therefore a firm may prefer to change its price drastically to achieve another maximum causing a discontinuity in the reaction curves (see also Remark 2). In particular, as discussed above, firm G may prefer to switch to a case where \( \alpha^*(0) \) has the opposite sign.

The following proposition summarizes the results about firm G’s bundling decision in cases where an equilibrium exists.

**Proposition 4.** Firm G prefers pure bundling if and only if either of the following conditions holds:
(i) $c_2 < \frac{1}{2}$ and $\theta > 2c_2$,
(ii) $\theta < 4(1 - c_2)$ and $\theta \leq \frac{4}{337}(27 + 14\sqrt{2})c_2$,
(iii) $4(1 - c_2) \leq \theta \leq \frac{1}{5}c_2 + \frac{1}{20}(2 + 3\sqrt{2})$.

The profits of firms $A$ and $G$ satisfy the inequality $\Pi_G > \frac{1}{2}\theta > \Pi_A$ in case (i), and $\Pi_A > \Pi_G > \frac{1}{2}\theta$ in cases (ii) and (iii).

Condition (i) corresponds to the region above the thick dashed curve in Figure 1 and clearly confirms the intuition about the competition softening effect and the substitution effect. It means that $c_2$ must be low so that the competition on the market for good $X_2$ can be softened sufficiently, i.e., there is a significant competition softening effect, and $\theta$ must be high enough so that it is not easy for consumers with low valuation for good $X_2$ to switch from the bundle to good $X_{A1}$, i.e., there is a weak substitution effect. The inequalities $\Pi_G > \frac{1}{2}\theta > \Pi_A$ mean that whenever pure bundling is preferred in case (a) it makes firm $A$ worse off, which is a similar result as in the basic model.

Conditions (ii) and (iii) correspond to equilibria of types (b1) and (b2), respectively. In these cases the substitution effect is very strong and has an inverse effect on firm $G$. If $\alpha^*(0) < 0$, all consumers with valuation 0 for good $X_2$ buy only product $X_{A1}$ from firm $A$. This means that only the consumers with valuation 1 are relevant for competition between firms $A$ and $G$ and any increase in price reduces the demand by less than it would have done in case (a). This changes the structure of the competition and allows firm $A$ and hence also firm $G$ to relax their prices, which makes pure bundling profitable. As opposed to the case where

\[14\text{In the classical Hotelling model (with one good), a similar effect is achieved if firm A is shifted to the point } \frac{1}{2} \text{ and the degree of differentiation is doubled. This yields prices } p_{G1} = \frac{5}{2}\theta, \quad p_{A1} = \frac{7}{2}\theta \text{ and profits } \Pi_{G1} = \frac{25}{6}\theta \text{ and } \Pi_{A} = \frac{49}{36}\theta. \text{ Not surprisingly, they are the same as in case (b3) where } p_{B2} = c_2.\]
condition (i) holds, $\Pi_A > \Pi_G > \frac{1}{2} \theta$, which means that firm $A$ earns higher profit than firm $G$ and all firms are better off than in the case of no bundling.

However, the effect on both consumer surplus and total surplus is negative. In case (b2) the consumer surplus and total surplus are $CS = m + w - c_1 + \frac{1}{2}(1 - c_2) - \frac{319}{128} \theta$ and $TS = m + w - c_1 + \frac{1}{2}(1 - c_2) - \frac{57}{128} \theta$. Both are obviously lower than in the case of no bundling. Cases (a1), (a2), and (b2) also lead to the conclusion that both consumer surplus and total surplus are lower than in the case of no bundling. However, the formulas are more complicated and they do not provide direct insight. All computations are straightforward and I omit them.

Remark 7. The above result has important implications for anti-trust policies since it shows that tying may make all firms better off whereby the effect on welfare is negative. Hence no firm is harmed by tying and has incentives to start a case against the generalist firm.

3.3 Mixed bundling by firm $G$

If firm $G$ sells product $X_2$ as well as the bundle, Bertrand competition on the market for good $X_2$ implies that its price is $c_2$. Hence all prices and profits are the same as specified in Table 3 in Appendix B in cases (a3) and (b3). The only difference is that now the condition $\partial \Pi_B / \partial p_{B2} |_{p_{B2}=c_2} \leq 0$ is not required to hold.

The following proposition summarizes the relevant conditions.

Proposition 5. In the subgame where firm $G$ sells the bundle as well as good $X_2$, the following statements hold:

(i) If $\theta \geq \frac{1}{2}(5 + 3\sqrt{2})c_2$, the subgame has an equilibrium. This equilibrium is not preferred by firm $G$ to selling separate products.
(ii) If $\theta \leq \frac{3}{20}(2 + \sqrt{2})c_2$, the subgame has an equilibrium. This equilibrium is preferred by firm $G$ to selling separate products.

(iii) Otherwise the subgame has no equilibrium in pure strategies.

Condition (i) corresponds to case (a3); condition (ii) corresponds to case (b3). In case (a3) there is no competition softening effect on the market for good $X_2$, and hence firm $G$ has no incentives to bundle. In case (b3) the effect is the same as discussed in the previous subsection for cases (b1) and (b2), i.e., the substitution effect is so strong that it causes a structural change allowing both firms $A$ and $G$ to relax their prices and earn higher profit. Similarly as in Proposition 4, the inequalities $\Pi_A > \Pi_G > \frac{1}{2} \theta$ hold in equilibrium, i.e., firm $A$ is better off than firm $G$.

Similarly as in the previous subsection, the effect on both consumer surplus and total surplus is negative. When condition (ii) from Proposition 5 holds (the only case where pure bundling is preferred by firm $G$), the consumer surplus and total surplus are

$$CS = m + w - c_1 + \frac{1}{2}(1 - c_2) - \frac{179}{72} \theta$$

and

$$TS = m + w - c_1 + \frac{1}{2}(1 - c_2) - \frac{31}{72} \theta.$$ 

Both are obviously lower than in the case of no bundling. By the same argument as in the previous subsection, this result is relevant for anti-trust policies (see Remark 7).

**Remark 8.** Concerning other types of mixed bundling, the intuition suggests that selling $X_{G1}$ as well as the bundle may be preferred by firm $G$ in cases (a1) or (a2) because it reduces the substitution effect. However, in cases (b1) and (b2), where the substitution effect is very strong, pure bundling should be preferred.
4 Continuous valuations of good $X_2$

In the basic model all consumers have the same valuation for good $X_2$ and prefer to buy it. In the extended model introduced in the previous section, I considered two types of consumers — with valuation 0 and 1. To introduce more variety of decisions and to check the robustness of the previous section’s conclusions, I will assume a continuous distribution of valuations for good $X_2$. I show that whenever the competition softening effect is significant, pure bundling is profitable when the substitution effect is weak (i.e., $c_2$ is small and $\theta$ is large), and that selling the bundle as well as $X_2$ is not profitable because of no competition softening effect. Moreover, I provide numerical examples to confirm the results of Propositions 4 and 5 and to illustrate that bundling has a negative effect on welfare whenever it is profitable for firm $G$.

In the model presented in this section, I assume that each consumer is indexed by a pair of parameters $(\alpha, v)$ which is uniformly distributed over the unit square; the parameters have the same meaning as in the basic model. Further I will assume that $0 < c_2 < 1$. The utility achieved by purchasing a particular combination of goods is the same as in Table 2. Similarly as in the previous section, I restrict the analysis to comparing the no bundling subgame with the pure bundling subgame and the mixed bundling subgame where firm $G$ sells product $X_2$ as well as the bundle.\textsuperscript{15}

4.1 No bundling

Analogically to Subsection 3.1, the consumers’ decision which type of good $X_1$ to buy is the same as in the basic model, yielding the same equilibrium prices and

\textsuperscript{15}A similar discussion as in Remark 6 also applies here. Moreover, the other types of mixed bundling are not tractable in this model.
profits as in (2). Bertrand competition on the market for good $X_2$ implies that $p_{G2} = p_{B2} = c_2$ in equilibrium, yielding zero profits. Hence all consumers with $v \geq c_2$ buy good $X_2$. The consumer surplus in this case is $CS = m + w - c_1 + \frac{1}{2}(1 - c_2)^2 - \frac{5}{4}\theta$; the total surplus is $TS = m + w - c_1 + \frac{1}{2}(1 - c_2)^2 - \frac{1}{4}\theta$.

4.2 Pure bundling

When firm $G$ engages in pure bundling, the situation changes because of the substitution effect. As compared to the independent pricing game, some consumers who had bought only good $X_{G1}$ (i.e., they have valuation lower than the price of good $X_2$) also obtain good $X_2$ in the bundle. Therefore they may prefer to switch to good $X_{A1}$. Consumer $(\alpha, v)$ buys the bundle if and only if $\alpha \leq \alpha^*(v)$, where $\alpha^*(v)$ is given by (3). All firms have a positive market share if and only if $0 < \alpha^*(p_{B2}) < 1$. Similarly as in the previous model, depending on the sign of $\alpha^*(0) = \frac{1}{2\theta}(\theta + p_{A1} - p_G)$, I obtain three cases for the distribution of the market:

(a) $\alpha^*(0) > 0$,  
(b) $\alpha^*(0) < 0$,  
(c) $\alpha^*(0) = 0$.

Cases (a) and (b) are sketched in Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix B. The shaded area represents consumers who purchase the bundle. I will call an equilibrium type (a) equilibrium, if $\alpha^*(0) > 0$. Analogically I define type (b) equilibrium and type (c) equilibrium. The market share of firm $G$ can be computed as follows:

$$q_G = \int_{\max\{0, -2\alpha^*(0)\}}^{1} \alpha^*(v) \, dv =
\begin{cases}
\frac{1}{2\theta}(\theta + p_{A1} - p_G + p_{B2} - \frac{1}{2}p_{B2}^2), & \text{if } \alpha^*(0) \geq 0, \\
\frac{1}{2\theta}(2 + \theta + p_{A1} - p_{B2} - p_G)(\theta + p_{A1} + p_{B2} - p_G), & \text{if } \alpha^*(0) \leq 0,
\end{cases}$$

\footnote{By market share I understand the measure of all consumers who purchase the product.}
The market share of firm A is simply $q_A = 1 - q_G$, and the market share of firm B is $q_B = (1 - \alpha^*(p_B)) (1 - p_B) = \frac{1}{2\theta} (-p_A - p_B + \theta)(1 - p_B)$. Therefore, the profits in case (a) are:

$$\Pi_G = \frac{1}{2\theta} (p_G - c_1 - c_2) (-p_A + p_G + \theta + p_B - \frac{1}{2}p_B^2), \quad (15)$$

$$\Pi_A = \frac{1}{2\theta} (p_A - c_1) (-p_A + p_G + \theta - p_B + \frac{1}{2}p_B^2), \quad (16)$$

$$\Pi_B = \frac{1}{2\theta} (p_B^2 - c_2) (-p_A + p_G + \theta - p_B^2)(1 - p_B). \quad (17)$$

Note that the formula for $\Pi_B$ can be used only if $c_2 \leq p_B \leq 1$ and $0 \leq \alpha^*(p_B) \leq 1$. Obviously any $p_B$ outside the interval $[c_2, 1]$ is dominated. If $\alpha^*(p_B) > 1$, the market share of firm B is zero and firm B is indifferent among all such prices. In such case I assume that it sets its price equal to $c_2$; see Remark 2.

Although the equilibrium prices of the pure bundling subgame cannot be specified explicitly as in previous models (see proof of the following lemma), I can prove some properties of the equilibrium. The profits in case (b) are much more complicated and no analogous statements can be proved. Therefore, I will restrict further analysis to type (a) equilibria in which $\alpha^*(p_B) < 1$.

**Lemma 4.** In any type (a) equilibrium of the pure bundling subgame, firm B earns positive profit if and only if $c_2^2 < 3\theta$. In this case, $p_B \in (c_2, (1 + c_2)/2)$.

**Lemma 5.** There is no type (a) equilibrium of the pure bundling subgame where firm B earns zero profit.

The above lemmas characterize type (a) equilibria of the pure bundling subgame.\textsuperscript{17} The inequality $(1 - p_B)^2 \geq 1 + c_2 - 3\theta$ is a necessary condition for such an

\textsuperscript{17}According to the above lemmas, $p_B \leq (1 + c_2)/2$ in equilibrium. This differs from the previous model, where no such restriction holds and also equilibria with $p_B = 1$ exist. The difference is caused by the form of the demand for good $X_2$. In this model it is continuous and
equilibrium to exist. This was obtained by substitution of \((20)\) and \((21)\) from the proof of Lemma 4 into \(\alpha^*(0) > 0\). Obviously, the inequality holds if \(\theta > \frac{1}{3}(1 + c_2)\).

Because it requires rather complicated computations to find an equivalent condition in terms of parameters \(c_2\) and \(\theta\), I performed numerical simulations whose results are sketched by the concave curve in Figure 4 in Appendix B. The region above the curve represents the values of parameters for which the necessary condition holds.

The following proposition shows a sufficient and necessary condition for profitability of type (a) equilibrium in the pure bundling subgame.

**Proposition 6.** Firm \(G\)’s profit in type (a) equilibrium of the pure bundling subgame is higher than in the equilibrium of the no bundling subgame if and only if \(c_2 < \bar{c}\) and \(\theta > \bar{\theta}(c_2)\), where \(\bar{c} = -3 + 2\sqrt{3} \approx 0.4641\) and

\[
\bar{\theta}(c_2) = \frac{-c_2^2 + 8c_2 - 4 + 4(1 - c_2)\sqrt{1 - 2c_2}}{c_2 - 1 + 2\sqrt{1 - 2c_2}}
\]

is an increasing function defined on the interval \([0, \bar{c}]\); see Figure 4 in Appendix B.

**Remark 9.** It can be easily shown that \(\bar{\theta}(c_2) > \frac{1}{3}c_2^2\) for all \(c_2 \in [0, \bar{c}]\). This means that any \(c_2\) which satisfies the conditions from Proposition 6, also satisfies the necessary condition from Lemma 4.

Proposition 6 is clearly consistent with the result of Proposition 4 for type (a) equilibria. It implies that for fixed \(c_2\) (such that \(c_2 < \bar{c}\)), firm \(G\) prefers type (a) equilibrium of the pure bundling subgame if the transportation costs \(\theta\) are high enough to yield a small substitution effect. The intuition behind this result is the following. For small \(\theta\) the products are less differentiated; therefore, consumers equal to zero when \(p_{B2} = 1\). However, in the previous section, I assumed the demand to be positive when \(p_{B2} = 1\) causing a discontinuity (see also Remark 2).
with low valuation for good $X_2$ who buy $X_{G1}$ in the independent pricing subgame switch easily to good $X_{A1}$ in the pure bundling subgame. The function $\bar{\theta}$ determines the minimal value of $\theta$ such that firm $G$ prefers pure bundling; Figure 4 in Appendix B shows its graph (the convex curve). Together with the necessary condition for existence of type (a) equilibrium, the region above both curves represents the values of parameters where bundling is profitable in type (a) equilibrium. Example 1 below illustrates a particular case where pure bundling is preferred for firm $G$.

On the other hand, if I fix the value of $\theta$, I can also state the above result as the following. Firm $G$ prefers pure bundling if the unit cost of good $X_2$ is low enough. The inverse of function $\bar{\theta}$ represents the maximal value of $c_2$ for which firm $G$ prefers pure bundling. This maximal value is bounded from above by $\bar{c}$, which means that $\bar{c}$ is a critical value such that for any $c > \bar{c}$, and pure bundling is not profitable in type (a) equilibrium. The intuition is that for high values of $c_2$, the competition softening effect is weak and only allows a mark-up that is too small to make bundling profitable. Note also that the critical value of $\bar{c}$ is close to the critical value $\frac{1}{2}$ from Proposition 4.

Although I am not able to find the prices explicitly, I can evaluate them numerically for given values of $c_2$ and $\theta$. The following two examples illustrate two types of equilibria. In the first one I consider a high value of $\theta$ and a low value of $c_2$ to illustrate the type (a) equilibrium and the results of Lemma 4 and Proposition 6. In the second example I consider a low value of $\theta$ yielding a type (b) equilibrium. In this case, all firms are better off in equilibrium, which is consistent with Proposition 4.

**Example 1.** Consider the values $c_2 = 0.4$ and $\theta = 1$ (and $c_1 = 0$ for simplicity). In the no bundling subgame, profits of firms $A$ and $G$ are $\frac{1}{2} \theta = \frac{1}{2}$. To find out
whether pure bundling is profitable, I apply Proposition 6 and obtain \( \theta(c_2) = 0.3849 \). Therefore, pure bundling should be more profitable for firm \( G \) than selling separate products. The equilibrium prices and profits can be computed numerically from (20), (21) and (24); Table 4 in Appendix B shows the results. Hence pure bundling is indeed preferred by firm \( G \) to selling separate products. Compared to the consumer surplus \( m + w - 1.070 \) and the total surplus \( m + w - 0.070 \) in the no bundling subgame, both are lower in the case of pure bundling, which confirms the results of the previous model with two types of consumers.

**Example 2.** Consider the values \( \theta = 0.01 \) and \( c_2 = 0.4 \) (and again \( c_1 = 0 \) for simplicity). In the no bundling subgame, profits of firms \( A \) and \( G \) are \( \frac{1}{2} \theta = 0.005 \). Table 4 in Appendix B shows the equilibrium prices and profits in the pure bundling subgame. Obviously all firms earn higher profit than in the case of no bundling. Compared to the consumer surplus \( m + w + 0.1675 \) and the total surplus \( m + w + 0.1775 \) in the no bundling subgame, both are lower in the case of pure bundling, which confirms the results of the previous model.

### 4.3 Mixed bundling by firm \( G \)

When firm \( G \) decides to sell the bundle as well as good \( X_2 \), by an analogical argument (Bertrand competition) as in the basic model, I obtain that \( p_{G2} = p_{B2} = c_2 \) in equilibrium. Firms \( G \) and \( A \) still maximize the same profit function as specified in (15) and (16), with \( p_{B2} = c_2 \). This is an analogous situation to the one analyzed in Lemma 5. In its proof I have shown that

\[
c_2(3 - c_2) \leq 3\theta
\]
is a necessary condition for $\alpha^*(0) > 0$. Hence if it is violated, there is no type (a) equilibrium. Otherwise I can evaluate the equilibrium prices and profits for type (a) equilibrium.

**Proposition 7.** In a type (a) equilibrium of the subgame when firm $G$ offers the bundle and good $X_2$, the equilibrium prices are

$$p_G = \theta + c_1 + c_2 - \frac{c_2^2}{6}, \quad p_{A1} = \theta + c_1 + \frac{c_2^2}{6}, \quad p_{G2} = p_{B2} = c_2,$$

yielding firm $G$’s market share $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{6\theta} c_2^2$ and profits

$$\Pi_G = \frac{1}{2\theta} \left( \theta - \frac{c_2^2}{6} \right)^2, \quad \Pi_A = \frac{1}{2\theta} \left( \theta + \frac{c_2^2}{6} \right)^2, \quad \Pi_B = 0. \quad (19)$$

The proposition shows that $\Pi_A > \frac{1}{2}\theta > \Pi_G$, which confirms the intuition that this type of bundling is not profitable because of the absence of the competition softening effect. On the other hand, there is a substitution effect (i.e., there are consumers who prefer $X_{G1}$ over $X_{A1}$, but do not want good $X_2$, so they switch to $X_{A1}$, and it does not pay for firm $G$ to lower the price sufficiently to compensate them). However, when $c_2$ approaches zero, the measure of the consumers who do not want good $X_2$ approaches zero and the substitution effect disappears making firm $G$ indifferent between this type of bundling and selling separate products. An analogous result can be obtained by considering valuations for good $X_2$ from some interval $[\underline{v}, 1]$, where $\underline{v} \geq c_2$.

**Remark 10.** The result can be again interpreted as the equilibrium when the market for good $X_2$ is perfectly competitive (see Corollary 1). In this case there is obviously no competition softening effect in type (a) equilibrium. Hence pure bundling is unprofitable.
Similarly as in the previous subsection, it is not possible to evaluate the type (b) equilibrium prices in terms of parameters. However, I provide a numerical example to support the result of Proposition 5, that selling good $X_2$ and the bundle may be profitable for firm $G$ when $\theta$ is low.

**Example 3.** Consider again the same values as in Example 2: $\theta = 0.01$ and $c_2 = 0.4$ (and $c_1 = 0$). In the no bundling subgame, profits of firms $A$ and $G$ are $\frac{1}{2}\theta = 0.005$. Table 4 in Appendix B describes the equilibrium prices and profits in this subgame. Obviously all firms earn higher profit than in the case of no bundling. Compared to the consumer surplus $m + w + 0.1675$ and the total surplus $m + w + 0.1775$ in the no bundling subgame, both are lower in the case of mixed bundling, which confirms the results of the previous model.

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper I analyze bundling by a multi-product (generalist) firm competing against several single-product (specialist) firms. I consider the case of two markets: a duopoly for a heterogeneous good, and a duopoly or perfect competition for a homogeneous good. When the generalist firm decides to bundle, two effects emerge: the competition softening effect and the substitution effect.

I show that in the case of duopoly on the market for the second good, if consumers’ valuations for it are homogeneous and high enough, there is no substitution effect and the generalist firm chooses pure bundling in equilibrium. However this strategy has a negative effect on the rival and a negative welfare effect, which is important for anti-trust policies because it shows that also a firm facing an equal rival may abuse its position as a multi-product firm. This finding is at variance with the widely accepted argument by Posner (1976) that tying may be profitable.
only in the case of monopoly and it should be taken into account by anti-trust authorities.

Moreover, if pure bundling is prohibited, firm $G$ may also achieve the same outcome when it offers the heterogeneous good for a high price such that nobody wants to buy it separately. However, this price can be even lower than the equilibrium price when selling separate products. This result is also important for anti-trust authorities because it shows how firms can circumvent their restrictions.

To illustrate the substitution effect, I extend the model by considering two types of consumers: those with low and high valuation for the second good. I classify firm $G$’s decision based on the parameters of the model. I show that pure bundling is preferred by the generalist firm to selling the products separately if the competition softening effect is significant (i.e., the unit cost of the second good is low) and the substitution effect is weak (i.e., the degree of differentiation of the first good is high), or if the substitution effect is very strong (i.e., the degree of differentiation of the first good is low) because it changes the structure of the market. Furthermore, I check the robustness of these results by considering continuous valuations for the second good.

In the case of perfect competition on the market for the second good, there is no competition softening effect and the generalist firm is indifferent between pure bundling and selling separate products when the valuations for the second good are homogeneous. However when they are heterogeneous, selling separate products is preferred by the generalist firm unless the substitution effect is so strong that it changes the structure of the market.

This paper makes the first step in exploring the abuse of tying by a multi-product firm without monopoly power. Its results are relevant for anti-trust policies since they indicate that a firm which faces an equal competitor in each market
can successfully use tying, which has consequently a negative effect on welfare. Hence tying should not be considered as abuse of monopoly (or dominant) position, but as abuse of a firm’s position as a multi-product firm. In the future the understanding of this issue should be extended in several directions:

- First, the fact that the multi-product firm can increase its profit by tying raises the obvious question whether it can even force foreclosure of some of its rivals.

- Second, in the paper I consider two markets with particular structures. A higher number of markets with different structures should be analyzed to see how robust the results of this paper are.

- Third, in the extension of the basic model, I analyze only one type of mixed bundling because of its important interpretation. It would be indeed interesting to completely analyze the equilibria in the mixed bundling subgame and the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Such deep analysis would help authorities make better decisions in many controversial anti-trust cases.

References


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A Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. As already mentioned, the consumer chooses only between buying both goods $X_{A1}, X_2$ or the bundle $G = \{X_{G1}, X_2\}$ yielding the market share $\alpha^*$ for firm $G$. Maximization of profits (4), (5), and (6) with respect to appropriate prices (note that all profit functions are concave) leads to first order conditions

\[
\begin{align*}
&\ p_{A1} + p_{B2} - 2p_G + \theta + c_1 + c_2 = 0, \\
&-2p_{A1} - p_{B2} + p_G + \theta + c_1 = 0, \\
&-p_{A1} - 2p_{B2} + p_G + \theta + c_2 = 0,
\end{align*}
\]

which are linear equations of unknowns $p_{A1}, p_{B2}, p_G$. By solving them I obtain the equilibrium prices (7). Note that the prices are always higher than unit costs. Obviously, $p_{B2} \leq v$ in equilibrium, meaning that this $p_{B2}$ is indeed the maximum of $\Pi_{B2}$ on the interval $[0, v]$.

To prove that the prices (7) establish a Nash equilibrium, I will show that no firm has incentives to deviate by undercutting (i.e., to yield another firm’s profit zero). Consider $p_{A1}$ and $p_{B2}$ given by (7). When firm $G$ decides to undercut, it has the highest profit if $\alpha^* = 1$, i.e., $p_G = p_{A1} + p_{B2} - \theta = \frac{1}{2}\theta + c_1 + c_2$. However, because the firms are located at the edges of the unit interval, the profit function is continuous\footnote{In the Hotelling model, the profit function may be discontinuous in the point of undercutting when the firm is located inside the interval. See, for example, Shy (1996), p. 163.} so the profit is lower than the interior maximum attained for $p_G = \frac{5}{4}\theta + c_1 + c_2$. This can also be verified by a direct computation. Similarly, if firm $A$ or $B$ wants to undercut, I obtain that undercutting yields the highest profit when $\alpha^* = 0$. By an analogical argument as above, undercutting is not profitable for any of them.

The above equilibrium was derived under the assumption that $0 < \alpha^* < 1$ (i.e., all firms have a positive market share). To complete the proof I will show that there is no other equilibrium. If $\alpha^* \geq 1$, in equilibrium, then $\alpha^* = 1$. Otherwise firm $G$, which
captures the whole market, can increase its price to achieve a higher profit. For \( \alpha^* = 1 \), i.e., \( p_G - p_{A1} - p_{B2} + \theta = 0 \), it may not be profitable for firm A to decrease its price. Hence, \( \partial \Pi_A / \partial p_{A1} |_{\alpha^* = 1} \geq 0 \) or \( p_{A1} = c_1 \). However, the first condition yields \( p_{A1} \leq c_1 \), which means that \( p_{A1} = c_1 \). Analogically I obtain \( p_{B2} = c_2 \) and hence \( p_G = c_1 + c_2 - \theta < c_1 + c_2 \).

Therefore, there is no equilibrium such that \( \alpha^* \geq 1 \). By a similar argument I can show that there is no equilibrium such that \( \alpha^* \leq 0 \).

**Proof of Lemma 2.** Consider an equilibrium in which \( p_{B2} = v \). The profit functions and also the first order conditions for firms \( G \) and \( A \) are the same as in the previous proof. Solving the system I obtain the prices given by (8); an easy check shows that \( 0 < \alpha^* < 1 \).

To show that \( p_{B2} = v \) is also the best response to firm \( A \)’s and \( G \)’s prices (8), I substitute them into \( B \)’s profit function to obtain \( \partial \Pi_B / \partial p_{B2} = \frac{1}{2\theta} (-2p_{B2} + \frac{2}{3} v + \frac{4}{3} c_2 + \theta) \). This means that \( \Pi_B \) is increasing on the interval \([c_2, v]\) and henceforth attains its maximum for \( p_{B2} = v \). Similarly as in the proof of the previous lemma, I can argue that no firm has incentives to undercut and that there is no equilibrium such that \( \alpha^* \leq 0 \) or \( \alpha^* \geq 1 \).

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Obviously, the prices are obtained directly from (7) and (8). These yield the market share \( \alpha^* = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\theta}\mu \), and after substitution into the profit functions from (5), (6), and (4), they yield the profits (11). Finally, the consumer surplus can be evaluated as

\[
CS = \int_0^{\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\theta}\mu} (m + w - (\theta + c_1 + c_2 + \mu) - \theta\alpha + v) \, d\alpha + \\
+ \int_{\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\theta}\mu}^{1} (m + w - (\theta + c_1 - \mu) - \theta(1 - \alpha) - (c_2 + 3\mu) + v) \, d\alpha = \\
m + w + v - c_1 - c_2 - \frac{5}{4}\theta - \frac{3}{2}\mu + \frac{1}{4\theta}\mu^2,
\]

which completes the proof.

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Obviously there is no equilibrium where \( p_{B2} = c_2 \). Hence \( p_{B2} > c_2 \) in equilibrium. If \( p_G > p_{G1} + p_{B2} \), nobody buys the bundle and everybody buys
good $X_2$ from firm $B$. In this case firm $G$ may decrease $p_G$ below $p_G + p_B$, and all consumers buying $X_G$ and $X_B$ switch to the bundle. The same argument also applies to the case where $p_G = p_G + p_B$ (see Remark 1). Moreover in this case firm $B$ may slightly decrease its price and all consumers buying the bundle switch to goods $X_G$ and $X_B$. Therefore, $p_G < p_G + p_B$ in equilibrium, which means that nobody wants to buy good $X_G$ separately (not in the bundle). This yields the same equilibrium prices $p_G$, $p_A$, $p_B$ as in the pure bundling subgame.

Now it remains to derive the condition for $p_G$. The above analysis implies that $p_G > p_G - p_B = \theta + c_1 - 2\mu$. Despite this, firm $B$ may be willing to decrease its price to $p_B' < p_G - p_G$ in which case all consumers buy good $X_B$ yielding firms $B$’s profit $\Pi_B' = p_B' - c_2$. Firm $B$ does not prefer to do so if and only if $p_G - p_G - c_2 < \Pi_B'$. Substituting the prices and profits from Proposition 1, I obtain condition (12). One can easily check that $p_G - p_B = \theta + c_1 - 2\mu$ is lower than the right-hand side of (12) which means that the condition implies $p_G < p_G + p_B$.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** If $\alpha < 1$ and $p_G, p_B > c_2$, the firm with the higher price may undercut its opponent to capture the whole market for good $X_2$ of measure $1 - \alpha^*$. On the other hand if $p_B > p_G = c_2$, then firm $G$ earns zero profit from selling good $X_2$, but it may increase $p_G$ which increases $\alpha^*$ and its profits (both from selling the bundle and good $X_2$). If $p_G > p_B = c_2$, then firm $B$ will increase its profit by increasing $p_B$. This proves that $p_G = p_B = c_2$ in equilibrium.

Obviously the marginal consumer determined by

$$
\alpha^* = \frac{p_A - (p_G - c_1)}{2\theta} + \frac{1}{2}.
$$

Hence the profits of firms $G$ and $A$ are the same as in the no bundling subgame when $p_G = p_G - c_2$. This yields the equilibrium prices (13).

Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 1, I can argue that both $G$ and $A$ have no incentives to capture the whole market for good $X_1$ which would cause $\alpha^* \notin (0, 1)$. 

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Proof of Lemma 3. In any type (c) equilibrium, \( \partial \Pi_G/\partial p_G|_{p_G=p_A1+\theta} \) must be non-negative from left and non-positive from right. Taking \( p_G \to p_A1 + \theta \) in (14) gives \( p_B \leq 0 \), which is a contradiction. Hence, there is no type (c) equilibrium.

Proof of Proposition 4. The proof directly follows from Table 3 in Appendix B.

Proof of Proposition 5. The proof directly follows from the discussion preceding the proposition and Table 3 in Appendix B.

Proof of Lemma 4. The first order conditions for maximization of profits of firms \( G \) and \( A \) are

\[
\begin{align*}
p_{A1} + p_{B2} - 2p_G + \theta + c_1 + c_2 - \frac{1}{2}p_{B2}^2 &= 0, \\
-2p_{A1} - p_{B2} + p_G + \theta + c_1 + \frac{1}{2}p_{B2}^2 &= 0,
\end{align*}
\]

which yield

\[
\begin{align*}
p_G &= \theta + c_1 + \frac{2}{3}c_2 + \frac{1}{3}p_{B2} - \frac{1}{6}p_{B2}^2, \\
p_{A1} &= \theta + c_1 + \frac{1}{3}c_2 - \frac{1}{3}p_{B2} + \frac{1}{6}p_{B2}^2.
\end{align*}
\]  

(20)

(21)

Firm \( B \)'s profit function (17) has one of the shapes sketched in Figure 5 in Appendix B, depending on the position of its zero points \( c_2, 1, \) and \( p_G - p_{A1} + \theta \). It has to be maximized on the interval \([c_2, 1]\). Consider first an interior solution. Differentiating with respect to \( p_{B2} \), I obtain

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_B}{\partial p_{B2}} = \frac{1}{2\theta}[(1-p_{B2})(p_G + \theta - p_{A1} - p_{B2}) - (p_{B2} - c_2)(1-p_{B2}) - (p_{B2} - c_2)(p_G + \theta - p_{A1} - p_{B2})],
\]

(22)

which is quadratic in \( p_{B2} \). Obviously \( \frac{\partial \Pi_B}{\partial p_{B2}}|_{p_{B2}=(1+c)/2} = -\frac{1}{6\theta}(1 - c_2)^2 < 0 \). Hence (see also Figure 5 in Appendix B) it is clear that a solution of (22) is a local maximum.
of $\Pi_B$ function if and only if
\[ p_{B2} < \frac{1 + c_2}{2}. \] (23)

I prefer this condition because it is simpler than the second order condition.

After substituting the solutions (20) and (21) for $p_G$ and $p_{A1}$ into the first order condition (22), I obtain that $p_{B2}$ is a solution of a cubic equation $f(x) = 0$ where
\[ f(x) = 2x^3 + (4 - c_2)x^2 - 2(3c_2 + 3\theta + 2)x + (c_2^2 + 4c_2 + 3\theta + 3c_2\theta). \] (24)

This solution establishes an equilibrium of the pure bundling subgame if and only if it belongs to the interval $J = (c_2, (1 + c_2)/2)$. Cubic equations can indeed be solved, but the formula is too complicated for any further analysis. Therefore, I do not compute the exact solution, but I provide a sufficient and necessary condition for its root to belong to $J$. Obviously $\lim_{x \to \pm\infty} f(x) = \pm\infty$, $f(0) > 0$, and $f((1 + c_2)/2) < 0$. This means that the equation $f(x) = 0$ has three real solutions, the first of them in $(-\infty, 0)$, the second in $(0, (1 + c_2)/2)$, and the third in $((1 + c_2)/2, +\infty)$. The second root lies in $J$ (the others obviously lie outside $J$) if and only if $f(c_2) > 0$, which is equivalent to
\[ c_2^2 < 3\theta. \] (25)

This proves the lemma.

**Proof of Lemma 5.** If firm $B$ earns zero profit in equilibrium, then $p_{B2} = c_2$ (see Remark 2). If $p_{B2} = c_2$ in a type (a) equilibrium, then $p_G$ and $p_{A1}$ are given by $G$’s and $A$’s best responses (20) and (21). Hence $p_G = \theta + c_1 + c_2 - \frac{c_2^2}{6}$, and $p_{A1} = \theta + c_1 + \frac{c_2^2}{6}$. To find firm $B$’s best response to those prices, I substitute them into $B$’s profit function to obtain $\Pi_B = (p_{B2} - c_2)(c_2 - \frac{1}{3}c_2^2 + \theta - p_{B2})(1 - p_{B2})$. This is negative for all $p_{B2} \in (c_2, 1)$ if and only if $c_2 - \frac{1}{3}c_2^2 + \theta \leq c_2$, i.e., $3\theta \leq c_2^2$.

For the above prices $\alpha^*(0) = \frac{1}{26}(\theta - c_2 + \frac{1}{3}c_2^2)$, which is non-negative if and only if $3c_2 - c_2^2 \leq 3\theta$. However, this condition cannot hold together with $3\theta \leq c_2^2$ because...
$3c^2 - c_2 > c_2^3$ for any $c_2 \in (0, 1]$. Hence there is no type (a) equilibrium such that $p_{B2} = c_2$.

**Proof of Proposition 6.** Because the prices cannot be computed explicitly (see the proof of Lemma 4), I will use $p_{B2}$ as a parameter. This way I identify all values of $p_{B2}$ for which the type (a) equilibrium profit in the pure bundling subgame is higher than in the no bundling subgame. After substituting the $G$’s and $A$’s best responses (20) and (21) into $G$’s profit function, I obtain firm $G$’s equilibrium profit expressed in terms of $p_{B2}$:

$$\Pi_G = \frac{1}{2\theta} \left( \theta + \frac{p_{B2} - c_2}{3} - \frac{p_{B2}^2}{6} \right)^2.$$  

This is higher than $\frac{1}{2}\theta$ (profit in the case of no bundling) if and only if $2(p_{B2} - c_2) > p_{B2}^2$, or $1 - 2c_2 > (1 - p_{B2})^2$ which never holds for $c_2 \geq \frac{1}{2}$. On the other hand, if $c < \frac{1}{2}$, the above inequality is equivalent to $1 - \sqrt{1 - 2c_2} < p_{B2} < 1 + \sqrt{1 - c_2}$. Obviously, the lower bound is higher than $c_2$ and the upper bound is higher than 1. Therefore, for $p_{B2} \in [c_2, 1]$, pure bundling is more profitable for firm $G$ if and only if

$$p_{B2} \geq 1 - \sqrt{1 - 2c_2}. \quad (26)$$

Note that $c_2 \leq 1 - \sqrt{1 - 2c_2} \leq 1$. This, together with the fact that function $f$ defined by (24) from the proof of Lemma 4 is positive on $(c_2, p_{B2})$ and negative on $(p_{B2}, (1 + c_2)/2)$, implies that (26) holds if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:

$$1 - \sqrt{1 - 2c_2} < \frac{1 + c_2}{2}, \quad (27)$$

$$f(1 - \sqrt{1 - 2c_2}) > 0. \quad (28)$$

Condition (27) is equivalent to $c_2 < -3 + 2\sqrt{3} = \bar{c}$ and condition (28) is equivalent to $\theta > \bar{\theta}(c_2)$ whenever $c_2 < -3 + 2\sqrt{3}$.

To complete the proof I will show that $\bar{\theta}$ is increasing on $[0, \bar{c}]$. Straightforward
computations yield that \( \frac{d\theta(c_2)}{dc_2} \to \infty \) as \( c \to \bar{c} \) from left and \( \frac{d\theta(c_2)}{dc_2}|_{c_2=0} = 0 \). Moreover, it can be easily shown that \( \frac{d\theta(c_2)}{dc_2} \) is defined and continuous on \([0, \bar{c}]\) and has no root in \((0, \bar{c}]\).

Proof of Proposition 7. The equality \( p_{B2} = c_2 \) follows from the discussion preceding the proposition. The prices are evaluated in the proof of Lemma 5. All remaining computations are straightforward.
Figure 1: Equilibria in the case of heterogeneous valuations for good $X_{G2}$
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equilibrium type</th>
<th>( p - MC ) for ( A, B, G )</th>
<th>Necessary conditions</th>
<th>Profits ( \Pi_A, \Pi_B, \Pi_G )</th>
<th>No switch condition, bundling decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a1) ( \alpha^*(0) &gt; 0 )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{10}(9\theta + 2c_2) )</td>
<td>( \theta &gt; \frac{3}{4}c_2 )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{200\theta}(9\theta + 2c_2)^2 )</td>
<td>( \theta \geq \frac{4}{343}(44 + 25\sqrt{2})c_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( c_2 &lt; p_{B2} &lt; 1 )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{5}(3\theta - c_2) )</td>
<td>( \theta &lt; \frac{1}{3}(5 - 4c_2) )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{10}(3\theta - c_2)^2 )</td>
<td>bundle iff ( \theta \geq 2c_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \frac{1}{10}(11\theta - 2c_2) )</td>
<td>needs ( c_2 &lt; \frac{4}{3} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{200\theta}(11\theta - 2c_2)^2 )</td>
<td>bundle iff ( c_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a2) ( \alpha^*(0) &gt; 0 )</td>
<td>( \theta - \frac{1}{5}(1 - 2c_2) )</td>
<td>( \theta &gt; \frac{1}{3}(1 + c_2) ) for ( c_2 \geq \frac{4}{3} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{129}(6\theta - 1 + 2c_2)^2 )</td>
<td>( \theta \geq \frac{1}{3}c_2 + \frac{1}{12}(2 + 3\sqrt{2}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p_{B2} = 1 )</td>
<td>( 1 - c_2 )</td>
<td>( \theta \geq \frac{1}{5}(5 - 2c_2) ) for ( c_2 &lt; \frac{4}{3} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{129}(1 - c_2)(3\theta - 2 + c_2) )</td>
<td>bundle iff ( c_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta + \frac{1}{6}(1 - 2c_2) )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta \geq \frac{1}{5}(6\theta - 1 + 2c_2)^2 )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a3) ( \alpha^*(0) &gt; 0 )</td>
<td>( \theta + \frac{1}{6}c_2 )</td>
<td>( \theta &gt; \frac{2}{3}c_2 )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{200\theta}(6\theta + c_2)^2 )</td>
<td>( \theta \geq \frac{1}{2}(5 + 3\sqrt{2})c_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p_{B2} = c_2 )</td>
<td>( 0 )</td>
<td>never holds</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{129}(6\theta - c_2)^2 )</td>
<td>never bundle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta - \frac{1}{6}c_2 )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( \frac{1}{200\theta}(6\theta - c_2)^2 )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b1) ( \alpha^*(0) &lt; 0 )</td>
<td>( \frac{9}{4}\theta )</td>
<td>( \theta &lt; \frac{2}{3}c_2 ) for ( c_2 \leq \frac{6}{7} )</td>
<td>( \frac{64}{63}\theta )</td>
<td>( \theta \leq \frac{4}{343}(27 + 14\sqrt{2})c_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( c_2 &lt; p_{B2} &lt; 1 )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{4}\theta )</td>
<td>( \theta &lt; 4(1 - c_2) ) for ( c_2 \geq \frac{6}{7} )</td>
<td>( \frac{64}{63}\theta )</td>
<td>always bundle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \frac{7}{4}\theta )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( \frac{64}{63}\theta )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b2) ( \alpha^*(0) &lt; 0 )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{3}(7\theta + c_2 - 1) )</td>
<td>( \theta &lt; \frac{1}{2}(2 + c_2) )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{360}\theta(7\theta - 1 + c_2)^2 )</td>
<td>( \theta \leq \frac{1}{3}c_2 + \frac{1}{20}(2 + 3\sqrt{2}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p_{B2} = 1 )</td>
<td>( 1 - c_2 )</td>
<td>( \theta \geq 4(1 - c_2) )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{129}(1 - c_2)(\theta + 1 - c_2) )</td>
<td>always bundle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \frac{1}{3}(5\theta + 1 - c_2) )</td>
<td>needs ( c_2 &gt; \frac{6}{7} )</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{360}(5\theta + 1 - c_2)^2 )</td>
<td>always bundle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b3) ( \alpha^*(0) &lt; 0 )</td>
<td>( \frac{7}{3}\theta )</td>
<td>( \theta &lt; \frac{2}{3}c_2 )</td>
<td>( \frac{49}{36}\theta )</td>
<td>( \theta \leq \frac{3}{20}(2 + \sqrt{2})c_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p_{B2} = c_2 )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>never holds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>always bundle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \frac{8}{3}\theta )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( \frac{25}{36}\theta )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Equilibria in the case of heterogeneous valuations for good \( X_G \)
Figure 2: Distribution of the market: Case (a) $\alpha^*(0) > 0$

Figure 3: Distribution of the market: Case (b) $\alpha^*(0) < 0$
Figure 4: Graph of the function $\hat{\theta}$

Figure 5: Possible shapes of $\Pi_B$
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ex.</th>
<th>Case, parameters</th>
<th>Prices</th>
<th>$\alpha^*(0)$, $p_{B2}$</th>
<th>Profits</th>
<th>$CS, TS$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>pure bundling</td>
<td>0.9878</td>
<td>0.2878</td>
<td>0.4878</td>
<td>$m + w - 1.1568$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>type (a) equil.</td>
<td>0.6443</td>
<td>0.6099</td>
<td>0.0339</td>
<td>$m + w - 0.1228$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c_2 = 0.4, \theta = 1$</td>
<td>1.4122</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5123</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>pure bundling</td>
<td>0.0171</td>
<td>-19.4215</td>
<td>0.0090</td>
<td>$m + w + 0.1327$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>type (b) equil.</td>
<td>0.4042</td>
<td>0.7885</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>$m + w + 0.1596$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>$c_2 = 0.4, \theta = 0.01$</td>
<td>0.4156</td>
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<td>0.0074</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>mixed bundling</td>
<td>0.0184</td>
<td>-19.2852</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
<td>$m + w + 0.1210$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>type (b) equil.</td>
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<td>0.7148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$m + w + 0.1375$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c_2 = 0.4, \theta = 0.01$</td>
<td>0.4141</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Numerical examples