ON Mergers in Consumer Search Markets∗

Maarten C. W. Janssen†
Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute

José Luis Moraga-González‡
University of Groningen and CESifo

Revised: December 2007

Abstract

This paper presents a study of mergers in a consumer search market where firms sell homogeneous products. Our first result is that mergers have redistributive effects with consumers searching little getting better off at the expense of consumers who search a lot. Our second result is that the magnitude of search costs is crucial in determining the incentives of firms to merge and the welfare implications of mergers. When search costs are relatively small, mergers turn out not to be profitable for the merging firms. If search costs are relatively high instead, a merger causes a fall in average price and this triggers search. As a result, non-shoppers who didn’t find it worthwhile to search in the pre-merger situation, start searching post-merger. We show that this change in the search composition of demand may make mergers incentive-compatible for the firms and, in some cases, socially desirable.

Keywords: consumer search, incentives to merge, price dispersion, redistributive effects

JEL Classification: D40, D83, L13
1 Introduction

There is an extensive economics literature on mergers. One basic insight is that mergers strengthen firms’ market power so that, in the absence of any offsetting effect, mergers are undesirable from a welfare point of view.\footnote{For a survey of the literature on the unilateral effects of mergers see Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright and Tirole (2003a).} Perry and Porter (1985), building on Williamson (1968), explicitly modelled the cost efficiencies which arise from economies of sharing assets in a setting with homogeneous product markets. They found conditions under which mergers are socially desirable. In antitrust economics, this reduction-in-costs argument in favor of mergers has been called the efficiency defense.\footnote{See also the papers of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and McAfee and Williams (1992).} Another basic point in the merger literature relates to the firms’ incentives to merge. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) derived the paradoxical result that quantity-setting firms selling homogeneous goods do not have an incentive to merge, except in the case where the merger leads to a monopoly. The paradox arises because in the post-merger equilibrium the non-merging firms increase their output relative to the pre-merger situation, which tends to put sufficient pressure on prices so as to make merging unprofitable. This result is known as the merger paradox. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) argued that the strategic nature of the decision variables has an important bearing on firms incentives to merge. Indeed, price-setting firms selling horizontally differentiated products may have an incentive to merge because price increases of the merging firms are accompanied by price increases of the non-merging firms. The price increases, of course, also imply that total welfare is always lower in the post-merger market.

The typical study of mergers has so far focused on markets with perfect price information. Casual empiricism suggests, however, that consumers have to incur significant search costs to get informed about prices. The purpose of this paper is to argue that consumer search provides at least three new and interesting perspectives on the study of mergers. First, ceteris paribus, mergers have an initial effect on (the distribution of) prices; however, since price setting and search intensity are endogenously determined in consumer search models, changes in search behavior bring additional effects on prices that can either reinforce or weaken the initial effect on prices. Second, in consumer search models the market equilibrium is not characterized by a single price but by a distribution of prices (see e.g. Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989; Reinganum, 1979).\footnote{The existence of price dispersion for seemingly identical goods has been extensively documented in empirical work (see e.g., Stigler (1961) and Pratt et al. (1979) for early studies and Sorensen (2000) and Lach (2001) for more recent work).} This implies that
different consumers buy from distinct parts of the price distribution. In particular, consumers who search a lot because they have low search costs tend to buy at prices from the lower quantiles of the price distribution; by contrast consumers who have high search costs search little and end up paying prices relatively high. If mergers do not have similar effects on all the quantiles of the price distribution, it is clear that mergers may affect the welfare of different consumers non-uniformly, even opening up the possibility that mergers benefit some consumers at the detriment of others.\footnote{It should be emphasized that in recent years price effects have become central in U.S. law and in the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Mergers Guidelines (Baker, 1999; Whinston, 2006). The point here is that when there is price dispersion, the implication of a merger on the average price is only part of the story since other moments of the price distribution are also important.} Finally, an interesting issue is whether search models can say something about the incentives of firms to reduce the number of retail outlets of the new, merged entity. As the prices firms charge are not observable before the search activity takes place and the search cost is sunk at the moment the price is known, merging stores have a stronger temptation to raise their prices after a merger than in standard models. However, if consumers conclude that prices at the stores of the merged firms will be higher than the prices at non-merging stores they would never visit the merging firms. This may give firms an incentive to commit to prices or to close down some stores.

We study mergers in the classical sequential consumer search model of Stahl (1989) with $N$ retailers. To obtain meaningful welfare effects, we relax the assumption that the first price quotation is costless (see Janssen et al., 2005).\footnote{When the first price quotation is obtained at no cost and demand is inelastic, all consumers buy in equilibrium and therefore price changes have no effects on industry sales.} On the demand side of the market there are two types of consumers, namely, consumers who search at no cost and thus are fully informed at all times – referred to as ‘shoppers’—, and consumers who must pay a positive search cost each time they search –referred to as ‘non-shoppers’—. In this model, there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium but, in contrast to the original paper by Stahl (1989), this equilibrium may come in three types. The distinct types of equilibrium differ in the level of prices that can be sustained in the market and in the search composition of demand. In fact, the departure from Stahl’s original setup has the implication that consumers with high search cost do not necessarily participate in the market.

Our main results are as follows. We first show that the merging firms have an incentive to shut down one of their retail stores for otherwise rational consumers would patronize the stores of the non-merging firms. This result arises as a consequence of the internalization of pricing externalities among the merging firms in the presence of consumer search. Because some consumers always buy from the cheapest store, if one of the stores of the merging firms happened to be the cheapest in the
market, there would be no reason to charge similar low prices in the other store of the merged firm. This implies that prices at one of the retail shops of the merged firm would typically be higher than average. Since consumers do not see prices without searching, rational consumers, anticipating this, would find it optimal not to visit the retail shops of the merging firms in the first place. To avoid this, the merged firm must credibly commit not to increase their after-merger prices relative to the non-merging firms. In real-world markets, mergers often involve the shutting down of a number of branches, retail shops, product varieties, etc. Peters (2003) reports evidence that merging airlines tend to lower flight frequency in markets initially served by the two merging entities, and merged banks and supermarkets often close down some of their branches. Even though fixed costs play an important role, our result provides an additional strategic reason behind this observation.

Our second result is about the effects of a merger on consumer welfare. We show that mergers in search markets affect the distribution of prices in a non-uniform way. In particular, we observe that the frequency with which low prices are quoted decreases while the frequency of high prices increases. As a result, mergers hurt low search cost consumers because they end up paying higher prices on average, but at the same time they benefit high search cost consumers because they pay lower prices on average. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical literature on mergers has not paid much attention to the effects of mergers on different transaction prices. Our result suggests that there may be important redistributive effects on the demand side.

Our final result is related to the incentives to merge. We show that whether mergers are incentive-compatible or not hinges upon the level of search costs. When search costs are relatively low, in equilibrium all consumers participate in the market. In this case, mergers are unprofitable and therefore we may expect that mergers do not to take place. This result thus confirms that the merger paradox continues to hold in markets where search costs are relatively small and unimportant. When search costs are instead relatively high, some consumers find it optimal not to participate in the market and do not search at all. In this case, a merger results in a change in the search composition of demand such that merging firms may obtain larger profits in the post-merger situation than in the pre-merger one. This is because \textit{ceteris paribus} a merger results in a lowering of the average price in the market, which is precisely the price that triggers search. Non-shoppers who did not find it worthwhile to search in the pre-merger situation, start searching post-merger. Relative to the pre-merger situation, the ratio of active non-shoppers to shoppers increases in the post-merger market and this explains the increase-in-profits result. The paper thus shows that the merger paradox does not hold when search costs are relatively important, even if products are
homogeneous and there is no cost efficiency to be gained from the merger.

Incentive-compatible mergers turn out to lead to an increase in consumer participation and this has the potential to make them even socially desirable (from a total surplus point of view). We show that this is always the case when demand is inelastic, while with downward sloping demand it is the case when the share of fully informed consumers is low enough.

The main thesis of this paper is that mergers may have novel and interesting effects in markets where consumer search is important. Although the study here mainly focuses on the theory, we do think that this consumer search perspective is important when considering mergers in some actual industries such as airlines and financial markets.\(^6\) These are usually concentrated markets where mergers are frequently proposed. Moreover, consumer search is important as evidenced by the variety of ways consumers buy airline tickets and mortgages or other financial products—some consumers use search engines, others simply visit one (online) store and buy—and the significant price dispersion existing in these markets (Baye and Morgan, 2001; Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004). In some studies (see, e.g., Borenstein, 1990 on airlines, Prager and Hannan, 1998 on banks and Whinston, 2006 (pp. 114-131)) it is reported that prices post-merger have actually fallen compared to their pre-merger levels and usually this is interpreted as evidence that mergers have led to cost reductions. Our study points to the fact that the welfare effects of mergers in these industries may actually differ for consumers with different search strategies. In addition, our paper suggests that search may provide an alternative explanation for the observed price changes.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the consumer search model. Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis. Here we show that when the first price quotation is also costly, there are three types of equilibrium. The distinct types of equilibrium differ in the magnitude of prices which can be sustained as well as in the extent of consumer participation. Sections 4 and 5 delve into the two questions related to the incentives to merge and the welfare implications of mergers. In Section 4 we discuss the special case of unit demand, which serves to bring out the main issues in the simplest setting. Section 5 shows that the results extend to the case of linear demand. Section 6 develops an extension of the basic model where we replace the set of identical high search cost consumers with a heterogeneous group of consumers who differ in their search cost. We show that the results discussed above remain the same and that the only

\(^6\)Markets for electronics, perfumes, gasoline, groceries, clothing, drugs, etc. are also markets of interest. In these sorts of market, firms often carry similar products, prices are often dispersed (Lach, 2002; Sorensen, 2000) and therefore consumer search is important.
change is with respect to the search behavior of the consumers. Section 7 concludes and provides a discussion of the main assumptions of the paper. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.

2 The Model

We study mergers in the standard consumer search model of Stahl (1989), but we assume that all price quotations are costly to obtain (as in Janssen et al., 2005). The features of the model are as follows. There are \( N \geq 3 \) firms that produce a homogeneous good at constant returns to scale. Their identical unit cost can be normalized to zero and prices can be interpreted as price-to-cost margins. There is a unit mass of buyers and we assume that buyers’ demand curves are given by \( D(p) \), with \( D'(p) < 0 \), where \( p \) is the price at which the consumer decides to buy. In some of the analysis we assume for convenience that demand is linear, i.e., \( D(p) = a - bp \), with \( a > 0, b > 0 \). It will be useful to denote the revenue function as \( R(p) = pD(p) \); we assume that \( R(p) \) is monotonically increasing up to the monopoly price, denoted, \( p^m \). Let \( R^{-1}(\cdot) \) be the inverse of the revenue function. The surplus of a consumer who buys at price \( p \) is denoted as \( CS(p) = \int_p^\infty D(p)dp \).

A proportion \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \) of the consumers has zero opportunity cost of time and therefore searches for prices costlessly. These consumers are referred to as ‘shoppers’ or low search cost consumers. The rest of the buyers, referred to as ‘non-shoppers’ or high search cost consumers, must pay search cost \( c > 0 \) to observe every price quotation they get, including the first one. Non-shoppers search for lower prices sequentially, i.e., a buyer first decides whether to sample a first firm or not and then, upon observation of the price of the first firm, decides whether to search for a second price or not, and so on. To avoid trivialities, we assume that if all firms priced at marginal cost then all consumers would search once and buy at the encountered firm, i.e., \( CS(0) = \int_0^\infty D(p)dp > c \).

Firms and buyers play the following game. An individual firm chooses its price taking price choices of the rivals as well as consumers’ search behavior as given. An individual buyer forms conjectures about the distribution of prices in the market and decides on his/her optimal search strategy. We confine ourselves to the analysis of symmetric Nash equilibria. The equilibrium distribution of prices in an \( N \)-firm market is denoted by \( F_N(p) \), its density by \( f_N(p) \) and the lower

---

7The assumption that consumers obtain the first price quotation at no cost has been widely adopted in the search literature and it boils down to assuming all consumers participate in the market so industry demand is inelastic. As shown in Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) and in Janssen et al. (2005), this assumption is not without loss of generality. In fact, when search is truly costly not all consumers may search because their search cost may be too high compared to the surplus they expect to get in the market. In those cases, the market will no longer be covered and industry demand will typically be elastic even if individual demands are inelastic, which is a more natural outcome.

8More formally, we consider trembling-hand perfect equilibria, where shoppers choose the weakly dominant strategy to always search for all prices before buying.
and the upper bound of its support by $p_N$ and $p_N$, respectively. It is obvious that firms will never set prices above the monopoly price.

Before moving to the study of the effects of mergers, we need to address the issue of whether merging firms wish to continue to operate two retail stores or else prefer to shut down one of the stores. Note that in the first case the merged entity would be in control of two prices, while in the second case the merged firm would control only one price. To answer this question, we need to make assumptions about the information consumers have in connection with the merger. In what follows, we shall assume that, if a merger occurs, consumers know (i) that two firms have merged, and (ii) the identity of the merging firms. Of course, since we are modelling mergers in a search environment, we shall assume consumers don’t know the prices of the merging firms without searching. Assumption (i) captures the idea that consumers’ conjectures about the gains from search must be correct in equilibrium. Assumption (ii) implies that consumers can choose whether to search for prices among the merged entities or else search for prices among the non-merging firms. The next proposition argues that the merging firms do not have an incentive to continue to operate two independent stores.

**Proposition 1** Suppose two firms merge and that consumers know the identity of the merging firms; then, the merged entity prefers to be in control of a single price rather than in control of two prices. Moreover, it is optimal for the merging firms to close down one of their stores.

The idea behind the proof of this result is as follows. Since merging does not bring any cost reduction, in the post-merger market consumers must be indifferent between shopping at the merging stores and shopping at the non-merging stores, for otherwise the pricing of either type of firm would not be optimal. Given this, we show that if the merging firms did control two prices in the post-merger putative equilibrium, the unilateral incentives of the merging stores would lead them to charge higher prices on average than the non-merging firms. This constitutes a contradiction as consumers would not then wish to visit any of the merging firms. Hence, appealing to this result, in
the rest of the paper we analyze the case where the merged firms shut down one of their stores.\footnote{The closing-down argument seems to hold quite generally in a consumer search context. In the proof of this result we assume that the merged entity cannot commit to charge the same price in the two stores. Under this assumption, the merged entity is tempted to increase the price at one of the stores and this temptation can only be eliminated by shutting down one of the shops. We note, however, that the result in Proposition 1 can be extended to the case in which the merged firm can commit to charging the same price in the two stores. The argument is similar because, in that case, the merged entity would have a larger share, namely $2/N$, of non-shoppers and would thus charge higher prices (cf. Baye et al., 1992) than non-merged firms. Again, non-shoppers, anticipating this, will direct their search effort to the non-merged firms, making it profitable for the merging firms to close down one shop.}

We note that Proposition 1 extends to situations where consumers know a merger has taken place in the market but do not know the identity of the merging firms. We spell out the basic ideas behind this statement in the Conclusions section.

\section{Equilibria}

In this Section we characterize the symmetric equilibrium of the pre-merger market and show that relaxing the assumption that the first price quotation is for free yields that there are three types of symmetric equilibrium. The distinct types of equilibrium differ in the price levels that can be sustained and hold for different magnitudes of search costs, i.e., for a given level of search cost, only one of these types of equilibrium holds. This result is important in our study of mergers because, as we will see later, the effects of mergers depend on the level of search costs.

We start by characterizing optimal consumer search. For this purpose, we invoke some results already known in the consumer search literature.

\textbf{Lemma 1} If there exists a symmetric equilibrium, then (i) non-shoppers search either once surely, or mix between searching once and not searching, and (ii) firms set prices randomly drawn from an \textit{atomless price distribution}.

\textbf{Proof.} For a proof of these results see Stahl (1989) and Janssen et al. (2005). \hfill \blacksquare

The ideas underlying this lemma are as follows. If non-shoppers were not active at all, firms would have no other equilibrium choice than charging the competitive price. In that case, non-shoppers' behavior would not be optimal. Now consider that in equilibrium a non-shopper walks away from a firm $j$ which is charging a price $p_j$. This implies that the expected gains from searching
further at price $p_j$ are higher than the search cost, i.e., $\int_0^{p_j} (CS(p) - CS(p_j))dF(p) > c$. Since all non-shoppers are identical, no consumer would remain at firm $j$ so charging $p_j$ cannot be optimal.

Notice that these two remarks together imply that non-shoppers either search for one price with probability one, or mix between searching once and not searching at all. In either case, they do not compare prices. Consider now the strategy of a firm and suppose that all firms charge the same price $\hat{p} > 0$. Since shoppers compare all prices in the market, it is readily seen that an individual firm would gain by charging a price slightly less than $\hat{p}$; all firms charging $\hat{p} = 0$ cannot be an equilibrium either since a deviant firm would gain by slightly increasing its price (the firm would sell to those non-shoppers who happen to venture its store and make a strictly positive profit).

In conclusion, symmetric equilibrium implies that firms mix in prices and non-shoppers either search for one price surely, or mix between searching once and not searching. In what follows we examine the characterization and the existence of equilibrium. The case in which consumers mix between searching one time and not searching is treated in the subsection on high search costs; the other case, which is similar to Stahl’s (1989) equilibrium is discussed later in the subsection on low search costs.

3.1 High search cost

Suppose that non-shoppers mix between searching once and not searching. Let $\mu \in (0, 1)$ denote the probability with which non-shoppers are active in the market. In this case the expected payoff to a firm $i$ from charging price $p_i$ when its rivals choose a random pricing strategy according to the cumulative distribution $F(\cdot)$ is

$$\pi_i(p_i, F(p_i)) = R(p_i) \left[ \frac{\mu(1 - \lambda)}{N} + \lambda(1 - F(p_i))^{N-1} \right].$$

The expression in square-brackets represents the quantity firm $i$ expects to sell at price $p_i$. The firm expects to serve the shoppers when it happens to be the case that its price is lower than its rivals’ prices; likewise, the firm expects to sell to the non-shoppers when they happen to visit its store.

In equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent between charging any price in the support of the price cdf, i.e., $\pi_i(p_i, F(p_i)) = \pi_i(p_N, 1)$; this indifference condition allows us to calculate the equilibrium price distribution:

$$F_N(p) = 1 - \left( \frac{\mu(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda N} \frac{R(\bar{p}) - R(p)}{R(p)} \right)^{\frac{1}{N-1}}.$$
Given that consumers are indifferent between searching once and not searching, the upper bound of the price distribution must be equal to the monopoly price \( p_m \) for otherwise a firm charging a price equal to an upper bound \( \bar{p} < p_m \) would gain by increasing its price. The lower bound of the price distribution can easily be calculated by setting \( F(p_N) = 0 \) and solving for \( p_N \).

The cumulative distribution (2) represents optimal firm pricing, given consumer search behavior. We now turn to find the conditions under which the assumed buyer search activity is optimal. For non-shoppers to mix between searching once and not searching, it must be the case that the surplus they expect to get in the market is equal to the search cost, i.e.,

\[
\int_{p_N}^{p_m} CS(p) f_N(p) dp = c. \quad (3)
\]

We can use the variable change \( z = 1 - F_N(p) \) to rewrite condition (3) as follows:

\[
\int_{0}^{1} CS \left( R^{-1} \left( \frac{R(p_m)}{1 + \frac{AN}{\mu(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}} \right) \right) dz = c. \quad (4)
\]

Let us denote the LHS of (4) as \( \beta_N(\mu) \), which denotes the incremental gains to a non-shopper from entering the market. Note that this function also depends on \( \lambda \) and demand parameters; to save on space we will not write this dependency unless necessary. Since \( CS(\cdot) \) is a decreasing function while \( R^{-1}(\cdot) \) is an increasing function, it is straightforward to verify that \( \beta_N(\mu) \) decreases in \( \mu \) (see Figure 1 below for a plot). It is also easy to check that \( \beta_N(\mu) \) converges to \( CS(0) \) as \( \mu \to 0 \); likewise, as \( \mu \) approaches 1, \( \beta_N(\mu) \) converges to a strictly positive number denoted \( \beta_N(1) \). To understand these remarks, notice that when \( \mu \to 0 \), only shoppers are left in the market so pricing must be competitive; in that case, the incremental gains from searching over not searching are highest and equal \( CS(0) \). As the number of non-shoppers increases, pricing becomes more monopolistic and the non-shoppers’ gains from participation decrease.

This leads to the following existence and uniqueness result.

**Proposition 2** Let \( CS(0) > c > \beta_N(1) \). Then there exists a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where firms prices are distributed according to the cdf given in (2) and non-shoppers mix between searching once for one price with probability \( \mu_N \) and not searching at all with the remaining probability, with \( \mu_N \) given by the solution to (4). In equilibrium an individual firm obtains an expected profit equal to \( \pi_N = \mu_N(1-\lambda)R(p^m)/N \), non-shoppers obtain an expected surplus equal to zero and shoppers obtain an expected surplus equal to \( \int_{p_N}^{p_m} CS(p) N(1 - F_N(p))^{N-1} f_N(p) dp > 0 \).
3.2 Low search cost

Suppose that non-shoppers search for one price with probability 1, as in Stahl (1989). In this case the expected payoff to a firm \(i\) from charging price \(p_i\) when its rivals choose a random pricing strategy according to the cumulative distribution \(F(\cdot)\) is

\[
\pi_i(p_i, F(p_i)) = R(p_i) \left[ \frac{1 - \lambda}{N} + \lambda(1 - F(p_i))^{N-1} \right].
\]  

(5)

The interpretation of this expression is similar to that in (1).

Proceeding as before we can calculate the equilibrium price distribution:

\[
F_N(p) = 1 - \left( \frac{1 - \lambda R(\bar{p}) - R(p)}{\lambda N R(p)} \right)^{\frac{1}{N-1}}.
\]  

(6)

The cdf in (6) represents optimal firm pricing given that non-shoppers search once surely. Let us now check when such behavior is optimal for consumers. If consumers do not search further it is because the expected gains from search are lower than the search cost. Let us define the reservation price \(\rho_N\) as the price that makes a non-shopper indifferent between searching once more and accepting \(\rho_N\) right away; this price satisfies:

\[
\int_{\rho_N}^{p_m} [CS(p) - CS(\rho_N)] f_N(p) dp = c.
\]

(7)

Notice that the LHS of (7) is increasing in \(\rho_N\) so that \(\rho_N\) is increasing in \(c\). If in equilibrium consumers do not search further it is indeed because firms do charge prices not greater than \(\rho_N\) because otherwise consumers would go on with their search. As a result, \(\bar{p} \leq \rho_N\); we also know that prices above the monopoly price are not optimal either. These two observations imply that the maximum price charged in the market must satisfy

\[
\bar{p}_N \leq \min\{\rho_N, p_m\}.
\]

(8)

Consider the search cost \(\tilde{c}\) such that the reservation price which solves (7) equals the monopoly price. This search cost satisfies

\[
\tilde{c} = \int_{\rho_N}^{p_m} [CS(p) - CS(p_m)] f_N(p) dp
\]

(9)

Or

\[
\tilde{c} = \int_{\rho_N}^{p_m} CS(p)f_N(p) dp - CS(p_m) = \beta_N(1) - CS(p_m)
\]

(10)
For search costs $c \geq \tilde{c}$, the upper bound of the equilibrium price distribution $\bar{p}$ is equal to $p^m$. For non-shoppers to search for one price surely it must be the case that, ex-ante, they expect to get sufficient surplus to cover the search cost, i.e.,

$$\int_{p^m}^{p^m} CS(p)f_N(p)dp > c.$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

which imposes the condition that $\beta_N(1) > c$.

When $c < \tilde{c}$, the upper bound of the equilibrium price distribution $\bar{p}$ is equal to $\rho_N$, where $\rho_N$ solves (7), which can be rewritten as

$$\int_{\rho_N}^{p^m} CS(p)f_N(p)dp = c + CS(\rho_N)$$ \hspace{1cm} (12)

For non-shoppers to search for one price surely it must be the case that, ex-ante, they expect to get sufficient surplus to cover the search cost, i.e.,

$$\int_{\rho_N}^{p^m} CS(p)f_N(p)dp > c.$$ \hspace{1cm} (13)

which holds when (12) is satisfied. Then we have the following result:

**Proposition 3** (a) Let $0 < c < \beta_N(1) - CS(p^m)$. Then there exists a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where firms prices are distributed according to the cdf given in (6) with $\bar{p}_N = \rho_N$ and non-shoppers search for one price with probability 1. The reservation value $\rho_N$ solves (7).

(b) Let $\beta_N(1) - CS(p^m) < c < \beta_N(1)$. Then there exists a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where firms prices are distributed according to the cdf given in (6) with $\bar{p}_N = p^m$ and non-shoppers search for one price with probability 1.

In equilibrium firms obtain expected profits equal to $\pi_N = (1 - \lambda)R(\bar{p}_N)/N$, non-shoppers obtain an expected surplus equal to $\int_{\rho_N}^{p^m} CS(p)f_N(p)dp > 0$ and shoppers obtain an expected surplus equal to $\int_{\rho_N}^{p^m} CS(p)f_N(p)dp > 0$.

Our results show there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where consumers may either search once surely, or mix between searching once and not searching. The ranges of search costs for which the distinct equilibrium types exist are shown in Figure 1. When search cost is low, consumers search once surely and their threat to search further restricts pricing in that the maximum price charged in the market is the reservation price $\rho_N < p^m$. When search cost is moderate, consumers search also one time surely but the firms can safely charge prices up to the monopoly price, since
buyers’ threat to continue searching is less effective. Finally, when search costs are sufficiently high, non-shoppers expect prices to be that high that they are indifferent between searching once and not searching.

4 Merger analysis: the simple case of unit-demand

We start our discussion on the incentives of firms to merge and on the collective effects of mergers by looking at the simple case of unit demand \( D(p) = 1 \), for all \( p \leq v \) and 0 otherwise). When demand is inelastic, there are no dead-weight-losses and therefore the analysis of mergers is relatively simple and some of the interesting results can be explained in an easy fashion. We will deal with elastic demands later in Section 5.

Since in this case the monopoly price is equal to \( v \), consumer surplus at the monopoly price is equal to zero. Then, Propositions 2 and 3 above show that there are two types of equilibrium: if search costs are relatively low \((0 < c < \beta_N(1))\) then in equilibrium non-shoppers search one time surely. In that case firms obtain an expected profit \( E \pi = (1 - \lambda) \rho_N / N \) and, using (7), the reservation price \( \rho_N \) can be calculated explicitly as:

\[
\rho_N = \frac{c}{1 - \int_0^1 \frac{dp}{1 + b \frac{p^N}{v^N - 1}}} < v, \tag{14}
\]

where \( b = \lambda / (1 - \lambda) \) indicates the ratio of shoppers to non-shoppers. This ratio will be important

\[\text{Figure 1: Regions of parameters for which distinct types of equilibrium exist.}\]
for our analysis since it tells us something about the search composition of demand.

If c is large enough (\( \beta_N(1) < c < v \)) so that inequality (14) is not satisfied, a partial consumer participation equilibrium exists. In this type of equilibrium, an individual firm obtains a profit \( E\pi = \mu_N(1 - \lambda)v/N \), where \( \mu_N \) is the probability with which non-shoppers search and is implicitly determined by the solution to equation (4), which in this case can be written as

\[
1 - \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{1}{\mu} b Ny^{N-1}} = \frac{c}{v}.
\]

(15)

Note that in this equilibrium the ratio of shoppers to non-shoppers is \( b/\mu_N \).

The unit-demand case is convenient because there are no welfare effects associated to price changes other than those related to the rate of participation of the non-shoppers. As a result, total surplus generated in the market takes a simple expression:

\[
TS = \lambda v + \mu_N(1 - \lambda)(v - c).
\]

This expression reflects two facts. One, a shopper always acquires one unit from the cheapest supplier thus generating a surplus equal to \( v \); two, a non-shopper only buys with probability \( \mu_N \leq 1 \), in which case a surplus of \( v - c \) is generated.

We now note that \( \mu_N \) is non-increasing in \( N \). Recall that the LHS of (15) denotes the incremental gains a consumer derives from searching one time over not searching at all. Notice that these gains are decreasing in \( \mu \), just because they decrease when the ratio of shoppers to non-shoppers falls (see Figure 1). We now show that these gains are decreasing in \( N \) (as shown in the graph). For this, we need to prove that

\[
\int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{1}{\mu} b(N + 1)y^N} = \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{1}{\mu} b Ny^{N-1}} = \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{b(N + 1)y^N}{\mu + b Ny^{N-1}}} = \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{b(N + 1)y^N}{\mu + b Ny^{N-1}}}
\]

where the inequality follows from the fact that \( \mu + b(N + 1)y^N \) and \( \mu + b Ny^{N-1} \) are both positive and strictly increasing in \( y \). The intuition behind this result follows from the well-known fact that when the number of firms in a search market increases, keeping search behavior constant, it becomes relatively more difficult to sell to the shoppers than to the non-shoppers, so firms increase
their prices on average.

Since $\mu_N$ is non-increasing in $N$, we conclude that total surplus is higher when $N$ is smaller in a partial consumer participation equilibrium; by contrast, in a full consumer participation equilibrium, total surplus is independent of $N$.

However, what is interesting is to look at the effects of a merger on distinct consumer groups. When search costs are high and non-shoppers are indifferent between searching once and not searching at all, we can deduct industry profits $\mu_N(1-\lambda)v$ from total surplus to obtain the surplus of the shoppers, which yields $\lambda v - \mu_N(1-\lambda)c$. Since $\mu_{N+1} < \mu_N$, it follows that shoppers are worse off after a merger. It is important to note that this reduction in the welfare of shoppers is not due to a genuine increase in prices because expected price, after consumers adapt their search behavior, remains constant. The decrease is due to the fact that the firms’ incentives to compete for the informed consumers weaken as fewer firms remain in the market and therefore, the chance of observing relatively low prices decreases as well. This harms fully informed consumers as they buy at the lowest observed price in the market. Figure 2(a) shows that a merger decreases the frequency of low prices and increases the frequency of high prices in a mean-preserving way. A similar result arises when search costs are low, which is illustrated in Figure 2(b).

![Price distributions before and after merger.](a) High search costs  
(b) Low search costs

Figure 2: Price distributions before and after merger.

To our knowledge, the incentives of firms to merge have so far not been studied in a search model. In this context of unit demand, we can show that in a full participation equilibrium firms do not have an incentive to merge, whereas they do have an incentive to merge in a subset of the parameter space where the equilibrium involves partial consumer participation. Taking this observation along with the remarks on welfare above, this means that whenever firms have an incentive to merge, total welfare increases. Moreover, if merging does not increase total surplus,
firms do not have an incentive to merge. Thus, from the point of view of social welfare, the incentives to merge are insufficient in this case of unit-demand: there are situations where mergers would be socially desirable from a total surplus point of view, but they do not occur as the firms involved do not have an incentive to merge.

We start by showing that when search cost is low and non-shoppers search once surely in equilibrium, then firms do not have an incentive to merge. Before the merger, an individual firm’s profit is given by \((1 - \lambda)\rho_{N+1}/(N + 1)\), while post-merger profits of a typical firm are \((1 - \lambda)\rho_N/N\). As a result, firms do not have an incentive to merge when the collective post-merger profits of the merging firms is lower than the joint pre-merger profits, i.e., when \(2\rho_{N+1}/(N + 1) > \rho_N/N\). Using the reservation price formula in (14), this condition requires that

\[
\frac{c/(N + 1)}{1 - \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + b(N + 1)y^N}} > \frac{c/2N}{1 - \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + bNy^N - 1}}.
\]

This can be rewritten as

\[
N - 1 - 2N \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + bNy^{N-1}} + (N + 1) \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + b(N + 1)y^N} > 0.
\]

Or, rearranging, as

\[
(N - 1) \left(1 - \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + bNy^{N-1}}\right) > (N + 1) \left(\int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + bNy^{N-1}} - \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + b(N + 1)y^N}\right).
\]

It is easy to see that the LHS of this inequality is positive. Thus, if the RHS is negative, the claim that mergers are not incentive-compatible when search costs are low follows. To show the RHS is indeed negative, we just need to follow the proof above that \(\mu_{N+1} > \mu_N\). Therefore, firms do not have an incentive to merge when the search cost is sufficiently low. In addition, there are no welfare gains to be derived from mergers.

We next show that firms may have an incentive to merge in a partial participation equilibrium, i.e., when the search cost is sufficiently large. In this case, in the pre-merger situation an individual firm obtains a profit of \(\mu_{N+1}(1-\lambda)v/(N + 1)\), while post-merger profits are \(\mu_N(1-\lambda)v/N\). Therefore, mergers are beneficial for the merging firms if \(\mu_N/N > 2\mu_{N+1}/(N + 1)\). From (15), we know that \(\mu_N\) is the solution to

\[
\int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{c}{v}Ny^{N-1}} = 1 - \frac{c}{v}.
\]
and that $\mu_{N+1}$ solves

$$\int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{b}{\mu}(N + 1)y^N} = 1 - \frac{c}{v}$$

As proven above,

$$\int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{b}{\mu}Ny^{N-1}} < \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{b}{\mu}(N + 1)y^N} \text{ for all } \mu$$

Given these equilibrium restrictions on how the participation rate of the non-shoppers is determined, we conclude that merging is profitable for the firms if

$$\int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + \frac{b}{\mu}Ny^{N-1}} < \int_0^1 \frac{dy}{1 + 2\frac{b}{\mu}Ny^N}. \quad (16)$$

The idea behind this is in Figure 3. The thicker curve shows non-shoppers’ incremental gains from searching once rather than not searching at all in the pre-merger situation, while the thinner curve shows these gains in the post-merger situation. Therefore, the search intensities of the non-shoppers in the pre- and post-merger markets are given by the intersection of these curves with the cost of search; these search intensities are $\mu_N$ and $\mu_{N+1}$, respectively. The condition in (16) requires $\beta_{N+1}((N + 1)\mu_N/2N) < \beta_{N+1}(\mu_{N+1}) = \beta_N(\mu_N)$.
This condition holds if
\[
\frac{bN}{\mu_N} \int \frac{y^{N-1}(1-2y)dy}{\left(1 + \frac{b}{\mu_N}Ny^{N-1}\right) \left(1 + \frac{2b}{\mu_N} Ny^N\right)} > 0.
\]
Or if
\[
bN\mu_N \int \frac{y^{N-1}(1-2y)dy}{\left(\mu_N + bNy^{N-1}\right) \left(\mu_N + 2bNy^N\right)} > 0. \tag{17}
\]

We now show that this inequality holds when \(\mu_N\) is sufficiently small. From the remarks above after equation (15), it follows that for given values of \(b\) and \(N\), \(\mu_N\) can always be chosen close enough to 0 by taking \(c\) close enough to \(v\). At \(\mu_N = 0\), the expression (17) equals 0; let us now show that (17) increases in \(\mu_N\) in a neighborhood of \(\mu_N = 0\). Taking the derivative of (17) with respect to \(\mu_N\) yields
\[
\int_0^1 \frac{bNy^{N-1}(1-2y)dy}{\left(\mu_N + bNy^{N-1}\right) \left(\mu_N + 2bNy^N\right)} > 0.
\]

For \(\mu_N\) close to 0, the sign of this expression will be determined by the sign of
\[
\int_0^1 \frac{y^{N-1}(1-2y)}{4b^2Ny^N} \left[2b^2N^2y^{2N-1} - \mu_N^2\right] dy
\]
\[
= \int_0^1 \frac{1-2y}{2b^2N^2y^N} dy = \int_0^{1/2} \frac{1-2y}{2b^2N^2y^N} dy - \int_{1/2}^1 \frac{2y-1}{2b^2N^2y^N} dy
\]
\[
> \frac{1}{2b^2N^2} \left(\int_0^{1/2} (1-2y) dy - \int_{1/2}^1 (2y-1) dy\right)
\]
\[
= \frac{2^{N-1}}{b^2N^2} \int_0^1 (1-2y) dy = 0.
\]

This proves that for \(c\) values close enough to \(v\), \(\mu_N/N > 2\mu_{N+1}/(N+1)\) and therefore mergers are incentive-compatible for the merging firms. In addition, from this inequality it follows straightforwardly that the non-merging firms also benefit from the merger.

At this point we would like to note that the range of values of \(c\) for which the firms would rather merge is of course larger. To illustrate this point, we have computed numerically the region of parameters for which mergers would be incentive-compatible. In addition, we have compared this to the region where mergers would be welfare improving. The results appear in Figure 4.

How large search costs are in real-world markets is therefore a natural empirical question. Several authors (Hong and Shum, 2006; Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004; and Moraga-González and Wildenbeest, 2007) have recently proposed structural methods to estimate search costs. Although this literature is still in its infancy, the results show that consumers do not search much, which suggests that search costs may be larger than expected. For example, in a study of some on-line
markets for memory chips, Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2007) find that only around 10% of the consumers seems to search intensively. This finding is in line with the results reported by Johnson et al. (2004), who studied consumer click-through behavior online. In a study of the market for prescription drugs, Sorensen (2001) reports a similar finding that only between 5% to 10% of the consumers conduct an exhaustive search. Our results for the case that search costs are relatively high may be important for the way mergers are analyzed by anti-trust authorities.\textsuperscript{12}

5 Mergers: the case of linear demand

The analysis of mergers in the unit-demand case is, of course, somewhat simplified, as it does not incorporate the consumer surplus effects of the price changes driven by mergers. In what follows, we show that the results of Section 4 generally hold true so that the absence of these consumer surplus effects is not essential for the previous arguments to hold. The general idea is that in consumer search markets mergers give firms incentives to lower average prices; if consumers were not searching (surely) in the pre-merger situation, they may find it worthwhile to initiate (increase)

\textsuperscript{12}The fact that search costs may be so high that consumers stop searching may explain some of the recent developments in the market for telephone directory assistance services in quite a number of European countries (see, e.g., ARCEP (2006, p. 22) about France and Ofcom (2006) for the UK). Traditionally, the incumbent operators provided these services and consumers could access it by dialing a specific number (usually 118). New firms wanted to enter this industry, but claimed they would be unsuccessful as long as the incumbent firm could continue to use the well-known (118) number as all consumers knew this number by heart and automatically dialed it in case they needed this sort of service. Regulators, insisting on the need for more competition in the market, forbid incumbent firms to continue using the 118 number. The typical consumer now has to search for a number to call to as well as for the price of the service. It has been some years since the 118 number was removed, and the size of the market has shrunk considerably relative to the old days.
search. This boost-in-demand effect of mergers may make them profitable for the merging firms as well as socially desirable.

**Proposition 4** Assume that \( D(p) = a - bp \). (i) For any \( a, b, \lambda \) and \( N \), if \( 0 < c < \beta_N(1) \), then \( \pi_{N+1} > \pi_N/2 \) so merging is not individually rational. (ii) For any \( a, b, \lambda \) and \( N \) there exists \( \bar{c} \in (\beta_N(1), CS(0)) \) such that \( \pi_{N+1} < \pi_N/2 \) for all \( c \geq \bar{c} \), i.e., merging is individually rational for a pair of firms.

The proof of this result is in the Appendix. We first prove that mergers are not incentive compatible when the search cost is low. As before, the reason is that in this case of low search costs a merger results in a lowering of the reservation value so the profits of the merging firms fall after the merger. Secondly, we prove that when search costs are relatively high, a merger changes the search composition of demand in such a way that the non-shoppers to shoppers ratio increases, which opens the possibility firm profits raise sufficiently.

Our second result discusses who benefits and who loses because of the mergers.

**Proposition 5** Assume that \( D(p) = a - bp \). (i) For any \( a, b, \lambda \) and \( N \), if \( 0 < c < \beta_N(1) \) then a merger results in a fall in industry profits, in an increase in the surplus of the non-shoppers and in a decrease in the surplus of the shoppers. (ii) For any \( a, b, \lambda \) and \( N \), if \( c \in (\beta_N(1), CS(0)) \) then a merger leads to an increase in industry profits and to a decrease in the surplus of the shoppers; the surplus of the non-shoppers remains constant.

Proposition 5 shows that the social welfare implications of mergers are complex. When the cost of search is low, as shown in Proposition 4, mergers are not expected to occur on the basis of the profits of the merging firms; however, if a merger did occur, it would lower the collective profits of the firms, increase the surplus of the non-shoppers and lower the welfare of the shoppers. By contrast, incentive-compatible mergers increase the industry profits at the expense of the surplus of the shoppers, while non-shoppers continue to obtain zero surplus. In the unit demand case it was easy to show that the increase in industry profits offsets the decrease in the surplus of the shoppers. Unfortunately, that proof does not extend easily to the new situation with elastic demand. Our next result shows that when the market hosts few shoppers, welfare increases as a result of the merger; simulation results (some of which are presented after the proposition) suggest that this welfare result is much more general.
Proposition 6 Assume that \( D(p) = a - bp \), and that \( c \in (\beta_N(1), CS(0)) \). Then \( \lim_{\lambda \to 0} (TS(N) - TS(N + 1)) > 0 \).

Numerical analysis of the model reveals that the result in Proposition 6 holds also in markets with a larger number of shoppers. To illustrate this, Table 1 shows the relevant equilibrium variables when 50% of the consumers are shoppers and 50% are non-shoppers. For this example we take demand to be \( q = 1 - 0.9p \) and the search cost \( c = 0.4 \). For these parameters, non-shoppers enter the market with probability \( \mu \). The Table shows that mergers increase the participation rate of the non-shoppers. This leads to a rise in firm profits and aggregate welfare. Again, shoppers lose when mergers occur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \mu_N )</th>
<th>N=2</th>
<th>N=3</th>
<th>N=4</th>
<th>N=5</th>
<th>N=6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.7912</td>
<td>0.4776</td>
<td>0.2631</td>
<td>0.1354</td>
<td>0.0659</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0549</td>
<td>0.0221</td>
<td>0.0091</td>
<td>0.0037</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4372</td>
<td>0.4821</td>
<td>0.5142</td>
<td>0.5339</td>
<td>0.5449</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3285</td>
<td>0.3074</td>
<td>0.2936</td>
<td>0.2857</td>
<td>0.2816</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Parameters are \( a = 1, b = 0.9, c = 0.4 \) and \( \lambda = 0.5 \).
Welfare is \( TS = \lambda ECS_{shoppers} + NE\pi \).

Table 1: Equilibrium values (model with linear demand)

6 Search cost heterogeneity

So far we have assumed that all non-shoppers have identical search cost. In reality, search costs will be more smoothly distributed across the consumer population. In this section, we relax the equal-search-cost assumption and consider the case where non-shoppers have different search costs. To keep things relatively simple, we introduce search cost heterogeneity in a way that extends the analysis in the main body of the paper. In the concluding section we will discuss more informally some results that can be obtained in a more general search model.

We consider a situation where consumers demand one unit of the good at most, and their common valuation is equal to \( v \). Let search costs be uniformly distributed in the interval \([c, \bar{c}]\), with \( v \geq c > \psi > 0 \), and assume that in equilibrium there exists a consumer with search cost \( \bar{c} \) who is indifferent between searching once and not searching, i.e., for whom the expected surplus equals zero, i.e., \( v - E[p] - \bar{c} = 0 \). Non-shoppers with search costs below \( \bar{c} \) will search while those with search cost above \( \bar{c} \) will not participate in the market. Assume also that consumers who search do
not search beyond the first firm; denoting the reservation value of the consumer with the lowest search cost \( c \) by \( \rho(c) \), this assumption amounts to assuming that the upper bound of the price distribution \( p \leq \rho(c) \).

An equilibrium with these characteristics can be constructed and we use it to show that the results on mergers above also hold here. In an equilibrium with these features, firms must mix in prices, and the upper bound of the price distribution must equal \( \rho(c) \). The constancy of profits condition requires that the payoff to a firm \( i \) from charging a price \( p < \rho(c) \) equals the payoff to a firm charging the upper bound \( \rho(c) \):

\[
\rho \left( \frac{1 - \frac{c}{N} \frac{-c}{p} + \lambda (1 - F(p))^{N-1}}{N - \frac{c}{c} - \epsilon} + \frac{1 - \frac{c}{N} \frac{-c}{p} + \lambda (1 - F(p))^{N-1}}{N - \frac{c}{c} - \epsilon} \right) \rho(c) \tag{18}
\]

Solving for the price cdf gives

\[
F_N(p) = 1 - \left( \frac{1 - \frac{c}{N} \frac{-c}{p} + \lambda (1 - F(p))^{N-1}}{N - \frac{c}{c} - \epsilon} \right) \tag{19}
\]

with lower bound \( p_N = \rho_N(c) / \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1 - \frac{1}{N - \frac{c}{c} - \epsilon}} \right) \). The reservation value of the consumer with search cost \( \zeta \) is the maximum price she would accept without searching further, which solves

\[
\int_{p_N}^{\rho_N(c)} (\rho_N(c) - p) f_N(p)dp - \zeta = 0 \tag{20}
\]

Since \( \rho_N(c) \) is the upper bound of the price distribution, this equation can be rewritten as \( \rho_N(c) - E[p] - \zeta = 0 \). Note that \( E[p] = \rho_N(c) - \int_{p_N}^{\rho_N(c)} p N(p)dp \). Changing variables we can write \( E[p] = \int_0^1 p N(y)dy \). Using (18) to obtain \( p(y) \), and rearranging we can obtain the reservation value of the \( \zeta \)-consumer:

\[
\rho_N(c) = \frac{\zeta}{1 - \int_0^1 (1 - \lambda Y)^{N-1} \frac{c}{c} + \lambda N Y^{N-1} dy} \tag{21}
\]

The critical consumer \( \tilde{c}_N \), who is indifferent between searching once and not searching is calculated by solving \( v - E[p] - \tilde{c}_N = 0 \), i.e.

\[
v - \rho_N(c) \int_0^1 \frac{(1 - \lambda) \frac{1}{Y} \frac{-c}{c} + \lambda N Y^{N-1} dy - \tilde{c}_N = 0 \tag{21}
\]

Equations (18) to (21) define a candidate equilibrium. To complete the characterization we need to show that no firm has an incentive to charge prices outside the support of the price distribution.
It is obvious that a firm would not gain by charging a price less than the lower bound $p$. Consider a firm deviating by charging a price $\hat{p}$ above the upper bound, i.e., $\hat{p} > \rho_N(c)$. To calculate the payoff of the deviant, notice that, given the strategy of the other firms, the deviant firm will not attract any of the shoppers; moreover, note that some of the non-shoppers, in particular those with reservation prices less than $\hat{c}$, will continue to search. Let $\hat{c}$ be the search cost of the consumer whose reservation value is $\hat{p}$, i.e., $\hat{p}$ satisfies $\hat{p} - E[p] - \hat{c} = 0$. If $\hat{p}$ is so large that $\hat{c} > \tilde{c}_N$ then no buyer will buy from the deviant. If $\hat{p}$ is not so high, then the payoff to the deviant would be $E\pi_N(\hat{p} > \rho_N(c)) = \hat{p} - \rho_N(c) - \hat{c}$, which is clearly negative for search cost distributions with a sufficiently small range.

We are now ready to study the effects of mergers on firm profits and welfare. The profits of a firm in this market are given by $E\pi_N = \frac{1 - \lambda \tilde{c}_N - E[p]}{e^{\frac{c}{\tilde{c}}}} - \rho_N(c)$. Comparing profits in the pre-merger and post-merger situations reveals that merging is individually rational for a pair of firms if $e^{\frac{\tilde{c}_N + \epsilon}{N+1}} - \rho_N(c) < e^{\frac{\tilde{c}_N - \epsilon}{2N+1}}$. Welfare in this market, as measured by total surplus, is given by the expression $W = \lambda v + \int_{\frac{\tilde{c}_N}{2}}^{\frac{\tilde{c}_N}{N}} v - e^{\frac{c}{\tilde{c}}} dc$.

Table 2: Equilibrium values (model with search cost heterogeneity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>$\tilde{c}_N$</th>
<th>$\rho_N(c)$</th>
<th>$E[p]$</th>
<th>$E\pi$</th>
<th>$W$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.45082</td>
<td>9.04918</td>
<td>3.54918</td>
<td>1.07552</td>
<td>5.95667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.14807</td>
<td>9.35193</td>
<td>3.85193</td>
<td>0.505056</td>
<td>5.67658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.91674</td>
<td>9.58326</td>
<td>4.08326</td>
<td>0.24961</td>
<td>5.44713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.75355</td>
<td>9.74465</td>
<td>4.24465</td>
<td>0.12442</td>
<td>5.27912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.6496</td>
<td>9.8504</td>
<td>4.3504</td>
<td>0.0614</td>
<td>5.1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.58415</td>
<td>9.91585</td>
<td>4.41585</td>
<td>0.0298016</td>
<td>5.09379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Parameters are $v = 10$, $\epsilon = 5.5$, $\pi = 7.5$; $\lambda = 0.5$.
expected surplus. Second, there are more active non-shoppers after the merger (as can be seen from the fact that $\tilde{c}_N$ is decreasing in $N$). This group of consumers now has a positive expected surplus against a surplus of 0 before the merger.

7 Discussion and conclusions

We have studied mergers in a market where $N$ firms sell a homogeneous good and consumers search sequentially to discover prices. The main motivation for this study has been that mergers generally affect market prices and thereby, in a search environment, the search intensity of the consumers. We have seen that endogenous changes in consumer search behavior have the potential to reinforce or, alternatively, offset the initial price effects of a merger. Interestingly, when search costs are relatively large, a merger results in a decrease in the expected price and since this is precisely the price which triggers search for consumers with relatively high search cost, non-shoppers who didn’t find it worthwhile to search in the pre-merger situation, start searching post-merger. We have seen how this “boost-in-demand” effect of mergers can make mergers incentive-compatible for the firms and socially desirable. This result seems to be relatively robust, since it holds under unit demand, elastic demand, and search cost heterogeneity. Another interesting finding has been that mergers affect distinct consumers in different ways, so mergers have distributional effects not only between firms and consumers but also between different types of consumers.

To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper on mergers in markets with search frictions. Along the way, we have restricted the analysis to a specific environment. One aspect of the model set-up we have analyzed is that consumers know the identity of the merging firms. Building on the distinction between the gains from searching among the merged firms and the gains from searching among the non-merging firms, we have proven that the merging firms do not have an incentive to continue to operate two stores. If a firm did continue operating two shops, it would be tempted to increase one of its prices all the way up to the monopoly price which, as a result, would drive consumers away from the merging firms. We have argued that this problem would persist even if the merging firms could credibly commit not to charge different prices at the two different shops, since even in this case the merging firms would be charging on average higher prices than the non-merging firms.

An interesting issue is what would happen if consumers could not tell which firms have merged. It turns out that the merging firms are strictly better off by letting consumers know about the identity of the merging stores; this is because otherwise non-shoppers’ incentives to enter the
market after the merger would be weakened and so the potential for merging profitably would be reduced. The idea is again that consumers, knowing that a merger has occurred, would expect one of the (merging) stores to be charging the monopoly price, which increases market average prices and lowers incentives to participate in the market altogether.\footnote{This issue is further discussed in a recent paper by Ireland (2007) who argues that in a search context mother companies may want to be silent about the fact that they set prices for multiple stores, and are better off pretending these stores set prices independently. The issues arising in our paper are different as Ireland (2007) assumes the first price quote is obtained at no cost.}

Another restriction we have imposed relates to the fact that consumers are quite homogeneous. Although we have analyzed an extension of the basic model where we allow some form of search cost heterogeneity, we have not addressed the more general situation where valuations and search costs of consumers follow some (arbitrary) distribution. Such a more general analysis is interesting as it will bring out other ways in which the composition of demand may change because of a merger. From the analysis in this paper we know that the ratio of consumers who search only once relative to the consumers who compare more prices is an important factor determining market outcomes. In the present paper, this ratio can change after a merger, as some consumers will start searching after the merger instead of not searching at all. In a more general setup, it may very well be the case that the composition of demand will be affected in different ways, for example, that a larger share of consumers will search less intensely (i.e. accept higher prices right away) after a merger.\footnote{Of course, whether or not a consumer continues searching will in general depend on which price realization he/she observes.}

We hope to investigate these issues in future work.

8 Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that firms will quote prices in such a way that non-shoppers will not search beyond the first firm. Let $F_t^1(p)$ and $F_t^2(p)$ be the (mixed) strategies of the two shops of the merged entity; likewise, let $F_{-t}(p)$ denote other firms’ (mixed) strategies. Let the supports of these mixed strategies be given by $[p_{1i}^1, p_{1i}^2]$, $[p_{2i}^1, p_{2i}^2]$ and $[p_{-i}^-, p_{-i}^+]$, respectively.\footnote{Standard arguments can be used to show that the supports of these pricing strategies must be compact and that there should not have mass points, except the strategies of the merging firms possibly having a mass point at the upper bound of their support.}

Consider a consumer who has observed a price $p$. The consumer’s gains from searching one more time depend on whether the consumer ventures one of the stores of the merged entity, or else one of the shops of the non-merging firms. Let $f_t^1(x)$ and $f_t^2(x)$ denote the price densities corresponding to the merged entity’s shops. A consumer who ventures one of the merged entity’s shops should
then expect a price according to the density function \( [f_1^1(x) + f_1^2(x)] / 2 \). Therefore, the gains from search for a consumer who searches randomly among the merging firms are

\[
\Phi_i(p) = \int_0^p [CS(x) - CS(p)] [f_1^1(x) + f_1^2(x)] / 2dx;
\]

likewise, the gains from search for a consumer who searches one of the merging firms after having visited the other merged firm are

\[
\Phi_j^i(p) = \begin{cases} 
\int_0^p [CS(x) - CS(p)] f_1^j_i(x)dx, & \text{if } p \notin [p_1^i, \overline{p}_1^i] \cap [p_2^i, \overline{p}_2^i] \\
\int_0^p [CS(x) - CS(p)] [f_1^1(x) + f_1^2(x)] / 2dx, & \text{if } p \in [p_1^i, \overline{p}_1^i] \cap [p_2^i, \overline{p}_2^i]
\end{cases} \tag{22}
\]

\[
\Phi_j^i(p) = \int_0^p [CS(x) - CS(p)] f_j^j_i(x)dx, \quad j = 1, 2; \tag{23}
\]

finally, the gains from searching among the non-merging firms are

\[
\Phi_{-i}(p) = \int_0^p [CS(x) - CS(p)] f_{-i}(x)dx
\]

where \( f_{-i}(x) \) denotes the price density function of a non-merging firm.

Given these expressions, we can define the reservation price of the non-shoppers for continued search among the different search alternatives: the price \( \rho_i \) (respectively \( \rho_1^i, \rho_{-i}, j = 1, 2 \)) which solves \( \Phi_i(\rho) = c \) (respectively \( \Phi_j^i(\rho) = c, \Phi_{-i}(\rho) = c, j = 1, 2 \)). Similar arguments as in Stahl (1989) imply that none of the firms will charge a price above \( \min\{\rho_1^1, \rho_2^1, \rho_{-i}, p^m\} \) so non-shoppers will visit one of the stores and stop searching there. The main point to realize here is that a firm charging \( \max\{\overline{p}_1^i, \overline{p}_2^i, \overline{p}_{-i}\} \) will not sell to any consumers if this price is above \( \min\{\rho_1^1, \rho_2^1, \rho_{-i}\} \) as non-shoppers will continue searching.

There are then three cases to be distinguished: (i) non-shoppers prefer to visit first one of the shops of the merged entity, (ii) non-shoppers prefer to first visit one of the non-merged firms and (iii) non-shoppers are indifferent between shops, whether from a merged firm or not. We now discuss these cases in turn.

(i) Suppose non-shoppers prefer to visit first one of the shops of the merged firm. In this case, the non-merging stores will only sell to the shoppers, if at all, in which case the price distribution of a non-merging store should be degenerated at the marginal cost. This constitutes a contradiction, however, as then the non-shoppers would prefer to visit one of the non-merging stores as well.

(ii) Consider next the case that non-shoppers prefer to visit first one of the non-merged firms. This implies that the merged firm will only attract the shoppers who are informed about all the
prices. In this case—if it can happen at all in equilibrium—the merged firm (weakly) prefers not to set different prices in the two stores as the store with the highest price does not generate any sales.

(iii) So, if in equilibrium the merged firm prefers to set different prices in the two stores, it must be the case that the non-shoppers are indifferent between visiting one of the non-merged firms and visiting one of the merged firm’s stores. In this case, the payoff to the merging firm setting prices \( p_1, p_2 \) (supposing \( p_1 \leq p_2 \) without loss of generality) would be

\[
\pi(p_1, p_2; F_{-i}(\cdot)) = \begin{cases} 
R(p_1) \left[ \frac{1}{N} \lambda(1 - F_{-i}(p_1))^{N-2} \right] + R(p_2) \frac{1 - \lambda}{N} & \text{if } p_1 < p_2 \\
R(p_1) \left[ \frac{1}{N} + \frac{\lambda}{N} (1 - F_{-i}(p_1))^{N-2} \right] + R(p_2) \left[ \frac{1 - \lambda}{N} + \frac{\lambda}{N} (1 - F_{-i}(p_2))^{N-2} \right] & \text{if } p_1 = p_2 
\end{cases}
\]

This profit expression is easily understood on the basis of the following two observations. First, note that each retail store of the merged entity attracts a share \( \frac{1}{N} \) of the non-shoppers, who come in proportion \( 1 - \lambda \). Second, suppose that \( p_1 < p_2 \). The cheapest store, in this case store 1, happens to attract all the shoppers when the price at this store is the lowest in the market, i.e., with probability \( (1 - F_{-i}(p_1))^{N-2} \). When \( p_1 = p_2 \), the shoppers are indifferent between the two stores so on average half of them show up at store 1 and the other half at store 2.

It is straightforward to see that the profit expression in (24) is monotonically increasing in \( p_2 \) hence the distribution of prices at one of the stores must be degenerated at the upper bound of the price distribution. Given this, it is readily seen that, when choosing \( p_1 \), the merged entity faces exactly the same tradeoff as the rival firms so in equilibrium we must have \( F_1(p) = F_{-i}(p) \) for all \( p \). From standard arguments it follows that the price distribution \( F_{-i}(p) \) must be atomless, with convex support and mean price \( \mathbb{E}[p] \leq \bar{p} \).

Consider now a consumer contemplating to venture one of the merging stores. Since buyer conjectures must be correct in equilibrium, this consumer should expect to observe a price equal to \( (\bar{p} + \mathbb{E}[p])/2 \) at one of the merging stores. Hence, the expected price at one of the merging stores will be higher than the expected market price so non-shoppers should rather visit one of the rival firms. It then follows that merging firms have an incentive to commit to setting one price and one way to make this commitment credible is to shut down one of the stores.16

Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i). We first prove that mergers are not incentive compatible when search costs are relatively low, in particular when \( c < \beta_N(1) \). Note that in this case non-shoppers

---

16As argued in the main text, we are assuming here that the merging firms cannot commit to charge the same price in the two stores (cf. footnote 9).
participate with probability 1 and the equilibrium characterizations is given in Proposition 3.

The equilibrium price cdf is

\[ F_N(p) = 1 - \left( \frac{(1 - \lambda) R(\overline{p}) - R(p)}{\lambda N R(p)} \right)^{1/(N - 1)} \]

where \( \overline{p} \) denotes the upper bound of the price distribution. When search costs are relatively low, it follows from Proposition 3 that \( \overline{p} \) is either equal to the monopoly price \( p_m \) or to the reservation price \( \rho_N \) where \( \rho_N \) is given by the solution to (7). For mergers to be incentive-compatible we need that \( R(\overline{p})(1 - \lambda)/2N \) be greater than \( R(\overline{p})(1 - \lambda)/(N + 1) \). When \( \overline{p} = p_m \) it follows immediately that mergers are not profitable. Consider now the case in which \( \overline{p} = \rho_N \). In this case it turns out that \( \rho_N \) increases in \( N \) so mergers are not profitable either. The reservation value \( \rho_N \) is given by the solution to equation (7), which can be rewritten as

\[ \frac{a^2}{2b} - \frac{a}{2} \left( \int_{\rho_N}^{\overline{p}} p f_N(p) dp \right) - \frac{1}{2} \left( \int_{\rho_N}^{\overline{p}} p(a - bp) f_N(p) dp \right) - \frac{(a - b\rho_N)^2}{2b} = c \quad (25) \]

Let

\[ I_1 = \int_{\rho_N}^{\overline{p}} p f_N(p) dp \]
\[ I_2 = \int_{\rho_N}^{\overline{p}} p(a - bp) f_N(p) dp \]

Using the change of variables \( z = 1 - F(p) \), these two integrals can be written as follows:

\[ I_1 = \frac{a^2}{2b} - \frac{1}{2b} \int_0^1 \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4b\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1 - \lambda} z^{N-1}}} dz \]
\[ I_2 = \int_0^1 \frac{\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1 - \lambda} z^{N-1}} dz \]

Plugging these in (1) we get

\[ \frac{a^2}{2b} - \frac{a}{2b} \left( \frac{a^2}{2b} - \frac{1}{2b} \int_0^1 \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4b\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1 - \lambda} z^{N-1}}} dz \right) - \frac{1}{2} \left( \int_0^1 \frac{\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1 - \lambda} z^{N-1}} dz \right) - \frac{(a - b\rho_N)^2}{2b} = c \]

Or

\[ \frac{a^2}{4b} + \frac{a}{4b} \int_0^1 \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4b\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1 - \lambda} z^{N-1}}} dz - \frac{1}{2} \left( \int_0^1 \frac{\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1 - \lambda} z^{N-1}} dz \right) - \frac{(a - b\rho_N)^2}{2b} = c \quad (26) \]

Let us denote the LHS of (26) by \( H(\cdot) \). We are interested in the derivative of \( \rho_N \) with respect
to \( N \) (actually we want to prove that \( \rho_N \) increases in \( N \)). Using the implicit function theorem we have

\[
\frac{d\rho_N}{dN} = -\frac{\frac{\partial H(\cdot)}{\partial N}}{\frac{\partial H(\cdot)}{\partial \rho_N}}
\]

Above in the paper we have proven that \( \int_0^1 \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1-\lambda} z^{N-1} \zeta} \) increases in \( N \). Likewise,

\[
\int_0^1 \sqrt{a^2 - 4b\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)} \zeta \zeta + \frac{a}{2} + \frac{a - 2b\rho_N}{2}
\]

decreases in \( N \). As a result, \( H(\cdot) \) decreases in \( N \).

It thus remains to prove that \( \frac{\partial H(\cdot)}{\partial \rho_N} > 0 \).

\[
\frac{\partial H(\cdot)}{\partial \rho} = \frac{a}{4b} \int_0^1 \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{a^2 - 4b\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}} \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1-\lambda} z^{N-1} \zeta} d\zeta - \frac{1}{2} \int_0^1 \frac{(a - 2b\rho_N)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1-\lambda} z^{N-1} \zeta} d\zeta + \frac{a}{2} + \frac{a - 2b\rho_N}{2}
\]

\[
= \frac{a - 2b\rho_N}{2} \left( 1 - \int_0^1 \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1-\lambda} z^{N-1} \zeta} d\zeta \right) + \frac{a}{2} \left( 1 - \int_0^1 \frac{1}{\sqrt{a^2 - 4b\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}} \frac{(a - 2b\rho_N)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1-\lambda} z^{N-1} \zeta} d\zeta \right)
\]

\[
(27)
\]

\[
Let us now look at the two integrals in this last expression. We know that \( 1 - \int_0^1 \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1-\lambda} z^{N-1} \zeta} d\zeta > 0 \).
\]

For the second integral we have

\[
1 - \int_0^1 \frac{1}{\sqrt{a^2 - 4b\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}} \frac{(a - 2b\rho_N)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{1-\lambda} z^{N-1} \zeta} d\zeta > 1 - \frac{(a - 2b\rho_N)}{\sqrt{a^2 - 4b\rho_N(a - b\rho_N)}} = 0
\]

This proves that \( \frac{\partial H(\cdot)}{\partial \rho_N} > 0 \). The desired result follows.

Part (ii). We now prove that when search costs lie in the range \( c \in (\beta_N(1), CS(0)) \) mergers may be profitable for the merging firms. First note that in equilibrium non-shoppers randomize between searching once and not searching in both the pre-merger and the post-merger equilibria.

The participation rate of the non-shoppers in the pre-merger and post-merger situations, \( \mu_{N+1} \) and \( \mu_N \), are given by the solution to the following equations:

\[
\int_{\mathbb{P}_{N+1}}^{p^m} CS(p) f_{N+1}(p) dp = c
\]

\[
(29)
\]

\[
\int_{\mathbb{P}_N}^{p^m} CS(p) f_N(p) dp = c
\]

\[
(30)
\]
respectively. Therefore, it must be the case that (using the variable change $z = 1 - F(p)$)

$$
\int_{0}^{1} CS\left( R^{-1}\left( \frac{R(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda(N+1)}{\mu_{N+1}(1-\lambda)} z^N} \right) \right) = \int_{0}^{1} CS\left( R^{-1}\left( \frac{R(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}} \right) \right)
$$

For the linear demand case, this equation can be rewritten as

$$
a^2 + \frac{a}{4b} \int_{0}^{1} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^N}} \, dz - \frac{1}{2} \left( \int_{0}^{1} \frac{R(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^N} \, dz \right)
$$

$$
= \frac{a^2}{4b} + \frac{a}{4b} \int_{0}^{1} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \, dz - \frac{1}{2} \left( \int_{0}^{1} \frac{R(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}} \, dz \right)
$$

Merging is profitable for the merging firms when $\pi_{N+1} < \pi_N/2$, that is, when $\mu_{N+1}(1 - \lambda)R(p^m)/(N + 1) < \mu_N(1 - \lambda)R(p^m)/N$, or, when $\mu_N/N > 2\mu_{N+1}/(N + 1)$. Given that the equality in (32) must hold in equilibrium, merging is profitable if

$$
I_1 - \frac{a}{2b}I_2 > I_3 - \frac{a}{2b}I_4
$$

where

$$
I_1 = \int_{0}^{1} \frac{R(p^m)}{1 + \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^N} \, dz; \quad I_2 = \int_{0}^{1} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^N}} \, dz;
$$

$$
I_3 = \int_{0}^{1} \frac{R(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}} \, dz \text{ and } I_4 = \int_{0}^{1} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \, dz
$$

We now prove that $I_1 > I_3$ for $\mu_N$ small enough. Note that

$$
\frac{I_1 - I_3}{R(p^m)} = \int_{0}^{1} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^N} - \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}} \right) \, dz
$$

Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to $\mu_N$ we have

$$
\int_{0}^{1} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^N} \right)^2 \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N^2(1-\lambda)} z^N - \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1} \right)^2 \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N^2(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1} \right) \, dz
$$

$$
= \frac{\lambda N}{(1-\lambda)} \int_{0}^{1} \left( \frac{2z^N}{\mu_N^2 \left( 1 + \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^N \right)^2} - \frac{z^{N-1}}{\mu_N \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1} \right)^2} \right) \, dz
$$

$$
= \lambda N(1-\lambda) \int_{0}^{1} \left( \frac{2z^N}{(\mu_N(1-\lambda) + 2\lambda N z^N)^2} - \frac{z^{N-1}}{(\mu_N(1-\lambda) + \lambda N z^{N-1})^2} \right) \, dz
$$
In a neighborhood of $\mu_N = 0$, the sign of this expression equals the sign of
\[
\int_0^1 \left( \frac{2z^N}{(2\lambda N z^N)^2} - \frac{z^{N-1}}{(\lambda N z^{N-1})^2} \right) \, dz = \frac{1}{\lambda^2 N^2} \int_0^1 \left( \frac{1}{2z^N} - \frac{1}{z^{N-1}} \right) \, dz = \frac{1}{\lambda^2 N^2} \int_0^1 z^{N-1} \frac{(1 - 2z)}{2z^{N-1}} \, dz = \frac{2^{N-1}}{\lambda^2 N^2} \left( \int_0^1 (1 - 2z) \, dz - \int_1^2 (2z - 1) \, dz \right) = \frac{2^{N-1}}{\lambda^2 N^2} \left( \int_0^1 (1 - 2z) \, dz \right) = 0.
\]

To complete the argument, we now prove that $I_2 < I_4$ for $\mu_N$ sufficiently small. That is, we need to show that
\[
\int_0^1 \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \, dz - \int_0^1 \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \, dz > 0
\]
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to $\mu_N$ we have
\[
\int_0^1 \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \, dz - \int_0^1 \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \, dz = \frac{\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} \int_0^1 \frac{z^{N-1} \, dz}{(1 - \lambda) z^{N-1}} = 0.
\]
The sign of this expression is equal to the sign of
\[
\int_0^1 \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \, dz - \int_0^1 \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \, dz = \frac{\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} \int_0^1 \frac{z^{N-1} \, dz}{(1 - \lambda) z^{N-1}} = 0.
\]
In a neighborhood of $\mu_N = 0$, this reduces to
\[
\int_0^1 \frac{1}{2a} \left( \frac{1}{\lambda N (1-\lambda) z^{N-1}} \right) \, dz = \frac{1}{2a \lambda^2 N^2} \left( \int_0^1 \frac{1}{2z^{N-1}} \, dz \right) = \frac{(1 - \lambda)^2}{2a \lambda^2 N^2} \left( \int_0^1 \frac{z^{N-1} \, dz}{2z^{N-1}} \right) > 0
\]
where the last inequality follows from the proof above that $I_1 > I_3$. Since $\mu_N \to 0$ as $c \to CS(0)$, the result follows. ■

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Part (i). For these parameters, industry profits are equal to $(1-\lambda)R(\rho_N)$. Since $\rho_N$ decreases after a merger (cf. Proposition 4), it follows that the collective profits of the
firms go down if a merger occurs.

The surplus of the non-shoppers can be written as \( c + CS(\rho_N) \) (cf. equation 12) so it follows that non-shoppers benefit from a merger. The proof that the surplus of the shoppers increases after a merger is similar to the proof in Part (ii) in this Proposition and therefore omitted to save on space.

Part (ii) Industry profits are equal to \( \mu N(1 - \lambda)R(p^m) \) and they are clearly increasing in \( \mu_N \). As \( \mu_N > \mu_{N+1} \), if \( c > \beta_N(1) \), the result on profits follows trivially. The result for the shoppers simply follows from the fact that if \( c > \beta_N(1) \), they are indifferent between searching once and not searching so that their expected surplus equals 0.

Consider now the expected surplus of the shoppers, which is equal to
\[
\int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N)}} (a - bp)^2 \frac{dE_N(p)}{2b}
\]
where \( E_N(p) \) denotes the distribution of the minimum price of a random draw of size \( N \) when \( N \) firms operate in the market.

As before, denoting \( R(p) = p(a - bp) \), we rewrite (36) as follows:
\[
\frac{a^2}{2b} - \frac{a}{2} \left( \int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N)}} p dE_N(p) \right) - \frac{1}{2} \left( \int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N)}} R(p) dE_N(p) \right)
\]

The objective is to prove that
\[
\int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N)}} (a - bp)^2 \frac{dE_N(p)}{2b} < \int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N+1)}} (a - bp)^2 \frac{dE_{N+1}(p)}{2b}
\]

Or, using (37), that
\[
\frac{a}{2} \int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N)}} p dE_N(p) + \frac{1}{2} \int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N)}} R(p) dE_N(p)
\]
\[
> \frac{a}{2} \int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N+1)}} p dE_{N+1}(p) + \frac{1}{2} \int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N+1)}} R(p) dE_{N+1}(p)
\]

We first show that the first term of the LHS of (38) is greater than the first term of its RHS, i.e.,
\[
\int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N)}} p dE_N(p) > \int_{\frac{p^m}{p(N+1)}} p dE_{N+1}(p).
\]
Using the change of variables $z = 1 - F(p)$, this is equivalent to proving that

$$N \int_0^1 \left( \frac{a}{2b} - \frac{1}{2b} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \right) z^{N-1} dz - (N+1) \int_0^1 \left( \frac{a}{2b} - \frac{1}{2b} \sqrt{a^2 - \frac{4bR(p^m)}{1 + \frac{\lambda(N+1)}{\mu_{N+1}(1-\lambda)} z^N}} \right) z^N dz$$

is positive. Since $\frac{4N}{N} > \frac{2\mu_{N+1}}{N+1}$ and $R(p^m) = a^2/4b$, expression (39) is greater than

$$\frac{a}{2b} \left\{ \int_0^1 \left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^{N-1}}} \right) N z^{N-1} - \left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{1 + \frac{2\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)} z^N}} \right) (N+1) z^N \right\} dz.$$

This expression is positive if

$$\left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}}} \right) > \left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{1 + 2\gamma z^N}} \right) \frac{N+1}{N} z,$$

where $\gamma = \frac{\lambda N}{\mu_N(1-\lambda)}$. Inequality (41) can be rewritten as

$$\sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}}} - \frac{N+1}{N} z \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{1 + 2\gamma z^N}} < 1 - \frac{N+1}{N} z$$

and as the first root is smaller than the second root for $z \geq \frac{1}{2}$, the LHS of this inequality is smaller than

$$(1 - \frac{N+1}{N} z) \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}}}$$

so that (41) certainly holds for $z \geq \frac{1}{2}$. We next consider the case when $z < \frac{1}{2}$. When $\gamma \to \infty$, both the LHS and the RHS of (41) converge to 0. We will subsequently show that the derivative of the LHS w.r.t. $\gamma$ is strictly smaller than that of the RHS, which then implies that the inequality holds for any finite value of $\gamma$. Taking the derivatives of both sides of (41) w.r.t. $\gamma$, it must be the case that

$$-z^{N-1} \frac{1}{2 \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}}}} < -2N \frac{1}{N} z^{N+1} \frac{1}{2 \sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{1 + 2\gamma z^N}}}.$$

This inequality holds if

$$\frac{2N+1}{N} z^2 \sqrt{\frac{1 - \frac{1}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}}}{1 - \frac{1}{1 + 2\gamma z^N}}} < \left( \frac{1 + 2\gamma z^N}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}} \right)^2,$$

The LHS of (42) can be rewritten as

$$\frac{2N+1}{N} z^2 \sqrt{\frac{\gamma z^{N-1}}{2\gamma z^N} \frac{1 + 2\gamma z^N}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}}} = \frac{N+1}{N} \sqrt{2z^3 \frac{1 + 2\gamma z^N}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}}}.$$
so that the inequality in (42) holds if

\[
\frac{N + 1}{N} \sqrt{2 e^3} < \left( \frac{1 + 2\gamma z^N}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}} \right)^{3/2},
\]

or \(\sqrt{2} \left( \frac{N+1}{N} \right)^{2/3} (1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) z < 1 + 2\gamma z^N\), which is true since \(\sqrt{2} \left( \frac{N+1}{N} \right)^{2/3} z - 1 < 0 < z^N \gamma (2 - (N+1)^{2/3} \sqrt{2})\) for all \(z < \frac{1}{2}\).

To complete the argument we now prove that the second term of the LHS of (38) is larger than the second terms of its RHS, i.e.,

\[
\int_{p(N)}^{p^m} R(p) dF_N(p) > \int_{p(N+1)}^{p^m} R(p) dF_{N+1}(p).
\]

This can be written as

\[
N \int_{p(N)}^{p^m} R(p)(1 - F(p))^{N-1} dF(p) > (N + 1) \int_{p(N+1)}^{p^m} R(p)(1 - F(p))^N dF(p). \tag{43}
\]

Using the variable change \(z = 1 - F(p)\), we can rewrite (43) as

\[
\int_0^1 N R(p^m) \frac{z^{N-1} dF(p)}{1 + \gamma z^{N-1}} - \int_0^1 (N + 1) R(p^m) \frac{z^N dF(p)}{1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1}} = R(p^m) \int_0^1 \frac{N z^{N-1}}{(1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) (1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1})} dz + \frac{\gamma z^{2N-1}}{(1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) (1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1})} \int_0^1 \left( \frac{N z^{N-1}}{(1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) (1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1})} \right) dF(p) > 0.
\]

The last integral in this expression is certainly larger than

\[
\int_0^1 \frac{N z^{N-1} - (N + 1) z^N}{(1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) (1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1})} dz = \int_0^{\frac{N}{N+1}} \frac{N z^{N-1} - (N + 1) z^N}{(1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) (1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1})} dz + \int_{\frac{N}{N+1}}^{1} \frac{N z^{N-1} - (N + 1) z^N}{(1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) (1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1})} dz > \int_0^{\frac{N}{N+1}} \frac{N z^{N-1} - (N + 1) z^N}{(1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) (1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1})} dz + \int_{\frac{N}{N+1}}^{1} \frac{N z^{N-1} - (N + 1) z^N}{(1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) (1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1})} dz = \int_0^1 \frac{N z^{N-1} - (N + 1) z^N}{(1 + \gamma z^{N-1}) (1 + 2\gamma z^{N-1})} dz = 0.
\]

The proof is now complete. ■

**Proof of Proposition 6.** Denoting by \(F_N(p)\) the distribution of the minimum price of a random
draw of size \( N \) when \( N \) firms operate in the market, expected total welfare can be written as

\[
TS(N) = \mu_N (1 - \lambda) \int R(p) dF_N(p) + \frac{\lambda a^2}{2b} - \frac{\lambda a}{2} \int p dF_N(p) + \frac{\lambda}{2} \int R(p) dF_N(p),
\]

which using the variable change \( z = 1 - F_N(p) \) can be rewritten as

\[
\lambda a^2 \left\{ \frac{\gamma N}{4b} \left[ 2 + \int_0^1 \left( 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \gamma N N z^{-1}} \right) N z^{-1} + \frac{N z^{-1}}{2 \left( 1 + \gamma N N z^{-1} \right)} \right] dz \right\},
\]

where \( \gamma_N = \lambda/\mu_N(1 - \lambda) \). We need to show that \( TS(N) > TS(N+1) \) when \( \lambda \) (or equivalently \( \gamma_N \)) is small. Using the fact that \( 2N/\mu_N < (N+1)/\mu_{N+1} \) this is certainly the case if

\[
\int_0^1 \frac{\gamma N^2 (N - 1) N^2 z^{2N-1} + \gamma N N z^{N-1}((3N - 1) z - 1) + (N - 1)}{2 \gamma N N (1 + \gamma N N z^{-1})(1 + 2 \gamma N N z^{N})} dz > \int_0^1 \left( \frac{N + 1}{N} \sqrt{\gamma N N z^{-1}} - \frac{\gamma N N z^{-1}}{1 + \gamma N N z^{-1}} \right) N z^{-1} dz
\]

which is clearly true for \( \gamma_N \) close to zero. ■

References


37
